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ABSTRACT 
 
 My research is concerned with the production of knowledge and how the process of 
knowledge production might shape how we view and understand people’s bodies. In 
particular, this research sought to understand the construction of knowledge about self-
mutilation, how discourses of gender, the body and risk shaped how self-mutilation was 
perceived and whether or not these dominant knowledge(s) re-produced inequalities. The 
aim of my research was to explore the various ways of thinking that surround self-
mutilation and to map the connections and disconnections between the diagnostic criteria 
used to diagnose self-mutilation and psychiatrists’ understandings. Using a post-
structuralist critical discourse analysis approach, I conducted a longitudinal analysis of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) versions 1 through 5 (spanning 1952-2013) 
and in-depth interviews with ten psychiatrists practicing child, adolescent and adult 
psychiatry. The results illustrate that knowledge produced in the DSM does impact how 
psychiatrists make sense of self-mutilation. Drawing on multiple theoretical perspectives, 
such as the work of Deborah Lupton, Michel Foucault and Dorothy Smith, I show that 
self-mutilation discourses reflect larger dominant ideas surrounding gender, the skin, 
healthy bodies and risk; that self-mutilation is gendered and is linked to a diagnosis of 
borderline personality disorder; and that there are multiple ways in which DSM language 
is taken up, reproduced and resisted by psychiatrists. In sum, this thesis has outlined the 
intersections between gender, power, and psychiatric knowledge.
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my co-supervisors, Dr. Natalie Beausoleil and Dr. Fern 
Brunger, for their continued support, patience and guidance. Thank you to my other 
committee member, Dr. Olga Heath, for her time, support and valuable insight. Thanks 
again to Fern for being an excellent boss and for her honesty, her humor and constant 
reassurance.  
I would also like to thank Dr. Diana Gustafson for her ongoing support and 
encouragement and for drilling into my mind what “epistemic stance” means. Thank you 
to Dr. James Valcour for his patience and for taking the time to go all the way back to 
grade nine math with me to teach me about fractions and decimals so I could begin to 
grasp graduate level epidemiology. 
Thank you to Jennifer Woodrow for her steadfast on-call Microsoft office support 
and for kindly reminding me over and over that tables and charts are not the same thing! 
Thank you for your fortitude and expertise. Thanks to Melody Morton-Ninomiya for all 
of her help and guidance and for the subtle smirk that never needed an explanation. Thank 
you to Laura Fullerton for her support and much needed Skype sessions during the thesis-
writing phase. Thank you to Sandra Reid for her editing proficiency and encouragement.  
Thank you to Kate Bride for our guitar playing sessions, feminist conversations, for 
encouraging me to go to graduate school and for the opportunity to create a boundless, 
outspoken, and extraordinarily vulnerable project. I miss you Kate. Rest in Peace.  
Thank you to Dr. Jill Allison for her warm hello smile/ wave combination and for 
our discussion of Foucault that came at a crucial time in the writing phase.  
iv 
 
Thank you to Darlene Tobin, Shannon Steeves, Paula Hogan, Christa McGrath, Dr. 
Kathy Donovan and Doreen Penney for all of their help, conversations and deep, from-
the-belly laughs that kept me going day-to-day. Thank you to the one of a kind Mr. Mike 
Cake for always singing in the hallway and for making me smile and laugh all the times I 
was at the Health Science late at night, sleep deprived and having some existential crisis 
or another. Thank you to Scott Howse who patiently and kindly helped me with my 
countless Mac-related questions.  
Thank you to my undergraduate professors Drs. Steven Riggins, Linda Cohen, 
Sharron Roseman, Robin Whitaker, Reade Davis, Sonya Corbin-Dwyer, Marie Croll, and 
Kelly Brown for introducing me to life changing ideas and concepts and for listening to 
me work them out for hours on end in your offices. Truly amazing.  
Thank you to Drs. Beth Whalen and Peter Cornish for many, many years of support, 
patience and honesty, which, of course, is a gross understatement. Again, thank you.  
Thank you to Moira Darling for teaching me how to understand and use my internal 
compass.  
Thank you to Dr. Kathleen Mercer for helping me see my strength and potential and 
subsequently, the infinite possibilities available to me. Thanks for your energetic and 
unfaltering belief in my capabilities and my future. I look forward to the turbulent, 
magical ride along the way, constantly adapting, evolving and (re) figuring things out as I 
go. 
Thank you to all of my friends for listening to my questions, victories and rants  
(okay…mostly rants) over the past few years. Thank you for the couches, blankets, food, 
v 
 
hugs, music, coffee, laughs, walks, drives, wine, sushi, soup, tea and study dates. I could 
not have done this without your constant, rock-solid support. Thank you, thank you, thank 
you. I love you profoundly. 
Thank you Mom for not pressuring me even though I am sure at times you wanted 
to, and for being happy for me at each of my milestones no matter how long they took. 
Thank you for the much needed sushi gift certificates. Thank you Dad and Karen for your 
continued support over the decade of my university career, I don't know where I would be 
without it. You certainly helped me get through my studies as comfortable as possible. 
Thank you to my big brother, Christopher, for telling me there was, indeed, a dimly lit 
light at the end of the proverbial tunnel and for knowing me well enough to know what 
kind of comfort I needed and when I needed it. Thanks for sending ridiculous, random 
emoticons that I had to piece together and make sense of; I think it is the best game ever. 
Thank you to my little brother Nathan, for being outrageously silly, knowing how to 
cheer me up and just for being your wonderful, beautiful self.   
Thank you to all of the aforementioned and many more for trusting my ability to 
carry out this project from start to finish and pushing me when I needed to be pushed (and 
at times, shoved).  
Thank you to all of the psychiatrists who agreed to participate in interviews and 
shared their thoughts and experiences in practice. Thank you for your time and for being 
frank with me. The interview data is rich because of your candor.  
Thank you to Nicole, for changing the way I see the world around me and the 
people who navigate their way in and around it—for better and for worse.  
vi 
 
This thesis was written in spite of power— in all its shapes and forms—however 
explicit or subtle.  
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables… ............................................................................................................... xiv	  
List of Symbols, Nomenclature or Abbreviations ............................................................ xv	  
List of Appendices ........................................................................................................... xvi	  
Chapter 1 – Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1	  
1.1 Purpose and Overview .............................................................................................. 1	  
1.2 Rationale .................................................................................................................... 3	  
1.3 Study Objectives ....................................................................................................... 7	  
1.4 Thesis Organization ................................................................................................... 8	  
Chapter 2 – Literature Review .......................................................................................... 10	  
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 10	  
2.2 Gender, Medicalization and Mental Health ............................................................ 11	  
2.2.1 The Medicalization of Women’s Unhappiness and the Gendering of Emotion
 13	  
2.3 The Body ................................................................................................................. 16	  
2.3.1 Risk and the Body ......................................................................................... 19	  
2.3.2 Foucault: Experts, Discipline and Shifts in Power ....................................... 25	  
2.3.3 Lupton, Foucault and Self-mutilation ........................................................... 28	  
viii 
 
2.4 The Objectification of Knowledge .......................................................................... 30	  
2.4.1 Critique of Sociology and Women’s Standpoint .......................................... 31	  
2.5 A Sociological Examination of Self-injury and the Complex Continuum .............. 32	  
2.5.1 Gender and Self-injury .................................................................................. 36	  
2.6 Reactions and Responses to Self-mutilation ........................................................... 38	  
2.6.1 The Reading of Purposefully Damaged Skin ................................................ 39	  
2.6.2 The Psychiatric Response ............................................................................. 42	  
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 44	  
Chapter 3 – Methodology and Method ............................................................................. 46	  
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 46	  
3.2 Ethical Considerations ............................................................................................. 49	  
3.3 Data Collection ........................................................................................................ 52	  
3.3.1 The DSM ....................................................................................................... 52	  
3.3.2 Interviews ...................................................................................................... 56	  
3.3.2.1 Recruitment ......................................................................................... 56	  
3.3.2.2 The Participants ................................................................................... 57	  
3.4 Qualitative Interview Method ................................................................................. 58	  
3.4.1 Reflexivity ..................................................................................................... 62	  
3.4.2 The Interview Process ................................................................................... 64	  
ix 
 
3.5 Data Analysis .......................................................................................................... 65	  
3.6 Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 66	  
3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 67	  
Chapter 4 – The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ........................ 69	  
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 69	  
4.1.1 Background of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual .................................. 70	  
4.1.2 Editions I through IV and the DSM-5 ........................................................... 71	  
4.1.3 Revisions ....................................................................................................... 73	  
4.2 The Use of the DSM by Professionals .................................................................... 73	  
4.3 Critique of the DSM ................................................................................................ 76	  
4.3.1 Moral Judgment ............................................................................................ 76	  
4.3.2 Politics and the Myth of Objectivity ............................................................. 77	  
4.3.3 The Relationship between Diagnosis and Treatment Coverage ................... 78	  
4.4 Historical References to Self-mutilation ................................................................. 80	  
4.4.1 Terminology .................................................................................................. 81	  
4.4.1.1 Term Use and Intention ....................................................................... 81	  
4.4.1.2 Self-mutilation and Related Terms in the DSM from 1968 to 2013 ... 83	  
4.5 DSM-5: Pre-publication and the Proposal to Include NSSI as a Separate Diagnosis
 86	  
x 
 
4.5.1 Renaming and Re-conceptualizing Self-mutilation and its Association with 
BPD and Suicide ................................................................................................................ 87	  
4.5.2 DSM-5 Post- publication: NSSI and Other Important changes .................... 89	  
4.5.3 Critique of the DSM-5 .................................................................................. 92	  
4.6 The DSM, Medicalization and Obscuring Contextual Complexity ........................ 94	  
4.7 The DSM and the Gendering of Self-mutilation ..................................................... 96	  
4.7.1 Evolution of a Disorder ............................................................................... 102	  
4.8 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 105	  
Chapter 5 – Psychiatrists’ Understandings of Self-mutilation ........................................ 107	  
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 107	  
5.2 The Participants ..................................................................................................... 107	  
5.2.1 Dr. G ........................................................................................................... 107	  
5.2.2 Dr. H ........................................................................................................... 108	  
5.2.3 Dr. F ............................................................................................................ 109	  
5.2.4 Dr. E ............................................................................................................ 110	  
5.3.5 Dr. D ........................................................................................................... 111	  
5.2.6 Dr. A ........................................................................................................... 112	  
5.2.7 Dr. I ............................................................................................................. 113	  
5.2.8 Dr. C ............................................................................................................ 114	  
xi 
 
5.2.9 Dr. B ............................................................................................................ 115	  
5.2.10 Dr. J ........................................................................................................... 116	  
5.3 Findings ................................................................................................................. 117	  
5.3.1 How do Psychiatrists Talk about Self-mutilation? ..................................... 117	  
5.3.1.1 Self-mutilation as Language ............................................................. 118	  
5.3.1.2 Self-mutilation as Dysfunctional Response ...................................... 122	  
5.3.1.3 Self-mutilation as Trend .................................................................... 125	  
5.3.1.4 Adolescent Versus Adult Self-mutilation ......................................... 127	  
5.3.1.5 The “Typical” Patient ........................................................................ 129	  
5.3.1.6 Self-mutilation as Symptom .............................................................. 132	  
5.3.1.7 Borderline Personality Disorder ........................................................ 133	  
5.3.1.8 The Skin ............................................................................................ 139	  
5.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 141	  
Chapter 6 – Psychiatric Practice, Self-mutilation and the DSM ..................................... 142	  
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 142	  
6.2 How Psychiatrists Deal with Self-mutilation in their Practices ............................ 142	  
6.2.1 Alternative Options for Pain ....................................................................... 145	  
6.3 DSM Knowledge and Psychiatric Practice ........................................................... 148	  
6.3.1 Uptake of the DSM ..................................................................................... 149	  
xii 
 
6.3.2 Ambivalence or Resistance Toward the DSM ............................................ 152	  
6.3.3 Self-mutilation, BPD and the DSM ............................................................ 154	  
6.3.4 Bodily Damage and control ........................................................................ 157	  
6.3.5 Bodily Expression and Gender ................................................................... 158	  
6.4 Summary ............................................................................................................... 159	  
Chapter 7 – Discussion and Conclusion ......................................................................... 160	  
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 160	  
7.2 Self-mutilation Knowledge Production ................................................................. 161	  
7.2.1 Discourse and Interaction ........................................................................... 164	  
7.2.2 Knowledge and the DSM ............................................................................ 167	  
7.3 Reflections ............................................................................................................. 170	  
7.4 Implications for those who Self-mutilate .............................................................. 176	  
7.5 Limitations ............................................................................................................ 177	  
7.6 Implications for Practice ....................................................................................... 178	  
7.7 Future Directions for Research ............................................................................. 178	  
7.8 Final Thoughts ....................................................................................................... 180	  
References… … .............................................................................................................. 182	  
Appendix A – Letter of approval from ethics review committee ................................... 190	  
Appendix B – Recruitment e-mail to the head of psychiatry .......................................... 192	  
xiii 
 
Appendix C – Follow-up e-mail to psychiatrists interested in participating .................. 194	  
Appendix D – Information sheet ..................................................................................... 196	  
Appendix E – Consent form ........................................................................................... 198	  
Appendix F – Interview script (Original) ....................................................................... 204	  
Appendix G – Interview script (Revised) ....................................................................... 205	  
Appendix H – DSM data ................................................................................................. 206	  
xiv 
 
List of Tables… 
 
Table 4.1 DSM overview editions I through V .................................................................. 80 
Table 4.2 Introduction of self-mutilation and related terms into the DSM ....................... 85 
Table 4.3  Self-mutilation listed as explicit diagnostic criteria ....................................... 103 
Table H.1 DSM overview editions I through V ............................................................... 206 
Table H.2 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-II (1968) .............. 207 
Table H.3 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-III (1980) ............ 207 
Table H.4 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-III-R (1987) ........ 208 
Table H.5 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-IV (1994) ............ 209 
Table H.6 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-IV-TR (2000) ...... 211 
 
 
 
  
xv 
 
List of Symbols, Nomenclature or Abbreviations 
 
BPD  Borderline Personality Disorder 
DSM  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
ICD  International Classification for Disease 
NSSI  Non-Suicidal Self-Injury 
PTSD  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
SM  Self-Mutilation 
WHO  World Health Organization 
APA   American Psychiatric Association 
DBT   Dialectical Behavior Therapy  
HMO  Health Maintenance Organization  
SI   Self-Injury 
CDA   Critical Discourse Analysis 
DID   Dissociative Identity Disorder  
 
 
  
xvi 
 
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Letter of approval from ethics review committee 
Appendix B – Recruitment e-mail to the head of psychiatry 
Appendix C – Follow-up e-mail to psychiatrists interested in participating 
Appendix D – Information sheet  
Appendix E – Consent form 
Appendix F – Interview script (Original)  
Appendix G – Interview script (Revised) 
Appendix H - DSM data 
 1 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Overview 
“Knowledge is power. We live in a world in which knowledge is produced and 
used to make change, inform others, support a perspective, or justify an action. 
Hence, the question of who provides knowledge is central to understanding how 
power is created, taken or maintained. Being able to produce knowledge then is a 
route to power, empowerment, and influence” (Kirby et al., 2006, p.1).   
 
Research, put simply, refers to the process of uncovering new knowledge. My 
research creates new knowledge by critically examining knowledge production itself. It is 
about highlighting the ways in which official medical knowledge is created and how 
medical practitioners take it up. It attempts to answer the questions: What are the 
differences between text and practice? What are the similarities and differences or 
contradictions in what psychiatrists say and what they say they do in practice? Overall, it 
is an inquiry into seeing how psychiatric knowledge is produced and recreated by the 
actors (psychiatrists). It explores the intersections between gender, power and psychiatric 
knowledge. In particular, this research seeks to understand the construction of self-
mutilation knowledge and will examine how it is produced in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and is understood by psychiatrists who 
have experience with patients who self-mutilate. For convenience, I focus on the practice 
of psychiatry within my home province, Newfoundland and Labrador (NL).  
This work is sociological in scope, therefore not addressing concepts such as 
social influence and modeling from a psychological perspective. I should also note that I 
am not exploring the physical health effects of self-mutilation (e.g., infection) or any 
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association with suicidal behavior. I am examining the dialectical relationship between 
the production of self-mutilation knowledge and already existing, dominant knowledges 
about gender, the body and risk. In addition, I examine whether or not certain ways of 
talking about disordered behaviors are gendered thus making a certain pathology or 
behavior masculine or feminine. I believe that it is important to highlight how taken-for-
granted knowledge(s) affects peoples’ experiences and ultimately their health. In 
highlighting these taken for granted knowledges, I am employing a critical, feminist, 
sociological approach. A critical feminist approach emphasizes the ways in which the 
body is the site of power relations and how discourses influence how we see and relate to 
others’ bodies as well as our own (Bordo, 2003; Martin 1987; Lupton, 1999). A feminist 
standpoint is crucial for examining the construction of psychiatric discourses and, in 
particular, the impact such discourses have on how healthy or ill bodies (and minds) are 
identified. 
In examining complex relationships between power and the body, the Foucauldian 
concept of the body as the site of surveillance, regulation, and discipline is useful 
(Foucault, 1977). This conception can also be useful when trying to understand the ways 
in which hospitals and medical authority act as powerful institutions that in turn shape 
either normalized or marginalized ideas about bodies. In other words, Foucauldian theory 
helps us to understand how framing somebody as “sick/ ill” comes from larger, 
authoritative understandings of health and often affects peoples’ day-to-day relationships 
with both the people and institutions around them. For example, part of my inquiry 
concerns the concept of stigma attached to people who deviate from what is regarded to 
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be normal/normalized. This occurs in my later discussion of Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD).  A study by Camp, Finlay and Lyons (2002) concluded that women with 
chronic mental health problems made negative comments about themselves and avoided 
disclosure of their diagnosis out of fear of others’ potential reactions (such as rejection). 
Thus, stigmatized attributes are deeply discrediting in particular contexts and often 
become the dominant identities by which the person is seen and also how they see 
themselves. It is not hard to see how discourses and larger ideas about bodies, health and 
illness have real world effects (Bendelow, 2009). Violation of any social norm is likely to 
result in negative reactions and social marginalization. Thus, the norm is powerful 
because to go against it results in negative implications. Psychiatric diagnoses are strong 
examples of how deviations from social and psychological norms are understood and how 
diagnoses with pejorative labels negatively impact individuals’ lives.  
1.2 Rationale  
Given that medicine is an extremely powerful institution and one we rely on when 
we are most vulnerable, understanding how medical knowledge is constructed and 
understood is essential. Both personally and academically, I am interested in how power 
works within medicine. The impetus for this research came from a desire to understand 
how medical knowledge shapes how we understand bodies and, specifically, the ways 
psychiatric knowledge positions bodies that are considered disordered. It is important to 
note that when I refer to bodies I am, in essence, also referring to the mind. The 
relationship between the mind and body is dialectical: a “disordered” mind affects 
behaviors that in turn affect the body and, conversely, what is seen on the “disordered” 
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body emanates from the mind. My focus is on “the body” because self-mutilation is 
corporeal. In addition, given that purposeful harm to one’s body often evokes strong, 
perplexed reactions from others, I decided this would be my main focus of inquiry. I 
chose the term self-mutilation because it sounds barbaric and extreme. This was 
purposeful because I believe the connotations of that term have contributed to the extreme 
reactions surrounding the behavior. Related terms that are widely used include: self-
injury, self-harm, non-suicidal self-injury, and self-inflicted injury. I refer to self-
mutilation and self-injury most often and use them interchangeably depending on the 
context I am writing in. I mostly use the term “self-mutilation” but, when referring to 
research or the DSM-5, I mirror the term used by the authors (such as the term NSSI— 
non-suicidal self-injury).  
Although there are no statistics for the prevalence of self-mutilation in NL, one 
quantitative study examining the overlap between non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) and 
disordered eating behaviors suggests that NSSI is indeed a serious concern in the 
province and one warranting further investigation. The study surveyed 1639 
undergraduate students (response rate 80%).  The study found that 6. 52% of participants 
engaged in NSSI at least once in their lifetime and that both females (6.5 %) and males 
(6.5%) engaged in self-mutilation as a coping mechanism (Duggan, Button, Heath & 
Heath, 2010). These numbers are consistent with other studies that suggest prevalence 
rates for college and university populations: 11.68 % (Heath, Toste, Nedecheva, & 
Charlebois, 2008) and 7.2 % (Gollust, Eisenberg & Goldberstein, 2008) of students report 
engaging in NSSI. Furthermore, these numbers reflect higher prevalence rates than many 
 5 
 
other mental health conditions including eating disorders (1.7%, Statistics Canada, 2002), 
schizophrenia (0.5-1.5%, DSM IV-TR, 2000) and bipolar I (0.4-1.6%; DSM-IV-TR, 
2000) which have been the subject of closer study. Further exploration into self-
mutilation (and its many synonyms) is needed.  
Historically, in Euro-American societies outside of a religious context, purposeful 
self-injury has often been trivialized, misidentified, and misrepresented; is also a behavior 
that millions of people have engaged in but often has been considered so unnatural and 
offensive that it has not been considered appropriate for public discussion or scientific 
inquiry (Favazza, 2011; Strong, 2009).1 Although, self-mutilation has gained much 
attention over the past decade, the reasons why some people feel a need, desire or urge to 
damage their own physical body is no doubt a very complicated phenomenon in need of 
further examination. While I am concerned with the reasons for and function of self-
mutilation, this is not something I take on at length in this research project. Rather, I think 
it is also important to examine larger ideas about bodies and gender and risk and how they 
influence how we talk about and think of self-mutilation – and how these knowledge(s) 
(re) create inequality and marginalization for those who self-mutilate. Bodies express 
what words often cannot articulate; scars, bruises, and burns have their own language that 
tells stories about the complicated relationship with the body. 
What is self-mutilation? Definitions of self-mutilation depend on how both self 
and mutilation are defined culturally and historically. For the purposes of my research, 
                                                
1 I must note that varying forms of self-mutilation are common and culturally accepted practices around the 
world. For example, bodily mutilation as a form of religious ecstasy is not uncommon around the 
world.  Those broader comparisons and examinations of the symbolic meaning of mutilation – for example, 
the meanings of blood in relation to the inscription of power on the body -- are beyond the subject of this 
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when I refer to self-mutilation I am referring to mutilation/ injury to oneself without the 
intention of suicide. Essentially, this is the same definition as non-suicidal self-injury, 
which is defined as a purposeful infliction of injury to oneself, without suicidal intent, 
that results in immediate tissue damage and is not socially/ culturally sanctioned, 
therefore excluding tattooing and piercing. It includes, although is not exclusive to, 
cutting, scratching, carving, burning and hitting oneself (Heath & Nixon, 2009).  
Marilee Strong (2009) maintains that the experiences that often act as underlying 
stressors prior to self-mutilation include: sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse, 
other forms of trauma (e.g., hurricanes, death in the family, serious illness, school 
bullying, body image issues), instability in childhood and perfectionism (or any 
combination of the previously mentioned). Similarly, when women institutionalized in a 
psychiatric hospital were interviewed about past and present reasons for self-harm, they 
cited natural disaster, death, illness and various forms of trauma as the driving force 
behind their engagement in self-harm behaviors (Liebling et al., 1997). These experiences 
often led to tremendous difficulty in being able to tolerate painful or upsetting emotions 
and thus the struggle for the use of something to soothe the emotional pain (Strong, 2009; 
Adler & Adler, 2011). Women are thought to self-mutilate in greater numbers than men; 
the way in which self-mutilation is described is also gendered feminine (Alder & Adler, 
2011; Strong, 2009; Brickman, 2004), something that will be discussed in detail later in 
this work.  A study examining the epidemiology of attempted suicide and self-harm visits 
in U.S. emergency rooms from 1993-2008 found emergency department visits for 
attempted suicide and self-inflicted injury have increased dramatically over the past two 
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decades. In addition, they noted that numbers of self-inflicted injury and attempted 
suicide were higher for women than men, however numbers for both sexes were 
increasing overall (Ting et al., 2012).  
In addition, self- injurious behaviors often provoke strong, negative reactions from 
others. Purposeful injury of one’s body is often puzzling because it is difficult to 
understand why someone would willingly injure their body without the intention of 
dying. In line with this, many medical and mental health professionals find self-injuring 
behaviors very challenging to understand and treat (Heath & Nixon, 2009; Walsh, 2006). 
Furthermore, beyond finding self-injuring behaviors challenging, some therapists and 
physicians find dealing with patients who self-injure leaves them feeling helpless, guilty, 
sad and angry (Favazza, 2011). Walsh (2006) examines the various responses of mental 
health professionals’ to self-injury and argues that the reactions can be conceptualized as 
a psychosocial phenomenon. He maintains that therapists, physicians, nurses, and other 
mental health professionals respond to self-injury physically, psychologically, and 
interpersonally. He asserts it is important for mental health professionals to manage their 
negative reactions through self-monitoring. Taking this into account, there is still a lot 
that needs to be understood about self-mutilation.  
1.3 Study Objectives 
The aim of my research is to highlight the various knowledge(s) and discourses 
that surround self-mutilation and to map the connections and disconnections between the 
diagnostic criteria used to diagnose self-mutilation and psychiatrists’ understandings of 
and experience with dealing with self-mutilation.  
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The specific objectives of my research are: 
1) To examine the construction of expert medical knowledge of self-mutilation by 
examining mentions of self-mutilation in the DSM (editions 1 through 5). 
2) To examine how psychiatrists describe and understand self-mutilation.  
3) To better understand how knowledge(s) of gender, the body and risk shape how 
self-mutilation is understood and further to critically interrogate whether or not 
these dominant knowledge(s) re-produce inequalities. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into 7 chapters. Chapter 2 will provide a review of 
literature broadly on medicalization moving on to risk, the body and the production of 
medical knowledge and then to the psychiatric response to self-mutilation. Chapter 3 
explains the methodology that influenced my research, what methods I used to collect my 
data, how I went about analyzing the data and the theoretical works that helped make 
sense of my findings. Chapter 4 is an overview of the DSM from its inception in 1952 to 
the DSM-5 just recently published. I also provide an overview of all references to self-
mutilation over the span of all five versions, the current proposal to include non-suicidal 
self-injury (NSSI) as a separate diagnosis, important changes to the DSM-5 and 
discussion of the discursive link between self-mutilation and BPD as well as a discussion 
of how self-mutilation has evolved over time. Chapters 5 and 6 provide results and 
analysis of interviews with psychiatrists. Chapter 5 focuses on how psychiatrists 
understand and describe self-mutilation.  Chapter 6 discusses how psychiatrists deal with 
self-mutilation in their practices and the relationship between the DSM and practice.  
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Chapter 7 summarizes my findings, discusses possible clinical implications and outlines 
areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this literature review is to position my research in relation to what 
is already written and to ask questions not yet considered. This literature review focuses 
on the literature that helped define my research questions. Feminism belongs to an 
overarching critical paradigm concerned with understanding how societal structures and 
power relations play a role in promoting inequalities by attempting to explain underlying 
structures that influence phenomena (Kirby, Greaves, & Reid, 2006). A review of the 
literature concerning knowledge production, gender, the body and risk is necessary to a 
sociological feminist inquiry into how self-mutilation is understood, how bodies are 
gendered and how risk itself is understood as gendered. A review of the literature on 
gender, the body and risk highlights how dominant ways of thinking and talking construct 
healthy/ normal and unhealthy/ abnormal bodies. These constructions are shaped 
predominantly by larger medical / scientific epistemologies which also means that a 
discussion of knowledge production and the objectification of knowledge must be 
included. The parameters of this literature review include a discussion of risk, gender, 
bodies, knowledge production and self-mutilation. Gender is a thread that runs throughout 
my research. It is intricately intertwined with understandings of bodies as well as how we 
understand risk.  
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2.2 Gender, Medicalization and Mental Health 
First, I think it is important to answer why is gender a useful point of analysis in 
general. Gender is useful for understanding positioning within social structures and 
subsequent inequalities that result (Young, 2005). Access to resources (for example, 
health care, education jobs, housing) is often based on structural positioning; material 
factors such as class, age, gender, and race affect one’s positioning within social 
structures and inequality. Young (2005) maintains that women are positioned within 
structures where they are unfairly constrained by regulative bodily norms and 
understandings of the female body. The division of labor, normative heterosexuality, 
child care and housework responsibilities are some of the ways in which women are 
positioned and constrained, thus being not afforded the same opportunities as men 
(Hochschild, 2003). Gender heavily influences the experiences one has in life and for 
women, this can be evidenced quite clearly within the discourses that surround their 
bodies (fluctuating hormones and moods) and their socially prescribed gender roles 
(feminine, not masculine) (Martin, 1987; Lupton, 1999). Social and institutional 
structures often also have implicit rules and norms that offer benefits and freedoms to 
some and not others. For example, gender and sexuality are often regulated by normative 
heterosexuality and those who do not fall within these prescribed rules are often 
marginalized in various implicit and explicit ways. All of these things influence peoples’ 
health directly and their experiences within health care systems (e.g., isolation and 
discrimination). Young (2005) argues that the experience of giving birth is often 
alienating for women due to power differences in doctor- patient relations (the ways in 
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which the doctor has power over knowledge and thus bodily processes) but also the ways 
in which medical discourses define healthy bodies (Martin, 1987; Martin 1994, Lupton, 
1999). 
The act of self-mutilation, beyond the fact that the opening up of one’s skin 
offends the senses of what is normal or stable, when women engage in it, also threatens 
how society sees feminine beauty (Brickman, 2004). There are differences in how tattoos 
on men and women are perceived or how scars on men and women are viewed. Ideal 
female bodies are understood to be beautiful, with soft and unblemished skin (Ahmed and 
Stacey, 2001). Damaging the skin physically and the urge to do it indicate mental 
instability. Psychiatrists understand self-mutilation as a coping mechanism used to 
regulate intense, upsetting moods. It is also considered an expression of those emotions 
(Heath & Nixon, 2009).  
As Clarke (2004) has argued, medical science became increasingly influential 
along with urbanization, secularization and industrialization. In the 19th century, medical 
institutions gained power as agencies of social control and human behaviors became 
subject to medical explanation like never before. Behaviors that may have been 
historically viewed as sinful or criminal could now be categorized as illnesses in need of 
treatment (i.e., alcoholism, depression, and homosexuality up until the 1970’s). Zola 
(1972) described the process by which human conditions and problems come to be 
defined and treated as medical conditions as medicalization. It has been said that the 
social and sexual control that male doctors exerted over women in the 19th century has 
shaped the gendered character of contemporary medicine, particularly the medicalization 
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of emotion (Woodlock, 2005). The term “medicalization” emerged with the foundational 
works of Illich (1975) and Zola (1972) who expressed concern that medicine seemed to 
be taking over areas of life that were previously under moral, legal, or religious 
jurisdiction. For example, the processes of birth and death now took place in hospitals 
(Bendelow, 2009). Similarly, the medicalization of emotions and behaviors started to take 
place with the rise of psychiatry as a discipline that had authority and power to label a 
range of everyday reactions (Young, 1995).  
Medicalization is both conceptual (in that medical vocabulary is used to define the 
problem) and institutional (in that the problem is legitimized when diagnosis and 
treatment occurs) (Bendelow, 2009). The process of medicalization is a critical piece in 
my research when examining how the DSM participates in the process of medicalization 
both conceptually through texts and institutionally in practice. In addition, the concept of 
medicalization is key to recognizing the influence medical knowledge has on the body 
and vice versa. As Foucault noted in The Birth of the Clinic (1973), changing ideologies 
of disease can be seen as an outcome of the changing perceptions of the body.  
2.2.1 The Medicalization of Women’s Unhappiness and the Gendering of Emotion 
The medicalization of women’s unhappiness as “depression” has had a large 
impact on women today (Bendelow, 2009; Woodlock, 2005). Labeling this distress as an 
“illness” and as something in need of treatment is problematic. The medical model does 
not take into account the social and historical context in which women have lived or have 
come to understand their experiences. Feminists have long considered women’s distress 
and unhappiness as resulting from their social positions and psychiatric discourses have 
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often recast women’s subordination to men as disorder, hysteria or madness (Blum and 
Stracuzzi, 2004). How gender is represented, conceptualized and researched in 
psychology and medicine has a powerful influence on how we understand ourselves and 
make sense of our life experiences (Stanley, 1993). Distress is a social as well as a 
personal event but the problem is that the psycho-medical approach views distress and 
emotional reactions as solely having a biological basis and therefore in need of medical 
attention and treatment (Cosgrove, 2000). Critics argue that we should look at the social 
and historical conditions that have contributed to women’s location in specific diagnostic 
categories. For example, we need a more in depth understanding as to why the DSM 
(editions three, four and five) cite women as comprising 75% of the Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) population (DSM-5, 2013).  
How certain behaviors are understood, for example aggression and crying, are 
also gendered (Young, 2005). Psychiatry has a “double power” of sorts where it has the 
power to marginalize “inappropriate bodies” but also the power to regulate and 
medicalize women’s embodiment through discourse. For example, Blum and Stracuzzi 
(2004) found that most psychiatric illnesses are implicitly gendered; they are constructed 
and understood in terms that convey femininity and/or masculinity. This sort of 
medicalization of women’s lives and experiences only intensifies the oppressive world in 
which they live, maintaining the power of men and submission of women by reinforcing 
the dualisms that separate them in the first place. Psychiatry/ psychiatric discourses can 
be seen as the central point at which institutional power, bodies, discourses, and gender 
intersect. Both the works of Elizabeth Grosz (1994) and Michel Foucault (1973) are 
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useful in understanding this intersection; Foucault for his understanding of how discourse 
regulates bodies and how power is inscribed on our bodies and Grosz for her discussion 
of how knowledge production shapes the perception of bodies as well as her call for a 
new understanding of bodies outside of the constraints of existing dichotomies. As Grosz 
has put it: 
“The body has thus far remained colonized through discursive practices of the 
natural sciences, particularly through discourses of biology/ medicine. It has 
generally remained mired in presumptions regarding its naturalness, its 
fundamentally biological and precultural status, its immunity to cultural, social 
and historical factors, its brute status as given unchangeable, inert and passive 
manipulable under scientifically regulated conditions. The ways in which bodies, 
men’s and women’s bodies, are understood by the natural sciences is however no 
more accurate than the ways social sciences and humanities understand them: in 
all cases, how bodies are conceived of seem to be based largely on prevailing 
social conceptions of the relations between the sexes” (1994, p. X) 
  
While Foucauldian theory provides useful concepts from which to understand how 
power and knowledge shape bodies, Grosz (1994) argues that Foucault’s discussion has 
not left a space for the inclusion of women’s differently sexed corporeality and thus lacks 
attention to the ways in which power and knowledge may work differently for men and 
women. She calls for a more nuanced way to relate to bodies, one that does not rely on 
the concepts and dichotomies that currently exist, as dichotomous thinking ranks one 
while subordinating another, keeping them unequal and constructing them as opposite. 
For Grosz, a new understanding of corporeality would avoid mind/ body dichotomies, 
avoid normalizing one type of body by which all others are judged, and understand the 
body as the site of social, political, cultural and geographical inscription.  
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2.3 The Body 
The body and its complexities have long been at the center of the nature/ nurture 
debate. When exploring how people think about and use their bodies in everyday life, it is 
important to look at the sociology of the body and feminist literature. Although the body 
is not exclusive to the domains of sociology and feminist literature, both sociology and 
feminism highlight the various ways in which the body is often the site of power relations 
and discourses that shape how people view, use, and relate to their bodies (as well as 
other people’s bodies). In other words, both sociological and feminist theories have 
deconstructed taken for granted assumptions surrounding the conceptualizations of the 
body and gender, for example, by exploring the intersection between gender and the body 
as the site of the production of various masculinities and femininities (Connell, 2009). 
Taken for granted assumptions are embedded in discourse and reproduced in the ways 
that the discourse is interpreted and used. Discourses are dynamic, change over time and 
differ in they way they are taken up.  
Beyond prevalence rates and the reasons that lead people to engage in self-
mutilation behavior, it is also important to understand how self-mutilation and dominant 
ideas about gender, the body and, risk are produced through everyday talk and interaction. 
We use our bodies every day in everything we do; we work with our bodies, move our 
bodies in particular ways, clean and groom our bodies, exercise our bodies and we 
sometimes superficially or physically alter our bodies. Bodies can also be a kind of 
capital or tool used in everyday interactions within institutions and with other people, but 
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how we (re) negotiate our bodies depend on contextual factors such as gender, class, race, 
age, status, and  (dis) ability.  
Ideas of what constitutes a “healthy body” have changed over time and so have 
ideas about individual responsibility for health (Martin 1994; Lupton, 1995; Youll & 
Meekosha, 2013; Turner, 1984). Part of this shift resulted from changing perceptions of 
risk as well as shifts in power (Lupton, 1999; Martin, 1994; Harwood, 2009).  
Medical/scientific discourses have tremendous influence and are constantly used to justify 
various types of inequality and serve to naturalize power. We live in a culture of 
individualization where we often attribute what society views as negative qualities, such 
as weight gain, eating disorders, and drug addiction, as things one has individual, 
personal control over, therefore eliciting less sympathy than something biological in basis 
like Type 1 diabetes, hyperthyroidism, or psoriasis. Medicalization works because there is 
often a push to identify things as ‘diseases’, like alcoholism or sex addiction because it 
takes blame off of the individual and results in less stigma. As long as things are thought 
to be “natural” and “scientific fact”, there is less blame directed toward the individual 
resulting in less stigma and little motivation for change at a social level. If poor eating 
habits, drinking too much, or purposely throwing up food were seen as biologically 
rooted things and therefore not within the direct control of the person, then societal 
attitudes might be more compassionate. Youll and Meekosha (2013) have noted how a 
focus on “positive thinking” (the idea an individual’s positive attitude can alter health 
outcomes) may allow people disillusioned with the dominant health care system to exert 
some control by taking personal responsibility. Paradoxically, even though positive 
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thinking could be seen as a form of “resistance”, people are still complying with neo-
liberal ideals of individualism and responsibility for self. This sort of self-responsibility 
can clearly be seen in discourses surrounding obesity and the excessive focus on the self-
regulation of diet and activity (Rail & Beausoleil, 2003). Dominant health discourses 
often reflect ideas of both healthism and individualism that positions the body as the 
centrality of health- bodily practices and disciplines are used to attain the ideal, healthy 
body. Rail and Beausoleil (2003) employ Foucault’s reference to the panopticon to 
illustrate the shift from external punishment to a self-imposed form of control or bodily 
discipline; the desire to achieve health has become a new corporeal self-control.  
Scientific knowledges of what constitutes healthy bodies are mediated by larger 
ideas about gender, race, class, ability, education, and sexuality (Rail & Beausoleil, 2003; 
Martin, 1994). Anthropologist Emily Martin (1994) explored the effect that healthy/ sick 
discourses and associated types of views had on people. She claimed that health was 
becoming a medium by which people’s value could be judged (Kirschner, 1999). She 
noted the intersection between health and structural positions during her research where 
she spent time at immunology grand rounds. She noticed that the patients being discussed 
with immune system “deficiencies” were most often black, elderly, women, foreign or 
working class that Martin contrasted to the structural position of the white male doctor. 
It is important to consider that the advertising and media industries are also 
exceptionally influential in shaping cultural attitudes and discourses. The altered body is 
seen in the media constantly; plastic surgery, weight loss programs, advertising aimed at 
altering/disciplining bodies, gym culture, tanning sessions, hair removal and the 
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purchasing of particular brand names and hence particular identities. Ideas of health and 
healthy are embedded in this sort of advertising as well; the skinny, good looking, 
exercised, groomed, well dressed body is the ideal that is for sale.  
2.3.1 Risk and the Body 
A consideration of the concept of “risk” and risk discourse is also important for 
framing my own research work for two reasons: (1) I am seeking to understand how self-
mutilation is understood in terms of risk; and (2) I intend to establish whether or not the 
relationship between self-mutilation and risk is gendered. In her text Risk (1999), Lupton 
explores the ways in which people in Euro-American societies understand, assign 
meaning to and manage risk in their everyday lives.  She argues that the use of the risk 
concept is an attempt to deal with uncertainty but often does quite the opposite and 
creates more uncertainty through its prevalence in everyday media and discussion. The 
effect of the intense concern and preoccupation with risk finds its way into governments, 
institutions, and organizations and subsequently into how we think of and conduct 
ourselves. Health knowledge and practices are embedded and justified within larger 
socio-political contexts. Knowledge about risk is bound to sociocultural contexts and 
scientific knowledge, or any other knowledge, is never value-free but rather a product of a 
way of seeing; experts often do not acknowledge the situated nature of their claims, 
preferring to represent them as objective, universal truths (Lupton, 1999).  
Lupton (1999), importantly, also recognizes the dialectical approach to the body— 
bodies as physical, biological beings in nature and also the ways in which discourses act 
to shape bodies and the experiences of bodies; in other words she recognizes how bodies 
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are transformed by social relations and power and, most notably how bodies are regulated 
by medical/ health discourses. She contends that many of the risks in the past, as well as 
the present, were seen to threaten the health or integrity of one’s body. Lupton explicitly 
builds on Michel Foucault’s work by highlighting how risk discourses are used as a way 
to regulate uncertainty and by extension people’s bodies in everyday talk and interaction.  
She highlights Foucault’s notion of the “inscribed body written on by discourse” as a 
central point from which to understand bodies and what she phrases, “is the nexus 
between anatomy and society” (Lupton, 1995, p. 6). In other words, Lupton is employing 
Foucault’s notion of biopower (where power relations work in and through the body) as 
another way to understand how discourse, most notably risk discourse, is used to monitor 
and regulate bodies. Grosz (1994) claims that for Foucault, the body is the field on which 
the play of powers, knowledges, and resistances is worked out; “the body is that 
materiality, almost a medium, on which power operates and through which it functions” 
(Grosz, 1994, p. 146).  
“For Foucault, power deploys discourses, particularly knowledges, on and over 
bodies, establishing knowledges as the representations of the truth of those bodies 
and their pleasures. Discourses made possible and exploited by power, intermesh 
with bodies, with the lives and behavior of individuals, to constitute them as 
particular bodies. Power is a condition of possibility of these true discourses, the 
motivating force behind their profusion and the energy which inscribes them on 
bodies and pleasures” (Grosz, 1994, p. 149-150).  
 
The act of self-mutilation is a very clear example of how power both operates on 
and works through bodies and is truly a literal inscription of the body. First, the reasons 
that led to engagement in self-mutilation were likely shaped by the unequal ways that 
power is inscribed on the body; the act itself is an obvious, visible representation of such 
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inscriptions and second, it is an explicit inscription in itself. Furthermore, the production 
of self-mutilation knowledge and discourse perpetuates unequal power relations—the 
body is both a product of normative discourse and also a material to be re-inscribed by 
normative discourse.  
For Foucault, “knowledge is what is socially recognized as knowledge” (Grosz, 
1994, p. 147). Knowledge is major instrument and technique of power and is made 
possible by and functions through regimes of power where power and knowledge are both 
made (Grosz, 1994). Knowledge is the channel through which power can seize hold of 
bodies. In addition, inscription techniques are not only imposed but are sought out 
actively; this is what Foucault might have called “techniques of self-production” (Grosz, 
1994). Biopower works through what Foucault refers to as technologies of the self where 
individuals engage in practices, surveillance, and regulation in order to transform 
themselves in some way (Wright, 2009).  Wright (2009) argues that knowledge and 
power are intricately linked and particular techniques of power affect individuals through 
certain systemic practices (e.g., pedagogical practices) where certain “truth” discourses 
are produced; certain pedagogical practices are used to produce normalizing, regulating 
and surveillance effects. While Wright (2009) is referring to the use of healthy weight and 
physical activity discourses in schools, the same connection can be made with the 
practices of psychiatry, the DSM and its normalizing, surveillance effects on individual 
behaviors to produce discourses of the disordered body. The DSM is a technology of 
power that determines the conduct of individuals by objectivizing the subject. Certain 
types of knowledge produce a code of conduct and accordingly a particular body/ mind.  
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The internalization of risk discourses leads people to regulate and monitor their 
own, as well as other people’s, bodies and behaviors. Lupton claims that most risk 
discourses in contemporary popular and expert culture portray risks as negative: to take 
unnecessary risks is seen as careless and irresponsible, therefore evidence of an 
individual’s lack of ability to regulate the self (Lupton, 1999). Purposeful self-injury 
violates the expectation that all people seek to avoid pain and instead pursue pleasure 
(Walsh, 2006). Self- mutilation could be considered an example of a failure to regulate 
oneself, or rather a failure to regulate intense emotions appropriately. In addition, 
uncertainty and fear about cutting, and the symbolic opening of one’s body/ skin not only 
threatens normative ideas about beauty and the body but also blurs the boundary between 
what is considered public and private. Emotions (like anger or extreme sadness), sexual 
activity, certain body parts (genitals), and bodily fluids (like blood and urine) are seen to 
be private and when they enter the public realm are often seen to be “inappropriate”, 
“problematic” “bad” or “risky”.  This sort of separation between public and private is 
sometimes kept in place physically by clothing (underwear) and/or the designation of 
private space (washrooms, bedrooms, hospital wards), but also by normative ideas and 
discourses that regulate what is socially acceptable and unacceptable.  
Anthropologist Mary Douglas (1969) has written about ideas that surround purity, 
danger, and the body and has argued that bodily control is an extension and expression of 
social control. She upheld that symbolic meanings have been applied to material bodily 
practices. The body and its openings are symbolic of boundaries around stability and 
order, constructed by ideas of “inside” and “outside”, “dirty” and “clean,” and policed by 
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the processes of marginalizing those who engage in what is considered taboo. Lupton also 
refers to the divides between acceptable and unacceptable bodies/ behaviors but instead 
uses the terms “civilized” and “uncivilized” bodies.  
To complicate the relationship between the body and risk even further, the 
dichotomies of public/ private intersect with the gendered dichotomies of masculine and 
feminine. What is publically or privately acceptable or what is seen as “risky” is also 
gendered. For example, Brickman (2004), challenging the pathologization of female 
bodies through what she terms “authoritative medical discourses”, examines popular 
discourses and contends that they frame cutting as a passive feminine behavior whereby 
women are constructed as too passive to “act out” but are still overly emotional and are 
“acting in” their immature frustrations through cutting their “delicate” skin, therefore, 
also threatening normative ideas about ideal feminine bodies. Furthermore, she argues 
that the continuance of seeing the female cutter myth within popular and medical 
discourses only serves to reproduce dominant gender and psychiatric discourses which in 
turn creates docile bodies by ensuring the internalization of disciplinary individuality 
through the careful observation of the self and others.   
Lupton (1999) also writes about the intersection of risk and gender and argues that 
risk-taking behavior is gendered. Lupton argues that risk taking behavior is often a 
(celebrated) part of proving one’s masculinity, especially in adolescence, and activities 
such as excessive drinking, drug taking, speeding in cars are considered to be heroic 
behaviors located within the sphere of danger and violence and contrasted to the feminine 
life characterized by production and care. Men engaging in risky activities often reflect 
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control (regulation) over their emotions and vulnerability (Lupton, 1999). This gendering 
of risk-taking constructs women as “safe”; therefore women who engage in anything 
considered risk-taking behavior (such as cutting) face a sort of doubled edged 
marginalization due to the fear and uncertainty that surrounds risk and the norms that 
construct who can take risks. Women are supposed to attempt to prevent risks and take 
care by “being responsible for the well-being of others” (Lupton, 1999, p. 159). 
Furthermore, women’s bodies are often culturally represented as chaotic compared to 
men’s; and the regulation and surveillance of the self may be more sought after. The 
avoidance of risk and the act of risk-taking are both examples of control and agency but, 
more than that, show that the body is often the site of power struggles that are managed 
and regulated via discourse.  
The difference in how expert knowledges are understood and taken up is also 
worth mentioning. Some lay people rely upon experts for their knowledge base about 
certain topics; yet sometimes they question or actively resist “expert” knowledge. In Risk 
and Everyday Life, Lupton and Tulloch (2003) explore how lay people understand and 
describe risk in everyday life, and argue that conversely, even though risk discourse sets 
risk up as something to be avoided and something to be in control of, some people engage 
in risk-taking behavior (e.g., extreme sports like sky diving, or hurting one’s self 
purposefully) as a way of taking up agency or attempting to control the mundane and 
strictness in one’s day-to-day life. In terms of self-mutilation, it would be useful to 
understand how mutilating oneself may indicate internalized control/regulation or active 
resistant agency (or perhaps both regulation and resistance at the same time). 
 25 
 
2.3.2 Foucault: Experts, Discipline and Shifts in Power 
Foucault made an immense contribution to the discussion of institutionalized 
power, knowledge production and the sociology of the body. In doing so, he also 
conceptualized new knowledges as extensions of institutionalized power, particularly 
through discourses and practices of psychiatry, criminology and penology (Turner, 1984). 
This institutionalization of the body made possible new practices of quantification and 
producing statistics. This resulted in the rationalization of the body and (as described in 
Foucault’s later work), of populations, by new forms of power and knowledge (Turner, 
1984). 
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977), Foucault provides a 
historical account of how discipline and punishment shifted from the public (explicit) to 
the private (implicit) over time. This new shift, Foucault noted, gave rise to new experts 
and authorities (lawyers, doctors, police), resulting in shifts in power as well. Foucault 
maintained that  this shift in power led to a whole new set of diagnostic criteria and tools 
(e.g., psychiatrists, categories like “unstable” or “unfit”) and new forms of power and 
authority (experts who had the power to make decisions about who was guilty or innocent 
and who had the power to allocate punishment). This meant that now knowledge, 
techniques, and scientific discourse also had the power to punish. Essentially, Foucault 
was arguing that modern day “quartering” still happens but it is just implicit and subtle 
(e.g., sexism, racism or the disciplining of knowledge). 
In his discussion of “docile bodies,” Foucault explores the development of rigid, 
precise forms of discipline which influenced how bodies are thought of and used, which, 
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he argues, developed an entirely new body politic. Foucault claims that disciplined and 
docile bodies are ideal bodies that function in certain institutions (such as schools and 
militaries) but in order to construct a docile body, one must: (1) constantly observe/ 
record bodies and (2) ensure the internalization of the disciplinary individuality within the 
bodies being controlled. Foucault argues that this must come about not by excessive force 
but through the molding of bodies by careful observation. Foucault illustrates this type of 
careful observation by using Jeremy Bentham’s model of the panopticon. The panopticon 
is an architectural model that became an important conceptualization of power relations 
for 19th century prison construction. The panopticon allowed for constant observation that 
was characterized by an “unequal gaze” (i.e., the constant possibility of being observed 
but never knowing for sure). This constant possibility of observation subsequently 
resulted in the internalization of disciplining individuality which meant that people were 
less likely to break rules if they thought they were being watched, which subsequently 
meant they “policed” (watched) themselves and conducted their bodies accordingly. A 
docile body was one that could be subjected, transformed, and improved-- the human 
body became a political economy with power relations of its own. The true magnitude 
was not in the scale of control as a whole but through the disciplining of gestures, 
movements and attitudes. The history of punishment can be seen as a series of 
technologies of the body, and procedures for the control and subjugation of the body. This 
makes clear how transformations in the conception of the body are a consequence of 
changing investments in the power of the body (Grosz, 1994). 
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The significance of this for analyzing the construction of self-mutilation can be 
better understood through reference to Foucault’s notion of “biopower.”  Grosz (1994) 
defines biopower as a power that regulates the minute details of daily life and behavior in 
individuals and populations. Biopower focuses on life and populations rather than the 
focus on disciplinary power and death, as death is power’s limit.  Biopower works both 
on and through bodies— it has the power to shape understandings of the body, but bodies 
are also vehicles that reproduce power in various ways. One of the ways that power is 
reproduced is though normalizing mechanisms. Biopower normalizes the behaviors of the 
subject, through the normalization and internalization of discourses and what Harwood 
(2009) has termed biopedagogies. Biopedagogies are a sort of  “how-to” on health and a 
marriage of the concepts biopower and pedagogy, stemming from a larger discussion of 
biopolitics. The concept of biopower helps shed light on the ways in which knowledge is 
produced across multiple sites. Biopedagogies teach life, shaping the identities and 
desires of life. Although Harwood is referring to the ways in which obesity discourses 
shape how we understand healthy bodies, the same concept can be extended to psychiatry 
and beg the question of who is producing the knowledge of the healthy regulated mind 
and psychiatric truths about who and what is disordered. Normalizing mechanisms can be 
seen in mental health discourse and practice in terms of what is regarded as normal, 
which is often understood through juxtaposition of discourses of what is abnormal and 
disordered.  
These normalizing mechanisms are internalized through the policing of the self. 
The self is not governed centrally but rather by a complex array of technologies of power-
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which utilize experts such as social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists and other 
professionals (Dean, 1999). These technologies of power prescribe standards towards 
which individuals can strive (e.g., healthy weight, active lifestyle, balanced mind). Even 
engaging in self-help practices constitutes a technology of the self and is still responsible 
for the management of individuals, shaping them toward certain ends. In this sense, 
resistance or agency through taking control of the self is not total resistance because the 
process is still a shaping, guiding and correcting or self-conduct (Dean, 1999).  
2.3.3 Lupton, Foucault and Self-mutilation 
Lupton explicitly builds on Foucault’s work by highlighting how risk discourses 
are used as a way to regulate uncertainty and also people’s bodies in everyday talk and 
interaction.  She highlights Foucault’s notion of the “inscribed body written on by 
discourse” as a central point from which to understand bodies and what she phrases, “the 
nexus between anatomy and society” (Lupton, 1995, p. 6). In other words, Lupton is 
employing Foucault’s notion of biopower as another way to understand how discursive 
practices, most notably public health risk discourses, are used to surveil and regulate 
bodies. As I have noted in the previous section, biopower works by normalizing the 
behaviors of the subject through the internalization of discourses through what Harwood 
(2009) has termed, biopedagogies and argues that risk biopedagogies (instructions on how 
to understand risk, manage risk and avoid risk) are ever present in society. She claims that 
most risk discourses in contemporary popular or expert culture portray risks as negative, 
taking unnecessary risks is seen as careless and irresponsible, therefore evidence of an 
individual’s lack of ability to regulate the self (Lupton, 1999). Moreover, Lupton and 
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Tulloch (2003) claim, over the span of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century, there 
has been an intensification of risk discourses emerging from various fields of expertise 
such as law, medicine, science and social science in an attempt to regulate risk. 
Put simply, when we think of risk, thoughts about danger, negative events or 
illness most likely come to mind.  We live in a world where there are “risks” involved in 
our day-to-day lives and our awareness of risk is heightened and is often part of everyday 
conversation (Lupton & Tulloch, 2003). How risk is conceptualized has gone through 
several iterations over time (natural, genetic or human fault). The argument that risk was 
something that was within human control and was calculable meant that it was then seen 
as controllable and something to be avoided (Lupton, 1999).  
The notion of risk as a socially constructed and changing category is pertinent to 
my research topic when looking at how risk is described and understood and how the 
concept of risk intersects with how self-mutilated bodies are conceptualized in the DSM 
and by psychiatrists. Reflect on the term self-mutilation. First, the word mutilation in 
itself implies there is something wrong or bad with altering the physical state of one’s 
body as mutilate/ mutilation is synonymous with “maim”, “disfigure”, “butcher”, 
“desecrate”, “violate” etc. But is there anything “wrong” with altering the physical state 
of one’s body? People often tan, shave, wax, pluck, receive botox or lip injections, build 
muscles, get tattoos, and pierce themselves. Such practices have been accepted, and 
sometimes even encouraged, bodily practices in Euro-American culture. So what makes 
self-mutilation different?  
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2.4 The Objectification of Knowledge  
In “The Conceptual Practices of Power”, Dorothy Smith critiques sociology in 
terms of sociological methods of inquiry and makes a strong case for sociology from the 
standpoint of women. Her arguments are relevant for a further inquiry into how, and 
which, knowledge(s) become important, how social phenomena get constructed and how 
knowledge(s) shape which concepts are used and, in turn, how concepts reproduce 
knowledge(s). Smith elaborates on each of these arguments and illustrates these points by 
highlighting how mental illness statistics are produced and constitute objectified forms of 
knowledge. She argues that objectified forms of knowledge conceal the lived actualities 
of people, particularly women. I draw on Smith’s discussion of the production of mental 
health statistics to illustrate how the DSM contains diagnoses that obscure the 
complexities of people’s lives that then become objectified forms of knowledge upon 
which we rely and produce statistics.  
In line with thinking about the objectification of knowledge and the production of 
statistics, it is important to consider classification and its relationship with diagnosis. Jutel 
(2011) has written about classification and contends that in medicine, diagnosis is an 
important classification system—a way to organize knowledge. Classification is the 
attempt to categorize things that are more similar than different by reducing disorderly 
mess to something more orderly. “Classification also seeks to create meaningful 
juxtapositions between groups and objects. It can only be about isolated, bounded boxes 
if there is something beyond the boundary part of a system where one category sits in 
relation to what it is not” (p. 192). Classification shapes medicine and defines practice 
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because the assignment of particular disease labels is linked to both therapeutic and social 
responses. In this sense, classification cannot be divorced from the social because in order 
for something to be classified as a disease, there has to be some recognition of its 
undesirability. Jutel (2011) maintains that once classification is established, however, it 
reproduces itself in an intuitive way that silences debate. Jutel’s work coincides with 
Smith’s notion of the objectification of knowledge in terms of the ways that classification 
participates in producing objectified forms of knowledge that subsequently lead to the 
production of statistics.  
2.4.1 Critique of Sociology and Women’s Standpoint 
Smith posits that sociological methods of inquiry are problematic, maintaining 
that the universe that sociologists encounter is already ideologically structured (Smith, 
1990, p.57). She argues that sociological research methods often overwrite and interpret 
the site of experience by transposing an experience-based writing and speaking; sociology 
then provides an objectified version of reality that neglects the version of what people tell 
about themselves. She argues that sociological concepts such as “gender” or “the family” 
are concepts that are constructed and then imposed back onto a reality; they are concepts 
that are worked up from the actualities of people’s lives as if they existed outside of 
people’s realities. Often times sociologists (or professionals in any discipline for that 
matter) conducting research come up with new concepts removed from the actualities of 
people’s lives or elaborate on already existing concepts. The problem for Smith exists in 
the data because the data being used or created have already been worked up and 
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formulated to fit objectified forms of knowledge that do not access lived experience and 
thus obscure complicated relations of people’s day-to-day lives.  
Thus, Smith proposes an alternative sociology starting from the standpoint of 
women. A sociology starting from this place re-organizes social investigation by 
beginning with local knowledge and tracing it back to extra local relations. She claims 
that starting from people’s everyday lives demystifies what happens in people’s lives 
subject to ruling relations. An alternative sociology, from the location of women, makes 
the everyday world problematic and in doing so we also problematize everyday localized 
practices of objectified knowledge that organize our everyday worlds. The standpoint of 
women exposes the alienated knowledge of the relations of ruling by highlighting the 
everyday practices of individuals (e.g., care work done by women). With this we can then 
confront that sociology that is written outside of experience (Smith, 1990).  Smith 
proposes an inquiry that produces a way of knowing that can be relied on in an ordinary 
way where sociological statements can refer back to the practices of actual people. 
Therefore, starting inquiry from the standpoint of women enables us to question the social 
relations constitutive of an objective knowledge of society. 
2.5 A Sociological Examination of Self-injury and the Complex Continuum 
 Patricia and Peter Adler conducted research on self-injury (SI) and argue that 
what is revealed through the online self-injury subculture marks an important shift in the 
use(s) of self-injury and how it has been understood. Their longitudinal research charts 
the evolution of self-injury from the early 1990’s to the early 2000’s, noting the shifts that 
have occurred at various points and in particular the rise of self-injury cyber populations. 
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They argue that this may highlight a shift (much like the shift in ideas around tattooing 
and piercing) from a behavior on the fringe to an acceptable mainstream practice. 
Interestingly, they chose not to use the term self-mutilation as they felt the term 
“mutilation” had a negative connotation and chose “self-injury” instead as they felt it 
more adequately described the acts people engaged in. They initially began recruiting 
exclusively for face-to-face interviews but became intrigued when searching the Internet 
using terms such as self-harm and self-injury and finding sites where people were sharing 
their thoughts and reflections on self-injury. Their study population included men and 
women ranging in age from 16 to the mid 50’s, although the majority were women (85% 
women and 15% men). Their study drew on 135 in-depth life history interviews. While 
some of the participants interviewed may have been hospitalized in the past, none were 
institutionalized at the time of the study, therefore highlighting an important segment of 
the self-injury population moving away from the view of self-injury as psychiatric 
pathology (Alder & Alder, 2011). 
The Adlers’ work forces us to realize that with both the increasing awareness and 
practice of self-injury, the question of whether or not the behavior is psychological or 
social (or both) remains. Much of what has been written on self-injury comes from 
research carried out by psychologists or psychiatrists studying self-injury from the 
perspective that views it as a problematic or maladaptive behavior indicative of a 
pathological problem or psychiatric disorder. Common themes surrounding self-injury 
include traumatic life experiences (particularly early childhood experiences that were 
upsetting or damaging to one’s emotional development and sense of security), impulse 
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and emotion control problems that lead to subsequently use of self-injury as a method to 
control, or a mechanism to soothe distressing thoughts and emotions. Adler and Adler 
(2011) make clear that there is still a place for psycho-medical models of self-injury as 
they help define the severity and scope of the behavior and argue that it certainly does 
seem to adequately explain reactions to severe trauma. They have noted in their research 
that out of those interviewed, the people who often did not “grow out” of self-injury 
behaviors were precisely the people who have experienced trauma and/ or 
psychologically upsetting childhoods. However, the psycho-medical model still fails to 
explain why it is that seemingly “normal” people without traumatic histories engage in 
such practices; here the line between pathology and mainstream practice is becoming 
increasingly blurred. The result is the shift of self-injury from a strictly psychological 
phenomenon to a broader sociological one.  
Adler and Adler (2011) posit that the different places where people were situated 
on the psychological/ sociological self-injury continuum depended on factors such as the 
main reasons for engaging in self-injury, the age of the person self-injuring and the 
duration of the self-injury career (how long the person has been engaging in self-injury). 
For example, those who engaged in self-injury for reasons such as high school stressors 
and stopped self-injuring in early college or shortly after graduation were more likely to 
have been engaging in self-harm as a trendy social fad and were more likely to hear about 
it from others or through the media (Alder & Adler, 2011). Those who engaged in self-
injury as a way to deal with the stress resulting from abuse or neglect, who continued to 
do it for long periods of time (even if at points they took hiatuses from self-injuring) into 
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their adulthood were more likely to fall on the psychological end of the continuum. 
Nonetheless, a sociological examination is critical because often self-injurers, regardless 
of where they fell on the continuum, were part of structurally disadvantaged, 
disempowered groups (such as those with lower socioeconomic status). Adler and Adler 
(2011) contend that when behavior spilled beyond psychiatric bounds, it took on 
sociological dimensions that could not be addressed by the clinical frameworks. Perhaps 
this was, and still is, part of the impetus for the DSM to include self-injury as its own 
disorder in future editions of the DSM-5 (it is not listed in the current edition of the DSM-
5 but it is still listed under conditions requiring further study for future editions). A 
critical sociological examination highlights that there are increasing numbers of the 
population who engage in self-injury and do not exhibit symptoms or criteria associated 
with a psychiatric disorder. This also provides insight into the response of the psycho-
medical community and the creation of new psychiatric disorders.  
The Adler’s study population included the following: people who associated with 
alternative subcultures (punk, goth, emo), trendy offshoots, adolescents dealing with 
“typical” stressors, and people who were most often younger, most often women and 
most often occupied structurally disadvantaged positions in either race or social class 
(Alder & Alder, 2011). The population, with the exception of a few, used self-injury as a 
way to manage intolerable feelings and emotions. Furthermore, the commonalities found 
among those in the self-injury population likely suggest positions of powerlessness rather 
than individual psychological or psychiatric pathologies. The experience of being 
disempowered likely results in an emotional distress that can then come to be (mis) 
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understood as symptomatic of a cognitive, behavioral, or medical problem. Alder and 
Adler (2011) note the shifts in self-injury in the early 1990’s, from the hidden practice of 
the psychologically disordered to a cult youth phenomenon dealing with typical teenage 
angst to a wide range of socially disempowered groups. People engaged in self-injury 
careers for various reasons: some had trauma or mental illnesses, others engaged in it for 
rebellion, comfort, or as a way to deal with everyday upsets. Others self-injured in effort 
to relieve emotional tension and maintain a “normal” emotional social appearance. For 
whatever reason, most people still engaged in it as a way to deal with emotional distress. 
Cutting often was a way to control one’s body or take back power when they felt they 
were in a power struggle between their bodies and minds or the world around them (Adler 
and  Adler, 2011).  
2.5.1 Gender and Self-injury 
 Adler and Adler identified the gendered component of self-injury in terms of the 
distribution of the population but also in how these behaviors were understood. They note 
early on that their research supports the assertion that there is a greater prevalence in 
women (85% of their participants were women). They touch on the discussion of 
women’s bodies as micro-regulated (through patriarchal, oppressive appearance practices 
such as skin and weight maintenance etc.) and argue that bodies that are not in line with 
these norms may be defined as deviant and are subsequently pathologized, medicalized 
and criticized harshly. Alternatively, they argue, one might see gendered self-injury as 
actively resisting through agency.   
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 More importantly, they also underlined how gender was taken up and understood 
by the participants they interviewed. The Adlers (2011) argue that intentionally injurious 
acts committed by men are not always perceived and interpreted into the same categories 
as women; a broader spectrum of acceptable risk-taking behavior exists for men. 
Participants were also aware of the ways in which self-injury was gendered, citing how 
the practice of self-injury and subsequent scarring was outwardly perceived differently 
for men and women. Men tended to repress emotion and exhibit obvious outward 
expression (through harsh injury) that was often understood as typical masculinity. 
Women by contrast internalized their emotions, not expressing their discontent outwardly 
(especially when it came to expressing anger).  Participants noted that men tended to cut 
deeper and have bigger scars or that they injured themselves as part of masculine culture.  
One female participant noted how self-injury was constructed as a gendered 
behavior because she felt men had more acceptable outlets for expressing their anger 
(such as punching walls). Many women felt that it was not acceptable for them to 
outwardly show anger through SI so instead they turned their anger inward; others felt SI 
was a way to symbolically externalize wounds they felt were initiated on them (Alder & 
Adler, 2011). Some also cited that the use of masculinity rituals involving SI (risk-taking 
behaviors to demonstrate pain tolerance), to prove one’s toughness or masculinity was 
common, particularly among high school boys. Here risk taking was normalized. One 
participant when asked about his scars explained to his mother that it was masculinity 
ritual he was engaging in with his guy friends and was permitted to continue (Adler & 
Alder, 2011, p.13). 
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Much has been written about self-injury and gender from a feminist perspective 
concerned with patriarchy and oppressive practices; the feminist cultural/ structural 
approach stands in stark contrast to psycho-medical explanations and explores the various 
ways power is inscribed on the body (Brickman, 2004; Kilby, 2001; Liebling et al. 1997). 
The Adlers’ work was a major sociological contribution to literature on self-injury. Adler 
and Alder (2011) also touched on some of the theoretical works written about gender and 
SI but also highlighted the ways in which participants understood self-injury as a 
gendered practice. Gender, like social class and race, shapes one’s position within larger 
social structures and thus makes some people more likely than others to be in powerless 
situations and experience feeling powerless, and lacking control. Some participants 
viewed SI as being gendered because women and girls often found themselves in 
disempowered situations (Alder & Adler, 2011, p. 74).  Whereas hyper masculine culture 
often celebrates, or at the very least normalizes, certain risk-taking behaviors, women 
who engage in risk-taking behaviors are more often heavily stigmatized.  
2.6 Reactions and Responses to Self-mutilation  
Intentional infliction of pain to one’s body often provokes strong, negative 
reactions from others. Purposeful injury of one’s body is often puzzling because it is 
difficult to understand why someone would willingly injure their body without the 
intention of dying. Medical and mental health professionals find self-injuring behaviors 
very puzzling and difficult to understand and treat (Heath & Nixon, 2009). Some 
therapists and physicians found dealing with patients who self-injured left them feeling 
helpless, guilty, sad and angry (Favazza, 2011).  
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Self- mutilation is perplexing and the ways in which it is understood often do not 
reflect or do justice to the underlying distress that is experienced or to what message the 
act itself is intended to convey. One might argue the misunderstanding that surrounds 
self-mutilation only serves to perpetuate and reinforce the very sort of invalidation that 
might lead to purposeful injury of oneself in the first place—Liebling et al. (1997) note 
that feeling invalidated is a trigger for some people who self-mutilate. Strong (2009) 
maintains that cutting is a language written on the body and in order to understand this 
language one really has to listen to what self-injurers say about what they do and why 
they do it. It is useful to consider the reasons for self-injury, the different ways self-
mutilation is read and the psychiatric response to self-injury. I will argue that the way 
self-mutilation is read and made sense of is ultimately not helpful to those who engage in 
it; how self-injurers are treated by medical professionals only exacerbates the struggle for 
one’s pain to be heard. I am referring mostly, although not exclusively, to women’s 
experiences throughout this section because much has been written about women who 
self-harm.  
2.6.1 The Reading of Purposefully Damaged Skin 
What is the function of purposeful injury, what purpose does cutting (or other 
forms of self-mutilation) serve? Ultimately, self-mutilation is used as a self-soothing tool 
in an attempt to feel relief. People who self-mutilated reported feeling grounded or re-
integrated afterwards; some say they feel whole, real, alive and human again, others say 
they use it to break out of feeling numb or conversely report engaging in self-harm 
because they feel too intense and want to feel numb (Strong, 2009). Another explanation 
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given for self-harm is the issue of control, some people say engaging in self-mutilation is 
a way of taking back control of one’s body, a body that has been controlled by past 
traumatic experience and is now controlled by intense distressing thought and emotions 
(Liebling et al., 1997). This would make sense given that the experience of trauma or 
abuse leaves one feeling invalidated, powerless or out of control. However, taking into 
consideration the reasons cited above, many professionals still mistake self-injury, 
particularly cutting, as a suicide attempt (Strong, 2009; Kilby, 2001). These explanations 
fall under the dominant psycho-medical explanations of the reasons for and function of 
self-mutilation. However, there is room for alternative understandings of self-mutilation. 
This is not necessarily to replace the current understandings but to add a more nuanced 
and complicated appreciation that takes into consideration social positions and structural 
factors aside from the psychological/ personality and biological/genetic perspectives.  
The type of treatment self-injurers receive is influenced by the ways in which 
people read or understand larger ideas about the body, gender, risk, pain, death and 
damaged skin (Ahmend & Stacey, 2001). Jane Kilby (2001), in her chapter on bearing 
witness to self-harm, contends that the act of self-harm is a plea for social recognition and 
it would seem that the simple response would be to listen. However, she argues, self-harm 
is difficult to bear witness to precisely because of how it is read and interpreted by others; 
the act of self-harm gains significance because of its break with verbal language, which 
means that others often want to define it in a desperate attempt to make sense of it. 
Consider the terms: non-suicidal self-injury, deliberate self-harm, self-injury, and self-
mutilation. All of these references are attempts to describe a similar act but are reflective 
 41 
 
of the different ways the behavior is read. For example, self-mutilation indicates 
desecration, self-harm indicates mistreatment, and non-suicidal self-injury divorces the 
behavior from suicidal intent. Nonetheless, no matter which term is used, self-mutilation 
is still poorly understood. As Kilby (2001) maintains, self-harm is often viewed by 
medical professionals as attention seeking or playing around with death thus wasting their 
time either because they do not truly want to die or because they are spending time where 
they could be treating someone else. Similarly, Strong (2009) goes on to say that self-
injurers are seen widely as a problematic and hopeless group, particularly in a medical 
system where time is limited and resources are scant and compassion is already stretched 
to the limit.  
An alternative way to view the cut skin, as opposed to understanding it as a desire 
to end one’s life, is a desire to live out past trauma. Armando Favazza (2011), well known 
for his research on self-mutilation, calls self-injury a morbid act of self-help that is used 
to feel okay again, a way to save oneself (quite the opposite of feeling suicidal). 
Psychologist Scott Lines has argued that cutting is an expression through blood and scars 
similar to the emotional expression of tears; others have proposed that self-mutilation acts 
as a mothering substitute in distressing times (much like food, drugs or sex) in an effort to 
fill a void and soothe and comfort oneself (Strong, 2009). Kilby (2001) maintains that the 
testimony of the cut skin is often a means to search for the affirmation and validation 
denied by trauma. As McLean (1996) maintains, self-mutilation represents a language of 
past trauma but also represents a breaking with language, thus the act becomes a language 
itself, a language of pain. Cut skin threatens the boundaries of inside and outside, sane 
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and insane. How others, and more importantly, medical professionals, read the skin and in 
particular, the cut skin, largely impacts those who want their voices heard and there is a 
disconnection between what self-injurers say they need when they seek help and what 
sort of treatment they report receiving from medical professionals (Liebling et al., 1997). 
Reading the cut skin as either attention seeking or an attempt at suicide obscures the 
complexities of women’s lives and reduces their bodies to time spent or wasted (Kilby, 
2001).  The cycle of speaking through the skin in order to be validated and the sort of 
treatment that self-injurers receive often reinforces unequal power relations and 
subsequently, further invalidation. For example, women hospitalized in psychiatric 
institutions reported feeling misunderstood and powerless which meant their desire to cut 
often became stronger. The desire to cut was an attempt to regain power and thus creates 
a cyclical pattern of cutting and feeling invalidated (Liebling et al, 1997).  
2.6.2 The Psychiatric Response 
Hospitalization in any context shifts power dynamics regardless of the reason for 
admission, considering that most day-to-day life responsibilities are removed and patients 
are under the care and control of the hospital staff and the larger organization of the 
institution itself. Power relations in psychiatry play out in a number of ways. Beyond the 
physical constraint of being hospitalized, power is also enacted through the use of 
diagnoses and the criteria used to diagnose. Diagnoses separate and order corporeal states, 
affording higher status to some than others. Diagnoses also organize illness, give 
permission to be ill, and influence the course of treatment and predict outcomes (Jutel, 
2009). The way self-mutilation is often seen, labeled and treated by medical professionals 
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poses another concern. How self-mutilation is read and understood in a medical context 
often means that patients, in an attempt to speak through body language, lose their voice 
once again. In other words, there is the initial pain or distress that leads to the mutilation 
and then the subsequent losing of one’s voice when it comes to seeking out treatment and 
being invalidated as someone who is attention seeking or suicidal, not taken seriously, 
and being further silenced. Unfavorable staff attitudes shaped by the larger medical-
psychiatric ideas influence the type of treatment patients receive. This is seen most 
acutely in women admitted to psychiatric hospitals. 
 In a study by Liebling et al. (1997) exploring past and present reasons for self-
harm, women admitted to psychiatric hospitals found that the experiences of excessive 
institutional control and the resulting power imbalance and negative reactions from staff 
often lead women to self-harm while in hospital as a way to regain control. The women 
listed reasons for self-harming behaviors while in hospital as feeling locked in or 
powerless. The same women reported experiencing reactions from staff that were 
unhelpful and at times punitive.  They suggested alternative ways in which they would 
prefer to have their self-harm responded to rather than the invalidating comments staff 
made. Their suggested alternatives included: feeling like they were in a more caring 
environment, feeling less locked in; having access to group therapy (particularly for 
sexual abuse survivors); and having someone understanding to provide them with 
company (Liebling et al., 1997).  
All too often however, the focus in hospitals is on medical treatments and certain 
types of distress are ignored or staff may lack adequate training. Liebling et al. (1997) 
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noted that because staff attitudes were seen as uncaring or punitive, this often meant that 
the women would not ask for help when they felt they needed it. In line with this, 
Johnstone (1997) argues that despite efforts made to inform staff of self-mutilation from 
the perspective of lived experience, the standard psychiatric approach has remained 
unhelpful and even damaging. Women who were institutionalized often times 
experienced negative reactions from medical staff and found it (re) traumatizing. These 
reactions were largely due to the assumptions embedded in medical psychiatry that are 
often based on the notions of diagnosis, illness, hospitalization and treatment (Johnstone, 
1997).  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the literature necessary for framing my research and 
pointed to gaps in the research. I began by outlining a discussion of gender, 
medicalization and mental health, shifting to literature on the sociology of the body and 
the relationship between risk and the body. A review of the literature on gender, the body 
and risk highlighted how dominant ways of thinking and talking construct ideas about 
normal and abnormal bodies and behaviors. I have shown how these constructions are 
also shaped by larger medical/ scientific epistemologies and incorporated the writings of 
Foucault, Lupton and Smith to show how their work is valuable in helping make sense of 
self-mutilation knowledge production. I also highlighted the importance of sociological 
readings of self-mutilation by showcasing Adler and Adler’s sociological inquiry into 
self-mutilative behaviors. Lastly, I emphasized how the psychiatric response to self-
mutilation paints a clear picture of the intersection between knowledge and practice and a 
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need for change. Through an examination of knowledge production in the DSM and by 
psychiatrists, my research is both an original and important contribution to the literature 
on knowledge.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology and Method  
3.1 Introduction 
This research is a critical study that seeks to understand the construction of 
knowledge about self-mutilation and examines how knowledge is produced in psychiatric 
texts and it is taken up and (re) produced by psychiatrists. This research is a post-
structural feminist analysis of health, deconstructing scientific/ psychiatric knowledges by 
examining how self-mutilation language is produced and taken up. I examined how self-
mutilation knowledge was produced and taken up by reviewing all editions of the DSM 
for references to self-mutilation and how they have changed over time. As well, I 
interviewed psychiatrists about their perspectives regarding self-mutilation, exploring 
their understandings and use of self-mutilation language.  
Qualitative research attempts to answer the how and why of phenomena and its 
goal is to explore and uncover the complexities of such phenomena. Qualitative methods 
of social inquiry are often used within the domain of the social sciences to increase 
understandings of what constitutes health, health behavior and health services (Green & 
Thorogood, 2009). Green and Thorogood (2009) maintain it is useful to characterize 
qualitative research not by the kind of data produced but rather by the objectives of the 
study; the aim of the study guides what are appropriate methods of data collection. Since 
my primary concern is to understand how knowledge about self-mutilation is produced, I 
used two different methods that are most suitable to answer this question: document 
analysis and one-to-one interviews.  
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In terms of data analysis, there are some difficulties in articulating how qualitative 
data will be analyzed given that themes often emerge and the research process can 
change. Qualitative research processes are often fluid and require an ongoing redefinition 
and adaptation. I decided to use critical discourse analysis to analyze my data. Put simply, 
discourse analysis is looking at language use and patterns in language use (Wright, 2009). 
Critical discourse analysis focuses on the relationship between power and discourse, 
studying the way in which “social power, abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, 
reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk 
2001: 352). A discourse consists of a set of common assumptions that may be so taken for 
granted as to be invisible or assumed (Cheek, 2004). Therefore, the goal of critical 
discourse analysts is to “make visible the “common-sense” social and cultural 
assumptions (or ideologies) which, below the level of conscious awareness, are embedded 
in all forms of language that people use” (Fairclough, 1995). 
 Discourse analysis can be considered in numerous ways from post-structural 
approaches to those more concerned with linguistics. A post-structuralist discourse 
analysis is the process of capturing regularities of meaning (Wright, 2009) and can 
promote the critical examination of “health” and “the body” as objects of inquiry (e.g.. 
Beausoleil, 2009). A central concern of a post-structural approach is with the relationship 
between power and knowledge given that power relations are always implicated with 
knowledge and no knowledge is objective or disinterested. Power relations are seen as 
operating through social institutions, are productive and are present in any social relation 
(Lupton, 1999). Post-structuralism raises questions about how selves are constituted and 
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how power and knowledge relations change over time in different places and in social, 
political and cultural contexts (Wright, 2009).  
Discourses both enable and constrain the production of knowledge by allowing 
and excluding certain ways of thinking about reality, including ideas about who can speak 
and what can be spoken about. Analyzing the discourses that the DSM and psychiatrists 
use to describe self-mutilation is one way of uncovering social and cultural assumptions 
about gender, the body, and risk and how they influence the language of mental health. 
“Language is how social organization and power are defined and contested and the place 
where ourselves, our subjectivity is constructed” (Hesse-Biber, 2004, p. 475). Phillips and 
Hardy (2002) argue that without discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our 
experiences, and ourselves. As Wright (2009) has argued, the notion of discourse 
provides a means to understand what resources are available to individuals as they make 
sense of the world and themselves in the world. However, it does not explain why some, 
rather than others, are taken up or how the same discourses are taken up in different ways.  
She contends that part of this answer lies in the relation between power and discourse.  
I focused on uncovering and examining references to self-mutilation and related 
terms in all published editions of the DSM (DSM I through IV) as well as the recently 
published DSM-5 (2013). In addition, I conducted one-to-one interviews with 
psychiatrists to gain their perspectives on self-mutilation and how they understand the 
behavior.  
 Green and Thorogood (2009) contend that whether we are cognizant of it or not, 
theoretical knowledge about how the world works informs the kind of questions we ask, 
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how we answer them and the type of interactions we have. My training in sociology and 
my reading in feminist theory shape my way of knowing the world and what I see as 
worthwhile research questions. This project is a feminist project in that I believe the 
legitimation of knowledge is heavily tied to social structures of domination and that this is 
the case when it comes to how self-mutilation knowledge is constructed. Knowledge is a 
process and although it is often organized and represented in a way that it reflects the 
standpoint of those who produced it, it is often presented as objective or true (Kirby, 
Greaves, & Reid, 2006). Some feminist research differs from the positivist paradigm in 
that the goal is not to discover an “objective” reality that exists waiting to be discovered 
but rather to challenge the very concepts of objectivity and universality altogether. As 
Hesse-Biber (2007) notes, “Feminists ask new questions that place women’s lives and 
those of the ‘other’ marginalized groups at the center of social inquiry” (p.3). Feminist 
research is a relational process rather than an objective product and demands a critical 
self-reflectivity, dialogue, and interaction. The goal here is not to find objective truth but 
rather to explore how self-mutilation knowledge is produced by the DSM and by 
psychiatrists. I will show how the production of self-mutilation knowledge, and its use in 
practice, largely reflects the perspectives of one dominant community (mental/ medical 
health professionals) or one dominant paradigm (medical-psychiatric-disease-illness-
model), such that ways of producing and knowing knowledge go unheard.  
3.2 Ethical Considerations 
Research projects typically have various stakeholders such as researchers, the 
institution(s) for which they work, the participants, and those who are affected by the 
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research results. The question of who the research is for will, of course, shape the research 
process. What the research is for will also imply different ideas about the proper 
responsibilities of the researchers (Green & Thorogood, 2009). Responsibilities of the 
researcher may also vary according to the discipline or paradigm; nonetheless specific 
ethical guidelines (such as, in Canada, those outlined by the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement) must be followed when undertaking research that involves human participants. 
Respect for human dignity forms the foundation for the guiding principles of the Tri-
Council Policy, this includes: respect for persons, and concern for welfare and justice 
(TCPS2, 2010). Consideration of these guiding principles also means recognizing that 
researchers and research participants may not see the possible harms and benefits of the 
research process in the same way, but it is essential to minimize potential harm for the 
research participants. This is ensured by a series of requirements such as a proportionate 
review by a research ethics board for any research involving human participants (TCPS 2, 
2010). 
The issues that may arise from my proposed research design (my second method, 
one-to-one interviews) center around:  free and informed consent, privacy and 
confidentiality, conflict of interest and inclusion in research. Informed consent is essential 
in research involving human participants. Research participants must be informed of the 
intent, purpose, and expected outcomes of the research and voluntarily consent to 
participate in the research (Green & Thorogood, 2009). Participants were required to sign 
consent form that explains the purpose(s) of the research, that ensures all personal 
identifying information is kept confidential and that they have the right to withdraw from 
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the interview/ research process at any time (Appendix E). Permission for the interview to 
be digitally recorded was also outlined in the consent form.  
Confidentiality was ensured by assigning a random pseudonym (e.g., Dr. A, Dr. 
B) to each research participant. I also made certain that there were no personal identifiers 
located within the data, either written or recorded. Names, employment information, 
office location or any other identifying information was not used in the transcripts or in 
the thesis. The master list of pseudonyms and the interview data were digitally password 
protected in separate folders and other related documents were locked in a file cabinet 
located in my academic department. Privacy and confidentiality of both psychiatrist and 
patient information were at issue in my research. Psychiatrists have a code of ethics they 
follow regarding privacy and confidentiality, so it was unlikely that patient information 
would have been divulged. However, in the case that identifying information was shared 
on record (which in one case it was), it was deleted from the written transcript and the 
recorder. If psychiatrists expressed a desire to say something off record, I turned off the 
tape recorder and made no recorded notes of the conversation. All of this was also 
outlined in the consent form signed by psychiatrists before the interview (Appendix E).  
The concept of minimal risk research is defined by the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement as “research in which the probability and magnitude of possible harms implied 
by participation in the research is no greater than those encountered by participants in 
those aspects of their everyday life that relate to the research” (TCPS, 2010: Page 23). My 
research posed minimal risks to participants involved in the research project. Having said 
that, I considered that one-to-one interviews with psychiatrists did pose two separate 
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confidentiality issues (as I have outlined above), first making sure that neither 
psychiatrists nor their practices are identified and second, ensuring that any information 
divulged by the psychiatrists regarding patient information would be deleted from both 
the digital recorder and transcription records. 
3.3 Data Collection 
3.3.1 The DSM 
My research seeks to understand the construction of knowledge about self- 
mutilation and examines how knowledge is produced in psychiatric texts and is taken up 
and (re) produced by psychiatrists. Since my primary concern is to understand how 
knowledge about self-mutilation is produced, in part through psychiatric texts, I focused 
on uncovering and examining references to self-mutilation and related terms in all 
published editions (DSM I through IV) of the DSM, the proposed criteria for the DSM-5, 
and any important changes in the recently published DSM-5.  
My aims were to: 
1) Examine DSM editions I through IV, the proposed criteria for the fifth edition of 
and any noteworthy changes in the published DSM-5.  
2) Compare and contrast how the editions have changed over time particularly with 
reference to self-mutilation.   
 
I took a longitudinal approach to document analysis of the DSM. This means that 
I conducted a document analysis of the DSM over time, between 1952 (DSM-I) and 2013 
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(DSM-5). The DSM is a widely used psychiatric diagnostic tool and it determines the 
official medical criteria to assess and diagnose self-mutilation. A longitudinal document 
analysis demonstrates how knowledge has changed throughout the different editions.  
According to Green and Thorogood (2009), using pre-existing documents can be 
an efficient way to answer qualitative research questions. There are a number of ways in 
which public records can be used as data for qualitative research as the topic of analysis. 
They maintain that public records can be a rich source of data for researchers interested in 
exploring the ways health categories are constructed and how political and social factors 
shape the types of data collected (Green & Thorogood, 2009, p. 178). Documents can be 
read in a number of ways and Green and Thorogood (2009) propose that social 
constructionists make the most out of document resources as they provide an important 
longitudinal record of official classifications of health and medicine. What is of interest is 
how categories are constructed and how they change over time. However, I undertook a 
slightly more nuanced approach to document analysis. I conducted a discourse analysis of 
the DSM (taking into account how the DSM has changed over time) and also considered 
how the DSM is taken up (used, understood, reproduced, and resisted) in practice. 
Understanding how documents are used in real life can be done by repositioning 
documents from the more traditional view of documents as passive and static to 
documents as active social agents where the focus is on function rather than the content 
alone (Prior, 2008). Dorothy Smith (2001) claims it is not enough to use texts alone as 
sources of information about institutions. Instead she reasons that what remains important 
is to examine how texts enter into people’s practices of everyday writing and mediate 
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everyday practices. She contends that sociology in some regards has failed to see how 
texts are implicated in social organization but emphasizes how central texts are to 
understanding ruling relations as ruling relations are textually mediated. Texts are active 
and their words and images are produced and re-produced over time in many different 
contexts, by many people all of whom are situated differently.  
I re-positioned the DSM to show how the DSM influences interaction and 
knowledge production. The DSM is not an ahistorical, unaffected document that just 
came into being, it is an incredibly powerful diagnostic tool that shapes interaction and is 
also shaped by interaction. Thus an exploration into how it informs psychiatrists’ 
viewpoints on self-mutilation is key.  
I accessed DSM editions I through IV through Memorial University’s library 
health database and Psychiatry Online (the online newspaper of the American Psychiatric 
Association). This online newspaper houses a historical DSM library where all published 
versions of the DSM are available to download in PDF format for viewing.  
For editions I through IV, I downloaded the PDF from the online database, noted 
the version, year of publication, any revisions made, number of pages, and references to 
self-mutilation (and its various synonyms) as well as any other additional observation 
notes, and how it may have changed from another version. In order to include various 
combinations or different endings, I used asterisks (*) at the end of terms in order to find 
all variations in the document. Using the “find” function in the PDF reader I searched the 
PDF using the following search terms: self-harm, self-mutilati** (to include self-
mutilation, self-mutilating, self-mutilative), self-injur** (to include self-injury, self-
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injurious), NSSI, non-suicidal self-injury, self-inflicted injury, purposeful injury. I then 
noted results that the search terms produced and took note of what diagnosis/ disorder the 
term self-mutilation/ self-injury was associated with along with the page number. I ran the 
search terms through each edition a second time to make certain the same results were 
produced. Because the search returned multiple results for each edition, I organized the 
results into a series of tables.  
For the proposed fifth edition2, I examined the website and the published hard 
copy. Before DSM-5 publication, using the website, I searched ‘self-mutilation’ in the 
search bar on the DSM-5 website and under the proposed revisions section. I noted the 
proposed change for the inclusion of a new disorder: V-01 Non-suicidal self-injury under 
the category “other disorders” and the APA’s rationale for the inclusion of the diagnosis. 
 In the spring of 2013 I was able to access a hard copy of the published DSM-5 to 
review mentions of self-mutilation.  While I was not able to download a PDF version and 
perform the same find function as I did with versions I through IV, I was still able to 
gather some important information on any deviations from the previous DSM-IV. I took 
note of whether or not non-suicidal self-injury was included as a separate disorder and 
                                                
2 Only versions I through IV were available through the psychiatry online database. At the time I was 
carrying out the analysis of the DSM, the DSM-5 was not yet published, but I had access to the proposed 
criteria. The proposed criteria for the fifth edition were available publically through the APA website for 
the development of the DSM-5: (available at http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx; accessed August 
2012).  While not the same as a published text, the DSM-5 development website contained the proposed 
revisions for the fifth edition of the DSM, ongoing research, links to publications, frequently asked 
questions, and opportunities for public comment on available drafts. Furthermore, during the time I was 
writing my thesis, the DSM-5 was published (spring 2013) at which time I was able to access a hardcopy 
for review.  
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any changes to borderline personality disorder criteria where self-mutilation is listed as 
one of the criteria.  
3.3.2 Interviews 
My goal was to examine the relationship between textual medical knowledge of 
self-mutilation and psychiatrists’ understandings of self-mutilation based on their 
professional experience. The focus of this section is the use of one-to-one interviews as a 
data collection method. The aim of conducting one-to-one interviews was to produce 
detailed accounts from the perspective of the interviewee.  How psychiatrists understood 
and subsequently treated self-mutilation was part of the answer in examining how self-
mutilation knowledge was constructed. 
3.3.2.1 Recruitment 
I interviewed psychiatrists located within the largest health authority in the 
province in St. John’s, Newfoundland. For psychiatrist recruitment I sent an email 
outlining my research and my request for participation to the head of Psychiatry 
(Appendix B). The head of Psychiatry agreed to help in my recruitment efforts by 
discussing my research at a faculty meeting, and then forwarded along to me the names 
and email addresses of the psychiatrists who were interested in participation. I 
subsequently contacted those who indicated an interest in my study via email to set up 
appointments (Appendix C). In a few cases, I wrote follow-up reminder emails. All 9 
psychiatrists who originally indicated interest responded and were available for 
interviews. A tenth psychiatrist was recruited using snowball sampling and was sent an 
 57 
 
information sheet about my study (Appendix D). Recruitment began in December 2011 
and was completed by the middle of February 2012. Ten interviews were conducted 
between January 2012 and March 2012.  
3.3.2.2 The Participants  
The psychiatrists I interviewed came from different educational backgrounds and 
worked at different sites, and specialized in treating different populations (e.g., adult or 
child and adolescent). I interviewed 10 psychiatrists in total and out of those I 
interviewed, there were 6 male and 4 female psychiatrists, 6 of which were child and 
adolescent psychiatrists and 4 who were adult psychiatrists3. The psychiatrists worked at 
three separate hospital sites with both inpatient and outpatient populations. The three 
hospital sites are located within the same health authority that comprises the largest health 
authority (of 4), in the province and serves a population of approximately 290,000 people. 
There was only one psychiatrist I interviewed who worked in psychiatric emergency. A 
greater number of psychiatrists with this type of experience/ perspective would have been 
useful to interview, however they did not indicate interest in my study. Future research 
could perhaps look at the perspectives of psychiatrists who work in psychiatric 
emergency and see and treat self-mutilation patients, as the presentation may be more 
acute and different than the experience of psychiatrists who treat patients in practice. 
                                                
3 Child and adolescent psychiatrists see people until age 18 after which they fall under the realm of general 
(adult) psychiatry. 
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3.4 Qualitative Interview Method 
Interviews are the most widely used method of conducting social inquiry. The 
qualitative interview is different from everyday sort of interviews in that researchers are 
exploring people’s accounts in order to develop some sort of theoretical understanding of 
underlying beliefs and structures; it opens up responses not assuming there is one truth 
but multiple truths and realities (Green & Thorogood, 2009). Rapley (2004) understands 
interviews as social encounters where speakers collaborate in producing retrospective 
(and prospective) accounts or versions of reality of their past (or future) thoughts, feelings 
and experiences. Holstein and Gubrium (2009) suggest simply that interviewing provides 
a way of generating data by asking people to talk about their lives. It has also been 
suggested that the interview is essentially a conversation directed towards the researcher’s 
need for data, but how much of the interview is directed depends on how rigidly or freely 
the interview is structured.  
There are different types of interview methods ranging from structured to semi-
structured to informal interviews. Green and Thorogood (2009) see the semi-structured 
interview as a method where the interviewer sets the agenda in terms of the sorts of topics 
covered but the interviewee’s responses determine the kinds of information produced and 
the importance of them. For my research, I decided to use a semi-structured interview 
format as it best suited my data collection needs; it was free enough to elicit a relaxed 
conversation between myself and the psychiatrists I was interviewing but still remained 
directed toward the topic I was exploring.  
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I developed an interview script where I ordered my questions in what I thought 
was a logical flow, but given the flexible changing nature of the interview process this 
was not always the case. Sometimes I did not adhere rigidly to the order of the questions 
as the conversation flowed naturally and so I let it flow, and if there were unanswered 
questions I went back afterwards and asked them. After I conducted a few interviews, I 
realized that some of my questions were not clear to the participant, so I re-arranged them 
according to the themes, training, experience and perspective to make them more 
coherent  (See Appendices F and G for the original and revised interview scripts). 
I began with general questions about education and choice of psychiatry as a 
profession to lead into the more detailed questions around self-mutilation. Open-ended 
questions were key in my interviews for obtaining the most detailed and rich accounts of 
psychiatrists’ experience. I used “tell me about” type of questions (e.g., “tell me about 
your experience in treating those who self-mutilate?”). When I felt it was necessary to get 
further information or that the information was not clear and I needed clarification, I used 
prompts and probes and mirrored back what I thought they said. There was a delicate 
balance between appropriate silence and knowing when to follow up on a particular 
question or to move on to the next. This was something that I became more comfortable 
with as time went on and I conducted more interviews. Occasionally, in addition to 
digitally recording the interviews, I jotted down a few brief notes during the interview 
and always wrote down more detailed notes and thoughts after each interview. I also kept 
a methods/ reflexivity journal organized according to the categories defined by 
Richardson (2004), in her chapter ‘Writing: A method of inquiry’. The notes were 
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organized under the following headings: observation notes (what I saw, heard, smelled), 
methodological notes (what to wear, what approach worked, what did not work, how I 
collected data), theoretical notes (connections, critiques, early themes) and personal notes 
(non-censored thoughts and feelings, doubts, and exciting moments). I found this to be 
very useful for organizing my thoughts throughout the whole research process. It served 
as a way to de-brief with myself, keep track of how my research evolved and helped 
make sense of how my own subjective position shaped my research. Richardson (2004) 
also maintained that keeping detailed notes like this was a way to understand how 
feelings were affecting what the researcher was laying claim to knowing.  
Holstein and Gubrium (2009) maintain that all interviews are active interactions 
instead of one-way exchanges. Furthermore, they contend, “treating interviewing as a 
social encounter in which knowledge is actively constructed suggests the possibility that 
the interview is not so much a neutral conduit or a source of distortion, but rather a site of, 
and occasion for, producing knowledge” (p.141). Similar to Prior’s (2008) argument that 
documents are not just passive receptacles of content but instead active agents in 
interactional processes, the same is true of the creation of data in the interview process.  
Considering that language is the primary way in which we make sense of the 
world, communicate understanding to others and shape the world, it is an essential site of 
analysis. Language becomes a central feature as both method and data. First, because 
interviews rely on an exchange of words between the interviewer and interviewee and 
second, the data generated from the interaction consists of a sample of spoken and written 
words. As I conducted my interviews I kept in mind that the types of questions I was 
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asking were shaping what answers I might receive. I kept it uppermost in mind that I was 
part of the interactional process of the interview and the creation of data (Holstein  & 
Gubrium, 2009; Kirby et al., 2006). Listening to the words psychiatrists used to describe 
those who self-mutilate was important in understanding how they make sense of the 
behavior and how they take part in (re) producing psychiatric knowledge. Understanding 
how language shapes categories and by extension, the world, is important in uncovering 
meaning, people’s everyday lives and how their experiences shape their health. I was 
concerned with how psychiatrists interpret, organize and make sense of self-mutilation 
and how the knowledge produced in the DSM around self-mutilation is taken up, 
interpreted, and adapted.  
However, language is only part of the inquiry; understanding the larger structural 
processes of interaction is also important. How language is taken up, by whom and in 
what context and how it affects interaction is dependent on many larger structural 
influences and factors. Language does not contain one meaning but multiple meanings. 
So my focus was not only on what psychiatrists say but rather what they say they do in 
practice.  
Given the interactional nature of the interview process, interviewers are also 
unavoidably implicated in meaning making. This is in part is created by, as I have said 
before, the questions that are asked, but also by body language and non-verbal cues by 
both participants. The use of non-verbal cues are also important and something to be 
aware of. I tried to be aware of how I sat and made sure to have what Holstein and 
Gubrium (2009) call an “active listening stance,” sitting with my posture posed slightly 
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forward on my chair, nodding my head, and allowing for appropriate silences and break 
in between questions and responses.  
3.4.1 Reflexivity 
Taking meaning making, question asking and interaction into consideration, it is 
not hard to see that reflexivity in any research process is also essential because the 
position of the researcher will affect the kind of relationship established and the 
interactions that follow. Green and Thorogood (2009) define reflexivity as a reflection 
process whereby the researcher considers and critiques their position within their research 
practice in the same manner they would critically analyze their own data. It is essentially 
a process of self-reflection about how one’s own subjectivity affects their research. 
Hesse-Biber (2007) argue that reflexivity is a dynamic, reflective, learning process in 
which there are constant negotiations with one’s self and their relationships with 
participants in terms of one’s own positionality, assumptions about the world, personal 
biographies and concepts of what constitutes as an insider or outsider. Furthermore, she 
argues that reflexivity is a process that takes place along all stages of the research from 
the research question through to interpretation and writing. However, she also notes “the 
boundaries between self-indulgence and reflexivity are blurred as there will always be a 
struggle with how much to reveal or keep silenced (Hesse-Biber, 2007, p. 507). Thus, my 
position as a 27 year-old, white, female, master’s student, feminist, sociologist engaged in 
interviewing psychiatrists in various positions, undoubtedly affected the dynamics of the 
interaction and thus the data generated. My desire to understand the relationship between 
power and the construction and use of diagnostic categories came from my own 
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experience navigating the politics of the mental health system.  I have witnessed first-
hand the complex ways that power is used and reproduced in interactions among staff, 
among patients, and between staff and patients, and how that use of power shapes, and is 
shaped by, the politics of psychiatry and its use of diagnostic categories. While talking 
about power and interaction might seem very abstract or unimportant, the effects are very 
real for the people who exercise power and for those who experience its effects. The ways 
my positionality affected my research was documented in a methods/ reflexivity journal 
that I kept throughout the research process. I kept this reflexivity journal as a parallel 
process to identify the ways in which I was implicated and positioned in my research so 
that I could be conscious of how my position was affecting the research.  
Consideration of different power/ social positions are noteworthy while 
conducting interviews, as power shapes the data. “An array of interlocking identities such 
as race, gender and class, influence the research process and insider/outsider 
positionalities become more complicated as the researcher ventures into relationships 
across difference” (Hesse-Biber, 2007, p. 499). Often times, past advice concerning 
conducting interviews and power differentials assumed the researcher would have more 
“power” but neglected the different ways in which power can be negotiated. In much 
health research, the opposite is often true where the interviewee often holds the more 
powerful position (Green & Thorogood, 2009). This was the case with my research where 
in terms of career status, age, educational level, and psychiatric language proficiency, I 
was in the less “powerful” social position. Considering, though, that power can be 
negotiated differently, I also had power in the research process given that I chose the 
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research question, came up with an interview script and ultimately organized and 
interpreted the data according to what I saw as important themes.  
3.4.2 The Interview Process 
The interviews took place in psychiatrists’ offices except for one that took place in 
the psychiatrist’s home. Initial recruitment was relatively easy but, due to time constraints 
and responsibility to patients, being able to schedule appointments was difficult, 
moreover interruptions during the interviews (e.g., phone calls, knocks on the door, 
pagers that needed prompt reply) were common. Some interviews were easier than others; 
some people were talkative, some were not or seemed to be pre-occupied (this was the 
case when interviewing one psychiatrist in particular).  
The number of interviews I chose to conduct was, in part, dependent on the 
number of people who indicated interest in participating, which in total was ten. For each 
interview I reviewed the consent process and, with the participants’ permission, I digitally 
recorded the interview. At the beginning of each interview, I introduced my research and 
myself. Some psychiatrists at this point had further questions, and some did not. I also 
asked if there were any questions at the end of the interview. I jotted a few notes during 
the interview and, once the interview was over, I recorded detailed notes on how I 
thought it went, and any initial themes I thought might be evident. I listened to the taped 
interviews once completely without transcribing to become familiar with the data and 
made note of different themes that seemed to be emerging. I then listened to the taped 
interviews a second time while transcribing the interviews and noted different themes that 
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seemed to be emerging. I transcribed the interviews myself, verbatim, including technical 
terms, slang, improper grammar, long pauses, and so on.  
3.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is an ongoing, emerging process and multiple readings of data can 
uncover different things. I have employed what Thomas (2003) has termed “a general 
inductive approach” to uncover important themes.  The purpose in using this approach is 
to condense extensive raw data into brief summary format, to establish links between 
research objectives and the findings from the data and to make theoretical sense of the 
underlying structure of the experiences or processes that are evident in the data. The 
model of analysis is the development of themes from raw data into a framework that 
encompasses what is considered important by the researcher. Inevitably, the findings are 
shaped by the assumptions and experiences of the researcher conducting research and 
analysis.  
Coding involved an initial reading of the transcripts followed by a close reading of 
the text and the creation of broad categories and themes (and subthemes). I then identified 
un-coded or overlapping categories, while identifying contradictory points of view. 
Transcripts were used to identify themes and, when no new themes were identified, I 
concluded that that all relevant themes were recognized. I then organized data into 
separate theme-based Microsoft word documents. 
The general inductive approach provides an efficient way of analyzing qualitative 
data (although it is often confused with grounded theory approach) (Thomas, 2003). 
However I am not claiming that the data “spoke” to me and revealed themes that were 
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somehow already organically there. The themes I uncovered were of course influenced by 
my research question and the methods I employed and my particular way of knowing the 
world. But a general inductive approach helped sort out a very detailed, large amount of 
data in order to identify relevant important themes. Within this general approach, after 
identifying themes, I looked for particular discourses within the DSM or used by 
psychiatrists and took note of how discourses were embedded in certain knowledge 
constructions. The term discourse has many different definitions depending upon the 
discipline in which it is used, but for the purposes here, I am referring to discourse as the 
use of language that is based on particular knowledge constructions. For example, there 
are biological discourses, political discourses, gendered discourses, and medical 
discourses and some discourses are dominant and others marginal. I employed critical 
discourse analysis to uncover implicit assumptions surrounding gender, the body, and risk 
found in the language of the DSM and in how psychiatrists spoke about self-mutilation. I 
was also concerned with how these discourses affected practice. I then linked the themes/ 
findings back to some of the writings I have outlined in the literature review chapter. 
3.6 Theoretical Framework 
Both documentary and interview data can be analyzed from multiple perspectives. 
My research is multi-disciplinary and works in and between the disciplines of sociology, 
anthropology, psychology and medicine. Within these disciplines, I draw on the writings 
and work of Michel Foucault, Deborah Lupton, Dorothy Smith, and various other post-
structuralist, materialist and feminist approaches. I found the work of Dorothy Smith and 
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her discussion of the objectification of knowledge to be particularly useful in theoretically 
making sense of self-mutilation knowledge construction.  
As I have noted above, above all I am most influenced by feminism. There are 
many different types of feminisms within feminist theory and I define feminism as an 
inquiry into “common sense” assumptions, discourses and behaviors are often reflective 
of deeper-rooted inequalities such as sexism and heterosexism and are based on gendered 
dichotomies of masculine/ feminine, strong/ weak, rational/ emotional. Theses 
inequalities, whether implicit or explicit, are the product of power differentials and have 
real world effects and implications for the health of women and men. From motor vehicle 
accidents to domestic violence to mental health issues, to war-related injuries, health is 
gendered and gender is often a contextual factor that affects people’s lives in very serious 
ways. I believe it is important to use a feminist lens when looking the health broadly, and 
specifically, in my own research in what ways gendered dichotomies shape how the 
body— or rather how self-inflicted damage to the body— is produced and understood.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Both Green and Thorogood (2009) and Fossey et al. (2002) argue that qualitative 
research aims to address questions that explore the meaning and experience of people’s 
lives and worlds. This research is aimed at gaining a richer, deeper understanding of how 
self-mutilation knowledge is constructed and understood. Given the flexible qualitative 
methodology I have employed, themes and alternative approaches have inevitably 
emerged and changed throughout the research process. I think the methods of data 
collection I have chosen complement one another in understanding how self-mutilation 
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knowledge is produced/constructed. The methods enable me to map the connections and 
disconnections between knowledge produced in the DSM and how knowledge is (re) 
produced/ taken-up by psychiatrists. 
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Chapter 4 – The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
4.1 Introduction 
The DSM is an American based classification of mental disorders used by 
psychiatrists around the world and is incredibly influential in the production of the 
language of mental disorders (Cooper, 2004). It is the primary handbook used by mental 
health professionals for providing consistent, standardized diagnoses when 
communicating about patients. Given that the DSM is tremendously influential in the 
production of the language of mental disorders, an analysis of the DSM is part of the 
logical flow in mapping out self-mutilation knowledge production in the DSM itself but 
also in psychiatric practice. In this Chapter, I will only briefly highlight how the DSM 
came into being and the changes it has undergone in its 60-year history. The DSM and its 
complex history is the subject of a much broader inquiry.  
This chapter will provide the necessary background to have an elementary 
understanding of how the DSM was produced, followed by a more in depth discussion of 
the DSM in relation to self-mutilation. I include an overview of how the DSM came into 
being, its diagnostic system, critiques of the DSM and the search results pertaining to 
mentions of self-mutilation in the editions I have examined. Although the DSM-5 was not 
yet out at the time I conducted the analysis of versions I to IV, this did not significantly 
alter my findings. I will address these changes in the DSM 5 later on in this chapter. 
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4.1.1 Background of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
According to the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2012), the DSM is 
defined as: 
The standard diagnostic tool used by mental health professionals worldwide to 
promote reliable research, accurate diagnosis, and thus appropriate treatment and 
patient care. Each psychiatric disorder with its corresponding diagnostic code is 
accompanied by a set of diagnostic criteria and descriptive details including 
associated features, prevalence, familial patterns, age, culture, and gender-specific 
features, and differential diagnosis. (APA, 2012)  
 
As the title and description suggest, the DSM is a text containing criteria and 
guidelines used to define, diagnose, communicate about and guide treatment for various 
mental disorders to medical or mental health professionals. This need for classification 
has been evident throughout the history of medicine. Classification systems are developed 
to organize information and aid in the diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions; 
agreement on classification categories however is contentious. What led to the 
development of the DSM? In the United States, prior to World War II, the need to collect 
statistical information was the preliminary impetus for the categorization and 
classification of mental disorders. What might be considered a first attempt to gather 
information on mental illness, noted by the APA, was recording the frequency of “idiocy/ 
insanity” in the 1840 census. Forty years later, the 1880 census listed seven different 
categories of mental illness (APA, 2012).  
The period after WW II marked a fundamental shift in psychiatry, recognizing the 
impact of environmental stressors associated with combat and the effect stressors had on 
soldiers. This subsequently marked a significant change in thinking surrounding 
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psychiatric disorders and treatment (Grob, 1991). Taking this into consideration, a 
broader nomenclature was developed by the United States Army to better encompass the 
outpatient populations of World War II service people and veterans. At the same time, in 
1948, The World Health Organization (WHO) published the sixth edition of the 
International Classification for Disease (ICD), which, for the first time since being 
published, included a section on mental disorders. Subsequently, the APA Committee on 
Nomenclature and Statistics developed a variation of the ICD-6, which became the first 
edition of the DSM (DSM-I). The DSM-I contained a glossary of descriptions of 
diagnostic categories (APA, 2012). The development and publication of the DSM and the 
ICD were often concurrent and shared the goal of diagnostic agreement and congruency 
so that mental health professionals would be able to communicate diagnoses and 
disorders consistently.   
4.1.2 Editions I through IV and the DSM-5 
The DSM has evolved over the past 60 years, changing significantly, reflecting 
both changes in society as well as understandings of psychiatric disorders. As is the case 
for most texts, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is not exempt from the influence of 
the social/ historical/ political period in which it was published.  
The impetus for the development of the first DSM was an increase in patients’ 
mental suffering from fighting in WWII and the need for a standardized diagnostic 
measurement. The DSM-II was an attempt to better organize the previous version, but 
still failed to produce clear diagnostic categories. This subsequently led to the 
development of the DSM-III. DSM-III represented a major shift in the DSM. For the first 
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time, the DSM made the move from descriptive paragraphs to a criterion based, multi-
axial diagnosis system that attempted to address the problem of diagnostic agreement 
among physicians; it was a radical change from the DSM-II, which was oriented toward 
psychoanalytic concepts (Martin, 2009). The DSM-III included new diagnoses, such as 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), and 
homosexuality was removed as a mental disorder (DSM-III, 1980). Explicit, 
operationalized criteria meant that diagnostic agreement among mental health 
professionals was better than before (Bernstein, 2011).  However there were number of 
inconsistencies in the new criteria. The APA appointed a work group to revise the edition 
and make corrections that led to the development and publication of the DSM-III-R in 
1987 (APA, 2012).  
The DSM-IV came out in 1994. Compared to the DSM-III and DSM-III-R, 
numerous changes were made to the classification, the criteria and the text description; 
some disorders were added and some deleted (APA, 2012; DSM-IV, 1994). There were 
no major changes to DSM-IV-TR (2000) other than changes to the text portion.  
The much anticipated, highly controversial DSM-5 was published in the spring of 
2013. This edition changed from using roman numerals DSM-V to DSM-5 to make 
revisions easier e.g., DSM-5.1, 5.2. The DSM-5 included fifteen new diagnoses (e.g., 
caffeine withdrawal, cannabis withdrawal and skin picking disorder) while eliminating 
others completely (e.g., Asperger’s Disorder) and made changes to some of the already 
existing criteria and specifiers.  
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4.1.3 Revisions 
The APA maintains that the DSM serves as an important educational tool and that 
it is essential that information within the text be recent. A revision to the manual usually 
reflects the need for incorporating new evidence from ongoing research (APA, 2012). For 
the most part, each edition has undergone a revision either of the entire manual, denoted 
by “R” (e.g., DSM-III-R) or a revision to the text denoted by “TR” (e.g., DSM-IV-TR). 
Sometimes revisions are necessary to incorporate new research (either statistical, clinical 
or both); other times revisions are made to change, include, or delete certain diagnoses.  
 4.2 The Use of the DSM by Professionals 
It is important to understand how the DSM is used, in other words how diagnoses 
are made. The DSM does just what the title says: its intended purpose is to convey 
statistics about mental disorders and to provide clinicians with directions about how to 
code, report and diagnose mental disorders. The priority of this sort of manual is to create 
a helpful clinical guide to assist mental health professionals with how to diagnose and 
report psychiatric disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  The major advancement of the DSM-
III was the introduction of the systematic criteria sets and a multi-axial diagnosis system. 
This organizational structure continued in the DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-IV-TR (2000).  
According to the DSM-IV-TR (2000)4, the purpose of the manual is to provide 
characteristic descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians to 
                                                
4 Throughout this section, I will refer to the DSM-IV-TR. As described in the Methods section of this 
thesis, this analysis was conducted prior to the publication of DSM-5. The analysis remains salient; it is 
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diagnose, communicate, and study people with various mental disorders. The DSM does 
not contain information regarding treatment, although the goal is accurate diagnosis 
leading to appropriate treatment (APA, 2012). However, it is important to note that the 
influence of DSM diagnosis still shape treatment and treatment outcomes. The 
explanations of diagnostic procedures begins with a cautionary statement on making 
diagnoses,  stating that diagnostic criteria are offered as guidelines for making diagnosis, 
and that the proper use of these guidelines requires specialized clinical training (DSM-IV-
TR, 2000, p. xxxvii).  
So how are the diagnoses made? The DSM-IV-TR is grouped into 16 major 
diagnostic categories, each of which has various diagnosis contained within the 
corresponding category. For example, Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is found 
under the heading Personality Disorders and Bipolar Disorder is found under the heading 
Mood Disorders. Each disorder has a name and corresponding diagnostic number/ code. 
The coding system in use in the United States at the time of DSM-IV-TR (2000) 
publication was the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical 
Modification (ICD-9-CM). Most disorders that appear in the DSM appear with a 
numerical code that appears preceding the name of the disorder, at the beginning of the 
text section and at the beginning of the list of criteria (e.g., “301.7- Antisocial Personality 
Disorder”). For some diagnoses, the appropriate code depends on further specification 
and often times subtypes (e.g., Delusion Disorder, Jealous Type) and/or specifiers (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                            
consistent with DSM-5. Therefore, I have chosen to retain my original language here, referring to DSM-IV-
TR rather than revising in keeping with DSM-5. 
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296.21 Major Depressive Disorder, Single episode, mild) are provided for increased 
specificity.  The APA declares the use of this code is important for medical record 
keeping and is often required for insurers and government agencies. Each diagnosis is 
followed by a text section outlining the diagnostic features of the disorder accompanied 
by epidemiological information and diagnostic criteria for the disorder.  As the DSM 
clearly indicates, the diagnosis usually applies to the individuals’ current presentation at 
the time of seeking medical help (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).5  
After a diagnosis is made, often a multi-axial assessment system is also used to 
ensure a comprehensive, systematic evaluation has been made.  Attention is paid not only 
to mental disorders, but also to the various physical or general health concerns and 
environmental and psychosocial factors. Because of the complexity of some 
presentations, most diagnoses also have a “Not Otherwise Specified” (NOS) category to 
be applied in cases when the diagnostic criteria do not cover all clinical situations and 
presentations (e.g., Eating Disorder NOS). Some have criticized NOS categories as being 
a catch all diagnosis when a diagnosis is not necessary (Davis, 2006).  
It is worth mentioning that the DSM-5 eliminated the 5 axes, multi-axial 
assessment system. The new system combines the first three axes outlined in past editions 
of DSM into one axis with all mental and other medical diagnoses. The APA maintains 
that the impetus to shift to a single axis system was to remove artificial distinctions 
among conditions (DSM-5, 2013). 
                                                
5 A more detailed description of coding and reporting procedures can be found on page 1 of the DSM-IV-
TR (2000). 
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4.3 Critique of the DSM 
As with any text whose goal it is to organize, categorize and label the complexity 
of people’s lives, the DSM is not exempt from much criticism and contentious debate. It 
is often considered the “bible” of psychiatry and when used has the power to label an 
individual’s behavior, which can have positive or negative consequences for an 
individual’s life (e.g., stigma, internalization of the label, denial or acceptance of 
treatment coverage from insurance agencies). Although the DSM is an incredibly 
powerful diagnostic tool, the validity and reliability of diagnoses have been called into 
question. The APA recognizes the possible problems in using diagnostic categories and 
lists the limits of using a categorical approach: “DSM-IV is a categorical classification 
that divides mental disorders into types based on criteria sets with defining features, 
however, there is no assumption that each category has absolute boundaries” (DSM-IV-
TR, 2000, p. 24). 
4.3.1 Moral Judgment 
The development of the DSM, its politics and the effect of its (mis)use has been 
the source of much debate within various disciplines. Thomas Szasz in the Myth of 
Mental Illness (1974) holds that psychiatric interventions are directed at moral, not 
medical, problems. Extending this, Miller (2004) writes about the implicit moral 
judgments that are found in the treatment of human suffering and argues that the extent to 
which our culture approaches the moral dimensions of human character in a de-moralized 
manner is evident in the DSM-IV. In particular, he argues that Axis-II, Personality 
Disorders, is not a list of symptoms but rather a description of lifelong patterns of 
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thought, feeling and behavior that are characterized as being disordered. Miller argues 
that this sort of classification is invalidating and harmful to the people who experience 
these thoughts and feelings. He also questions whether psychiatry and psychology have 
taken on the responsibility of enforcement and control of moral standards of behavior. He 
questions whether this enforcement is seen in domains that do not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the law, such as intimate relationships and personal tastes where therapists 
often act as wardens in the sense that they are employed to “do something” about 
correcting what is seen as problematic ways of being in the world (Miller, 2004). Others 
have argued that while all diagnoses in the DSM house some implicit moral evaluations, 
the moral judgment is hardly disguised when it comes to personality disorders (Caplan, 
1995; Kirk and Kutchins, 1992).   
4.3.2 Politics and the Myth of Objectivity 
Cooper (2004), in her critical assessment of “what is wrong with the DSM,” 
concludes that while the DSM is of practical use, it is not necessarily the best 
classification of mental disorders. Questioning what constitutes a “natural” mental 
disorder, she argues that naming a condition a “disorder” is partly a value judgment. She 
cites the diagnosis of homosexuality as a classic example of how political issues shape 
what conditions count as diseases/ disorders and which do not. The debate surrounding 
homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder listed in the DSM was contentious and was later 
changed in 1973 when Robert Spitzer (chair of the DSM-III) put together a new definition 
of mental disorder that was both politically useful and seemed to appease both sides of 
the debate. He proposed that a “condition can only be a mental disorder if it causes 
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distress or disability” (Cooper, 2004, p. 7). He did this by defining mental disorder and 
removing the diagnosis of “homosexuality” from the DSM but replacing it with “sexual 
orientation disorder” instead. Spitzer created a subtly different definition of mental 
disorder that managed to still pathologize sexual orientation in a way that did not seem 
overtly homophobic. Second, Cooper (2004) questions objectivity and theory-laden 
perception in psychiatric theory. “For the most part, the descriptions of conditions 
included in the DSM are based on psychiatrists’ observations of psychiatric patients. Thus 
we must ask whether perceptions of people are affected by theoretical beliefs” (p. 15). 
She concludes that inquiries into how knowledge is produced are crucial considering 
classification is theory-laden.  
4.3.3 The Relationship between Diagnosis and Treatment Coverage  
Another major criticism of the DSM is the relationship between which diagnoses 
are included in the DSM and various financial pressures. While this is specific to the 
United States and is not directly connected to my research, in an effort to highlight the 
incredible far-reaching power of the DSM, is imperative to underscore the power a DSM 
diagnosis has on treatment coverage. As I have mentioned earlier, while the DSM does 
not provide guidelines for treatment, it is important to note that DSM diagnoses shape 
treatment and treatment outcomes. One way this affects individuals is through denial of 
treatment coverage. Anthropologist Emily Martin (2009) maintains that since insurance 
companies or federal programs require DSM codes on their bills, many people have 
become familiar with the language of the DSM. It could be argued that people are 
somewhat forced to take up the vocabulary of the DSM, particularly if they need 
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coverage. In the 1960’s, insurance companies began to cover part of the cost of 
psychotherapy and it soon became required by medical insurance companies that DSM 
diagnoses be provided in order to obtain coverage for treatment (Martin, 2009; Cooper, 
2004).  The pressure for reimbursement manifested itself in different ways. First, doctors’ 
interests were affected and those who wished for their patients to be reimbursed may be 
inclined to exaggerate a patient’s diagnosis (in order to justify treatment and obtain 
coverage) or may record less severe diagnosis (in an attempt to reduce or avoid stigma 
and socially unacceptable diagnosis) (Martin, 2009; Cooper, 2004). Not only does it 
become clear that diagnoses have real world effects for people (stigma, insurance 
coverage) but also that diagnoses may be somewhat arbitrary and can be easily 
manipulated by financial pressures. Second, there is pressure to include “new” diagnoses 
in the DSM as a result of patients and psychiatrists lobbying for treatment and insurance 
coverage. For example, Cooper (2004) has argued that when lobbying is successful, new 
diagnosis are included in the DSM, citing the introduction and inclusion of PTSD in the 
DSM-III (1980) as the result of lobbying efforts by Vietnam veterans and programs 
aimed at treating the disorder.  
The DSM is quite powerful; it has the power to label and marginalize, but also to 
help and treat. It provides the vocabulary that shapes how individual behaviors are 
understood and categorized, particularly when they do not fit what is seen as normal, 
appropriate behavior. The DSM also provides psychiatrists, other health professionals and 
lay people with the language to define mental illness. Inquiry into how the DSM produces 
diagnostic knowledge and specifically knowledge surrounding self-mutilation is key in 
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understanding how experts both take up and understand what is considered self-
mutilation.  
4.4 Historical References to Self-mutilation   
The DSM has changed considerably since its inception, going through many 
revisions as well as changes to the overall organizational structure. References to self-
mutilation, and related terms, have also changed over time since the first edition of the 
DSM-I in 1952.6 Some noteworthy observations stand out: first, the DSM has grown in 
terms of number of pages and the number of disorders over time, from 132 pages and 106 
disorders in DSM-I in 1952 to 947 pages and 297 disorders in DSM-5 in 2013. The 2013 
edition contains the same number of disorders as did the DSM-IV-TR in 2000. This is 
because complaints about the ever-increasing number of disorders led the Chair of the 
DSM-5 task force to announce that the number of disorders in the DSM-5 would not 
increase (Rosenberg, 2013). However, as Rosenberg (2013) has pointed out, due to the 
major re-structuring of the DSM-5, new disorders can be subsumed under existing 
disorders thus appearing as if the number of disorders did not increase. This explains why 
both the DSM IV-TR and the DSM-5 list 297 disorders. 
Table 4.1 DSM overview editions I through V DSM	  Edition	   Year	  Published	   Number	  of	  Pages	   Number	  of	  Disorders	  DSM-­‐I	   1952	   132	  pages	   106	  disorders	  DSM-­‐II	   1968	   119	  pages	   182	  disorders	  DSM-­‐III	   1980	   494	  pages	   265	  disorders	  
                                                
6 See Appendix H for a detailed breakdown of references to self-mutilation and related terms seen in DSM 
editions I to IV. 
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DSM-­‐III-­‐R	   1987	   567	  pages	   292	  disorders	  DSM-­‐IV	  DSM-­‐IV-­‐TR	   1994	  2000	   886	  pages	  943	  pages	   297	  disorders	  297	  disorders	  DSM-­‐5	   2013	   947	  pages	   297	  disorders*	  
 
4.4.1 Terminology 
4.4.1.1 Term Use and Intention  
It is necessary to discuss the issue of DSM terminology as a foundation to 
understanding how self-mutilation is constructed in the DSM and how it evolves over 
time. I originally started out thinking I would examine only references to self-mutilation 
as that was my object of inquiry; however, there are so many related terms that something 
might have gotten lost in my analysis if I had proceeded with this narrow inquiry.  
Therefore, in addition to self-mutilation, I included in my analysis three related terms: 
self-inflicted injury, self-injury, and self-harm. This broader inclusion was useful for 
highlighting how different synonyms are used with certain disorders and not others.  
The terms self-mutilation, self-injury, self- inflicted injury, self-harm and non-
suicidal self-injury have all been included in the DSM over the course past four editions7. 
Different terms are associated with different disorders; some disorders are associated with 
the term self-mutilation and others with self-harm or self-injury. I chose to include all of 
the variations of self-mutilation for two reasons: first, to ensure I did not overlook 
anything by limiting the search to looking only for references to self-mutilation. Second, I 
                                                
7 An in-depth analysis of differences in terminology is beyond the scope of this inquiry.     
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thought the use of different terms highlighted something worth exploring:  some disorders 
used terms like self-harm and others used self-mutilation, when essentially they referred 
to the same type of behavior—a purposeful injury to oneself. Some interesting questions 
come up: why the difference in self-mutilation, self-inflicted injury and self-harm as 
terms? Do they refer to something different? Is there is a judgment implicit in the 
differences in terms? For example, perhaps the term self-harm is the term associated with 
autism, but is it with the assumption that it cannot be helped because the disorder is 
considered organic?   Head banging, self-biting and self-hitting are part of the diagnostic 
criteria Stereotypic Movement Disorder, but is not considered to be part of self-mutilating 
behavior in the criteria: is this because it is understood as something else? Perhaps the 
term self-mutilation is seen as intentional on the part of the individual, reflecting a lack of 
control, or failure to regulate oneself, thus garnering negative attention?  
For DSM editions II to IV, the APA was not explicit about the rationale for the 
particular use of one term over another. The DSM-5, however, in the proposed revision to 
include non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) as a separate disorder in future editions, 
maintained the rationale for the use of the term NSSI as opposed to the terms self-
mutilation or self-harm. The APA argued that self-mutilation is the term used in the 
existing borderline literature and that “mutilation” refers to the physical loss of, or loss of 
use of, a body part, whereas NSSI involves superficial damage without loss of power or 
autonomy and is the term most commonly used in the more recent research (p. 6, Shaffer 
and Jacobson, 2009). It remains unclear why the term self-mutilation is still used in the 
context of borderline personality disorder (BPD) when the term “mutilation” refers to loss 
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of, or loss of use of, a body part. This is an extreme, and some would argue rare, case of 
self-mutilation. In addition, self-mutilation in the context of BPD can, and most often 
does, refer to superficial damage to the body. However, it does seem that the introduction 
of the term NSSI serves to dissociate self-mutilation from BPD.  
While all of the terms related to purposeful self-harm in the DSM refer to damage 
to the self in some way, I suggest that particular terms used seem to depend on the 
intention of the individual engaging in the behavior. For example, the terms self-inflicted 
injury, self-harm and self-injury are often associated with developmental disorders (e.g., 
Stereotypic Movement disorder, Autistic Disorder) or disorders where it seems the 
behavior is a consequence of suffering from the disorder (e.g., Catatonic Type 
Schizophrenia, Dissociative Amnesia Disorder) and therefore might be understood as less 
intentional. In other words, self-harm is an outcome of being disordered but not 
necessarily what makes them disordered to begin with. Self-mutilation, I argue, is often 
seen in the DSM as part of what makes one disordered (i.e., being listed as a criterion 
more often than an associated feature or complication). Perhaps it is both the perception 
of the individual’s intention as well its connection with BPD that plays a role in the 
negative view of self-mutilation. The relationship between intention and disorder 
becomes blurred and it becomes arduous to decipher what comes first, the behavior or the 
disorder.  
4.4.1.2 Self-mutilation and Related Terms in the DSM from 1968 to 2013 
When I conducted a term search of the different DSM versions, the results 
highlighted the terms wherever they were listed in the DSM. Sometimes this meant that a 
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particular term was listed as a central feature of a disorder (i.e., explicit diagnostic 
criteria), but the same term may have also been listed, peripherally, under the course, 
associated features, complications or prevalence sections. For example, self-mutilation is 
listed explicitly as part of the diagnostic criteria for BPD but self-mutilation is also listed 
under associated features for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). The former is one of 
the defining criteria by which professionals diagnose an individual with BPD and the 
latter is a behavior that may possibly occur in people who have the disorder but is not a 
defining feature of the disorder itself. Appendix H includes the detailed breakdown of the 
DSM search results.  In the following table, I outline where references to self-mutilation 
and related terms were first seen in the DSM.  
Table 4.2 highlights the introduction of self-harm related terms over time. Given 
that NSSI is currently being considered to be included as its own separate disorder in 
future versions of the DSM-5, we can begin to also see the evolution and introduction of a 
new disorder and thus appreciate how knowledge (diagnosis) gets produced. It is also 
important to note the term self-mutilation has been associated with a number of different 
disorders over the course of DSM editions three to five. The disorders included: Sexual 
Masochism, Childhood Onset Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Multiple Personality 
Disorder, and Stereotypic Movement Disorder. For these disorders, self-mutilation was 
listed under associated features, course, or complications or explicitly as diagnostic 
criteria. Consistently, however, self-mutilation has been listed as a diagnostic criterion for 
BPD since the DSM-III in 1980 to the current DSM-5. I will return to this point in the 
discussion at the end of the chapter.  
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Table 4.2 Introduction of self-mutilation and related terms into the DSM 
Term  DSM Version  Associated disorder(s) 
“Self-inflicted 
injury” 
DSM-II  Suicide and Self-Inflicted Injury 
(E950-959) 
“Self-mutilation” 
 
DSM-III8 299.9x  Childhood Onset 
Pervasive Development Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic criteria) 
 
302.83 Sexual Masochism 
(Listed under course) 
 
319.0(x) Unspecified Mental 
Retardation 
(Listed under diagnostic criteria) 
 
301.83 Borderline Personality 
Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic criteria)  
“Self-injury” 
 
DSM-III-R 307.30 Stereotypy/ Habit Disorder 
(Listed under prevalence) 
 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder 
(Listed under features) 
“Self-harm” 
 
DSM-IV 295.20 Catatonic Type 
(Listed under description) 
“Non-suicidal self-
injury” (NSSI) 
 
 
DSM-5 Part of proposal to include NSSI 
disorder in future DSM-5 editions) 
 
 
                                                
8 The DSM-III was also the first time BPD was included as a new disorder and “self-mutilation” was listed 
as one of the diagnostic criteria.  
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4.5 DSM-5: Pre-publication and the Proposal to Include NSSI as a Separate 
Diagnosis 
The term non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) was not seen in any of the previous 
editions of the DSM; the proposal to include NSSI disorder as its own diagnosis in the 
DSM-5 was a significant proposed change. Due to what some argued was the lack of 
diagnostic recognition, there had been several unsuccessful attempts to include NSSI as a 
separate disorder in previous editions of the DSM. Prior to the publication of DSM-5 in 
spring 2013, the task force proposed the inclusion of NSSI as a separate disorder (Selby et 
al., 2012). This was a major shift because NSSI had not been previously listed in the 
DSM-IV or the ICD-10 in itself or as part of any anxious or depressive disorder 
(Wilkinson and Goodyear, 2011). According to the APA, the rationale for the creation of 
a new diagnosis includes that the “new” disorder either has not been or was insufficiently 
represented in the DSM-IV, the diagnosis must have clinical value, must improve 
accurate identification and treatment, and be prevalent, impairing and distinctive (APA, 
2012). The APA extended this to support the argument for the inclusion of NSSI as a 
diagnosis in the DSM-5. There was a limited representation of NSSI in the DSM-IV and 
the closest representation was found in criterion # 5 of BPD, where “self-mutilation” was 
found in “recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, thoughts, or self-mutilating behavior” 
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  
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4.5.1 Renaming and Re-conceptualizing Self-mutilation and its Association with 
BPD and Suicide  
Shaffer and Jacobson, (2009) maintain that previous attempts to include NSSI in 
the DSM were rejected because it was regarded as a defining feature of BPD. This, 
however, was changing at the time the DSM V was being drafted; self-mutilation was 
becoming understood to be evident outside of BPD populations. Recent research had 
shown that there are both adults and adolescents in inpatient and outpatient populations 
who engage in NSSI behaviors but do not exhibit any of the other criteria for BPD (Nock 
et al., 2006; Selby et al, 2012). In addition, Selby et al (2012) found that NSSI occurs 
without BPD symptoms and is associated with higher levels of stress. Wilkinson and 
Goodyear (2011), in their review of whether or not it is appropriate to include NSSI as a 
diagnosis, concluded that adding NSSI disorder to the DSM-5 could have a number of 
positive consequences including: improved communication among mental health 
professionals and patients, as well as improved treatment and management decisions.9 
In their proposed revision to include NSSI as a separate disorder in future editions 
of the DSM-5, the APA clarifies the rationale for the use of the term NSSI (non-suicidal 
self-injury) as opposed to the terms “self-mutilation” or “self-harm”. They argue that self-
mutilation is the term used in the existing borderline literature and it refers to the loss of 
or use of a body part; self-harm refers to a broad range of behaviors including gambling, 
and suicide attempts whereas NSSI involves superficial damage without loss of power or 
autonomy and is the term most commonly used in recent research, thus is the most apt to 
                                                
9 The authors only refer to adolescent populations in their discussion. 
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describe the new disorder (DSM-5, APA, 2012). Furthermore, associating NSSI with 
BPD can lead clinicians to make an automatic assumption that those who self-mutilate 
have BPD, furthermore, NSSI had to be distinct from BPD (Selby, 2012). Shaffer and 
Jacobson (2009) argue that the failure to distinguish terms affects research activity and 
renaming and recognizing purposeful self-harm as NSSI will provide new ways of 
understanding the disorder apart from BPD. Taking this into consideration, what does that 
say about self-mutilation and its association with BPD? Is the proposed divorce from 
BPD in part an attempt to have NSSI taken seriously without the negative associations of 
being “difficult” to treat? The DSM-5 still uses the term “self-mutilating behavior” in the 
section on BPD but under Conditions Requiring Further Study; Non-Suicidal Self-Injury 
Disorder (p.803) uses the terms “intentional self-inflicted damage” and “self-injury” 
(DSM-5, 2013).  
Beyond being associated with BPD, self-mutilation is also commonly confused 
with suicidal behavior by both the general public and by health professionals (Liebling et 
al., 1997; Walsh, 2006). The association between self-mutilation and suicide is also 
argued by some to be a public health concern in that it contributes to the over-utilization 
of treatment resources (i.e., restrictive surveillance and management such as emergency 
room resources, hospitalization, and/or long-term therapies) (DSM-5, APA, 2012). 
Shaffer and Jacobson (2009) suggest that the mistaken association between suicide and 
self-mutilation is the foremost motivation for the inclusion of NSSI as its own separate 
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disorder. However, how NSSI as a diagnosis will lead to different management and 
treatments is not clear in the rationale provided by the APA.10  
4.5.2 DSM-5 Post- publication: NSSI and Other Important changes  
NSSI was not included as a new disorder in the DSM-5, although the possibility 
of including NSSI as its own disorder in future editions of the DSM-5 (DSM-5.1, 5.2) is 
not totally out of question. It is not clear why the inclusion of NSSI as a new disorder was 
not made. NSSI is still listed under conditions requiring further study in the DSM-5. The 
new proposed criteria for NSSI as its own disorder include: 
“In the last year, the individual has, on 5 or more days, engaged in intentional self-
inflicted damage to the surface of his or her body of a sort likely to induce 
bleeding, bruising, or pain (e.g.,, cutting, burning, stabbing, hitting, excessive 
rubbing), with the expectation that the injury will lead to only minor or moderate 
physical harm (i.e.,, there is no suicidal intent).  
  
Note: The absence of suicidal intent has either been stated by the individual or can 
be inferred by the individual’s repeated engagement in a behavior that the 
individual knows, or has learned, is not likely to result in death. 
 
The individual engages in the self-injurious behavior with one or more of the 
following expectations: 
To obtain relief from a negative feeling or cognitive state. 
To resolve an interpersonal difficulty. 
To induce a positive feeling state. 
  
Note: The desired relief or response is experienced during or shortly after the self-
injury, and the individual may display patterns of behavior suggesting a 
dependence on repeatedly engaging in it. 
 
The intentional self-injury is associated with at least one of the following: 
                                                
10 A more comprehensive listing of the rationale to include NSSI as a diagnosis is included in the APA’s 
discussion of proposed revisions to the DSM5 
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=443# (Accessed August 2012)  
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Interpersonal difficulties or negative feelings or thoughts, such as depression, 
anxiety, tension, anger, generalized distress, or self-criticism, occurring in the 
period immediately prior to the self-injurious act. 
Prior to engaging in the act, a period of preoccupation with the intended behavior 
that is difficult to control. 
 
Thinking about self-injury that occurs frequently, even when it is not acted upon. 
The behavior is not socially sanctioned (e.g., body piercing, tattooing, part of a 
religious or cultural ritual) and is not restricted to picking a scab or nail biting. 
  
The behavior or its consequences cause clinically significant distress or 
interference in interpersonal, academic, or other important areas of functioning. 
The behavior does not occur exclusively during psychotic episodes, delirium, 
substance intoxication, or substance withdrawal. In individuals with a 
neurodevelopmental disorder, the behavior is not part of a pattern of repetitive 
stereotypies. The behavior is not better explained by another mental disorder or 
medical condition (e.g., psychotic disorder, autism spectrum disorder, intellectual 
disability, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, stereotypic movement disorder with self-
injury, trichotillomania [hair-pulling disorder], excoriation [skin-picking] 
disorder).”  (DSM-5, 2013, p.803) 
 
Even though NSSI was not included in DSM-5, the existing proposal to include 
NSSI as a diagnosis points to some important considerations. It means that self-mutilation 
outside of BPD may eventually become recognized as a separate entity which emphasizes 
an important shift in recognizing the diversity of issues related to non-suicidal self-injury. 
It is essential to note, given the link between self-mutilation and BPD since the DSM-III 
in 1980, that the criteria for BPD in the DSM-5 remained unchanged from what was seen 
in DSM-IV-TR (2000) and still included self-mutilating behavior as a criterion. 
Therefore, self-mutilation is not yet divorced from BPD altogether. It is likely that, while 
NSSI may be included as a separate disorder in the future, self-mutilation will still remain 
a fundamental characteristic of BPD. This is due to the connection between self-
mutilation and impulsivity with difficulty regulating intense emotions, particularly in 
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times of real, or feared, rejection or abandonment, which does not seem to be in evidence 
in the proposed NSSI diagnosis.  
While there were no major changes to personality disorders per se, other changes 
in the DSM-5 included changes to Axis II disorders by eliminating the Axis II category 
altogether and moving Personality Disorders to the main disorders section. This 
reorganization could have a positive effect for the treatment of personality disorders. It 
has been suggested that many insurance companies have not covered treatment for 
personality disorders because Axis II diagnosis (e.g., personality disorders) were defined 
as pervasive and enduring, thus are considered time and resource intensive requiring 
mostly talk therapy, consistently over time. Importantly though, the DSM-5 included an 
alternate diagnostic model for personality disorders and encouraged its use among 
clinicians (Wakefield, 2013).  The alternate model was the result of original efforts to 
overhaul personality disorders entirely in order to provide a dimensional (vs. the 
traditional categorical approach) diagnostic model. While it is listed only as an alternative 
model, it still made its way into proposed changes to future DSM-5 editions and is a step 
toward a more complex understanding of personality variations, behavioral patterns and 
emotional reactions. Rather than relying on categorical criteria, the alternate approach 
provides more detailed criteria that more take into account multiple areas of an 
individual’s functioning. For example, the proposed alternate (dimensional) model for 
BPD has two major A and B sections where two or more of four have to be found in 
section A and four or more found in section B to warrant a diagnosis.  Section A includes 
the headings: Identity, self-esteem, empathy, and intimacy. Section B includes the 
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following headings: emotional lability, anxiousness, separation insecurity, depressivity, 
impulsivity, risk-taking and hostility. This is different from the previous and currently 
used categorical list of nine criteria where five or more have to be met to warrant a BPD 
diagnosis.  
Interestingly, ‘Skin Picking Disorder’ was included as a new diagnosis under the 
umbrella of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. This is interesting because it illustrates how 
ideas around intention and responsibility contribute to the distinction between what is 
considered within and outside of the control of an individual. In other words, skin picking 
disorder refers to damage to the skin yet is not considered self-mutilation or non-suicidal 
self-injury because it does not relate to the intention of harming oneself. Skin picking, 
rather, seen to be the result of fixation or preoccupation. 
The DSM-5 also underwent major changes to the diagnostic procedures that were 
originally created in the DSM-III (1980). The DSM-5 has eliminated the multi-axial 
system implemented in the DSM-III, restructured the entire document into three sections 
with different chapter headings. The elimination of the multi-axial system was an attempt 
to be congruent with other general medical diagnostics (that do not require multi-axial 
assessments) as well as co-ordination with ICD, which was a major concern (Wakefield, 
2013).  
4.5.3 Critique of the DSM-5  
Wakefield (2013) argues the DSM-5 places into question the state of knowledge 
in psychiatry and in mental health in general and poses the question of whether or not we 
can expect continuous revisions of psychiatric classification (Wakefield, 2013). Defining 
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and categorizing mental disorders has always been controversial. The controversy 
surrounding the DSM-5 is argued to be unprecedented; some criticize the DSM as 
pathologizing far too many variations of human behavior, but particularly so in the DSM-
5 (Wakefield, 2013). Mainly it is criticized for diagnostic inflation, the relationship 
between the APA and drug companies and the possible loss of insurance benefits due to 
diagnostic restructuring (i.e., coverage for therapy being denied due to change in 
diagnoses). Considering the overhaul of the DSM-5, Smoyak and Halter (2013) argue that 
it still does not depart significantly from previous diagnostic systems and may not provide 
information that better informs treatment.  
Alan Frances, the editor of the DSM-IV, objected to the ways in which he thought 
DSM-5 was participating in turning normal into disordered: 
“DSM-5 will turn temper tantrums into a mental disorder....Normal grief will 
become Major Depressive Disorder....The everyday forgetting characteristic of old 
age will now be misdiagnosed...creating a huge false positive population of 
people....Excessive eating 12 times in 3 months is no longer just a manifestation 
of gluttony and the easy availability of really great tasting food. DSM-5 has 
instead turned it into a psychiatric illness....DSM-5 has created a slippery slope by 
introducing the concept of Behavioral Addictions that eventually can spread to 
make a mental disorder of everything we like to do a lot....DSM-5 obscures the 
already fuzzy boundary been Generalized Anxiety Disorder and the worries of 
everyday life....Many millions of people with normal grief, gluttony, 
distractibility, worries, reactions to stress, the temper tantrums of childhood, the 
forgetting of old age, and ‘behavioral addictions’ will soon be mislabeled as 
psychiatrically sick.” (Frances 2012) 
 
In sum, the proposal to include NSSI as a disorder underlines how understandings 
of self-mutilation have evolved over time. This poses some interesting questions: Are 
more people presenting with self-mutilating tendencies to psychiatrists or is it that that 
people are finally recognizing the disorder and seeking help? If in fact self-mutilation 
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behaviors are increasing, why is this so? Is this due to cultural or psychological factors — 
and can these be separated? 
4.6 The DSM, Medicalization and Obscuring Contextual Complexity 
Broadly, a look at the DSM from a critical point of view illustrates how individual 
complexities are condensed into numbered criteria and coded diagnoses. The DSM is a 
diagnostic tool and, in order to diagnose, certain criteria need to be met. These criteria are 
also supposed to be part of an “objective” system of categories in accordance with a 
scientific model that is compiled of clearly defined disease categories (Martin, 2009). 
Psychiatrists do not have biological or medical tests to determine mental illness and they 
rely upon the self-reported symptoms from patients, which are interpreted through the 
patient’s experience, then through the psychiatrist’s own experience, shaped by their 
academic training, and the diagnostic criteria listed in the DSM. The checklist criteria 
serve a way to code behaviors, the result being that the DSM oversimplifies the 
complexities of people’s lives. Saying an individual meets 5 of 7 criteria ignores the 
possible range and presentation of people’s behaviors. Consider this example, listed on 
DSM-5 website under the section “sexual dysfunctions”: N04- female sexual interest/ 
arousal disorder and N05 – male hypoactive desire disorder. The criteria of these 
disorders lack contextual and social explanations and are devoid of the complexities that 
surround relationships and sexualities. Take into consideration the names of the disorders 
themselves, which are reflective of dominant ideas surrounding gender and 
heterosexuality and the problematizing and pathologizing of oversexed and undersexed 
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behaviors, which are socially constructed concepts based on what is deemed appropriate 
desire and drive for each of the sexes— which are constructed as dichotomies.   
It is not the goal of the DSM to provide a nuanced, complex view of the reasons 
contributing to individual psychological manifestations and the DSM does not go beyond 
a medical, individual centered model to explain larger social relations and their individual 
effects. The DSM is not all bad either, it is a tool used to organize, code, and document 
behavior; a way to produce knowledge about mental illness and a way of structuring, 
ordering knowledge with the intention of giving a name to the pain and suffering of 
people and treating mental illness. What becomes problematic then is how these 
knowledges get produced and taken up, because this has implications for people’s 
everyday real lives. The removal of context surrounding certain behaviors and the effects 
that diagnostic labels have on individuals’ lives are significant, particularly if the 
diagnosis has a negative connotation (Camp et al, 2002).  Take for example, Axis II 
diagnoses, personality disorders, defined by the APA as “an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s 
culture” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p. 685). Being diagnosed with a personality disorder might 
consequently result in negative treatment from health professionals because clinicians 
often regard these patients as difficult, high risk (in terms of suicide) and untreatable 
(Davis, 2006). As I have pointed to earlier in the chapter, Miller (2004) also contends that 
there is an inherent judgment when it comes to personality disorders because it does not 
just serve as a list of symptoms but rather a description of lifelong patterns of thought, 
feeling and behavior that are characterized as being disordered. 
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4.7 The DSM and the Gendering of Self-mutilation 
Although Smith is critiquing the practices of sociology in The Conceptual 
Practices of Power, she extends this to the practices that produce objectified 
knowledge(s) in any discipline where the data has already been worked up and 
formulated to fit objectified forms of knowledge. I am drawing on the arguments Smith 
present in her text, “the statistics on women and mental illness and the ruling relations 
they conceal” in connection with my own research on the construction of self-mutilation, 
where self-mutilation is listed as one of the symptoms/ diagnostic criteria of BPD. I am 
extending her argument to highlight how the criteria for BPD listed in the DSM-IV are 
gendered and thus conceal what goes into the making of the statistics. This is further 
solidified in Smith’s article, “K is Mentally Ill”, where she highlights the difficulties in 
creating alternative accounts of an individual’s behavior when the set of instructions 
(objectified forms of knowledge) on how to understand someone as mentally ill have 
already been formulated; this is the process of diagnosis. Behaviors that that fall outside 
of that framework then have no place to belong or at the very least few other avenues to 
be interpreted through (Smith, 1978).  
Smith investigates the statistics on gender differences in mental illnesses and 
questions the procedures that produce the statistics, exploring the ruling relations 
underlying their production. Her main argument is that often what goes into the making 
of the text is not explicit and available, suggesting that the statistics on mental illness 
conceal the ruling relations that go into their making. Smith (2001) defines ruling 
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relations as various forms of bureaucracy, administration, media and discourses 
(scientific, technical and cultural), which, she maintains, are textually mediated.   
Furthermore, the process of becoming mentally ill (or rather being diagnosed as 
such) is a process in which psychiatric agencies participate (Smith, 1990). It goes 
something like this: an individual is recognized as not fitting appropriate social norms and 
thus is seen to exhibit “symptoms”, this individual is then diagnosed by a professional 
relying upon “objective” diagnostic criteria and is then subsequently counted in mental 
health statistics. However, “objective” criteria, apart from symptoms that are absolutely 
physically observable, are difficult to find. Seeing what people do as symptoms of mental 
illness comes about in a process of social interaction (without interaction, symptoms are 
not observable by others). The process of diagnosis is done through interaction between 
individuals (patients) and experts (psychiatrists) drawing on objectified forms of 
knowledge (DSM). Even if the position of the professional (e.g., psychiatrist, 
psychologist) is one of detachment, this still constitutes as interaction. Furthermore, once 
someone is labeled as “mentally ill”, he or she is not expected to make sense and is 
treated as if they do not, thus the process of “making” crazy (Smith, 1978), creating a 
situation where one’s behaviors can only be observed and understood as crazy and 
nothing else. As Jutel (2009) has argued, diagnosis is both a process and a label and 
guides medical practice. It provides structure to narratives of disorder and deciphers real 
from imagined while serving to also impact the relationships between doctor and patient. 
Understanding diagnoses provide insights into how we understand health and illness and 
the energies that shape our knowledge (Jutel, 2009). 
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Obscuring the complexities of people’s everyday lives also means obscuring their 
social positions. The work of sociologist Dorothy Smith is useful here as she argues that 
objectified forms of knowledge conceal the lived actualities of people, particularly 
women. The DSM is a diagnostic tool used by psychiatrists and serves as a way to order 
individual behaviors and, depending on the number of behaviors/ symptoms that fit the 
objective criteria, also serves as a method to produce diagnosis. Smith’s discussion 
surrounding the production of mental health statistics is useful to illustrate how the DSM 
contains diagnoses that obscure the complexities of people’s lives that then become 
objectified forms of knowledge upon which we rely and produce statistics. For example, 
consider that the diagnosis of BPD is more frequently given to women than men. BPD is 
a personality disorder characterized by unstable moods, behavior and relationships; the 
DSM-IV states that 75% of patients diagnosed as BPD are women, without any further 
discussion as to why this might be (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). This statistic has not changed in 
the recently published DSM-5 (DSM-5, 2013). This poses an interesting question, are the 
criteria for BPD gendered? I posit that some of the criteria for BPD are inherently 
gendered thus producing a gendered (feminine) patient.  
Consider the following criteria for BPD from the DSM: “# 4: Impulsivity in at 
least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex, substance abuse, 
reckless driving, binge eating) and # 8: Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty 
controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical 
fights)” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Both criteria include behaviors that in men are seen as part 
of normal masculinity and are often celebrated. Sex, substance abuse (excessive 
 99 
 
drinking), reckless driving, frequent displays of temper and physical fights are behaviors 
associated with the type of normalized risk-taking behavior in line with dominant 
constructions, and performances, of masculinity. Risk taking is a gendered performance 
and for men testing the boundaries of fear and endurance proves one’s masculinity 
(Lupton, 1999). This is contrasted to the constructed ideals of femininity that emphasize 
safety and caretaking. Women are often marginalized for behaviors that are regarded as 
incongruent with ideals of femininity (i.e., risk taking behavior or displays of behavior 
perceived as masculine) and, in essence, are pathologized for behaving like men. It is this 
type of transgression from social norms (gender roles) that results in social 
marginalization and the policing of gender roles that act to keep gender roles intact and 
constructed as opposites. Because BPD is largely characterized by risk-taking behaviors 
and risk taking behaviors are often an accepted part of masculinity it is not hard to see 
how women would comprise the majority of those diagnosed with BPD. The criteria 
listed in the DSM-IV for BPD are gendered and thus conceal what goes into the making 
of the statistic: “75% of patients with BPD are women”. The factual story that is produced 
from the individual is forced to fit an already formulated abstraction of psychiatry in the 
form of checklists that exist in the DSM.  
I contend that because of the strong discursive link between self-mutilation and 
BPD, self-mutilation is also gendered (feminine). Self-mutilation is also one of the nine 
criteria for BPD (# 5: Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating 
behavior DSM-IV-TR, 2000) and thus, through the gendering of the criteria for the 
disorder, self-mutilation becomes gendered (feminine) as well. The relationship between 
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self-mutilation, BPD criteria and the statistic that women comprise the majority of BPD 
patients may be a self-fulfilling prophecy, cuing the psychiatrist to look for certain 
behaviors and finding them. Put simply, BPD is gendered (feminine) through the 
construction of the diagnostic criteria (and the statistic that 75% of people with BPD are 
women). Self-mutilation is gendered (feminine) because of its strong link with BPD. This 
shapes how both self-mutilation and BPD are understood, treated and how ideas about 
both may be reproduced in psychiatry. To clarify, my argument that self-mutilation is 
gendered is not based on the prevalence rate: I am arguing that the prevalence statistic is a 
construction that comes from the fact that borderline personality criteria are gendered, 
therefore skewing what we think is the prevalence rate (because psychiatrists are finding 
what they are looking for).  
The DSM criteria contain a set of criteria that when the patients say things that do 
not fit they are simply left out. Thus, the factual story that is produced from the individual 
(in the case here, cutters or women who present with distress) is forced to fit an already 
formulated abstraction of the discipline (psychiatry). The text (in the case here, the DSM) 
organizes social relations that transform the local experiences of actual people and works 
them up into this stripped down representation of them (Smith, 1990, p. 108). Thus it 
neglects the adequate examination or explanation of the ruling relations that shape 
people’s everyday actualities. For example, when a woman has experienced traumatic 
sexual abuse, the complex problematic intersection of gender inequality and power 
relations is stripped down to fit nine criteria (in the case of BPD) resulting in a diagnosis 
and a statistic. The woman’s voice and the reality of her distress get lost in the label.  
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The DSM contains diagnoses that obscure the complexities of people’s lives that 
then become objectified forms of knowledge upon which we rely and from which we 
produce statistics. The DSM does not consider the actual experiences people have had 
that have shaped, and continue to shape, their lives and behaviors. Starting from the 
standpoint of women (or those marginalized and deemed others) real lived actualities will 
offer a very different version of the local than what is presented in the DSM.  As Smith 
(1990) claims, how knowledge is mediated becomes problematic because we do not 
necessarily know the ways in which that knowledge was organized for us prior to our 
participation in it, it is not totally available to us in its original form. The DSM is one 
such example. Beyond obscuring the complexities that have shaped people’s lives, what 
goes into the making of the DSM is not made explicit.  Any processes prior to its finished 
product are not explicitly apparent, even if information on task force and work groups 
seems to be transparent in the making of it. Ruling relations and the social organization of 
society is textually mediated. Smith maintains that a knower’s access to the object of 
knowledge is through its textual presence, which is often hidden but effective. “Knowing 
is still an act, knowledge discards the presence of the knowing subject” (Smith, 1990, p. 
66).  
The DSM constitutes knowledge but the subjects behind its production have 
disappeared and has obtained the taken for granted status of objective, scientific finding 
and the reader often interprets it as a given. To qualify a statement with “I know” is to 
lose factual standing thus to achieve factual standing is to eradicate historical, specific 
and subjective sources (Smith, 1990).  The objectification of knowledge is a feature of 
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ruling relations. Through an examination of the DSM and a closer look at self-mutilation, 
BPD criteria and its relationship to gender, the process of self-mutilation knowledge 
production and its discursive link to BPD and women becomes clearer. This is significant 
because uncovering how self-mutilation knowledge is constructed makes clear how 
gendered inequalities are perpetuated and reproduced in psychiatric knowledge and 
practice.  
4.7.1 Evolution of a Disorder 
Self-mutilation has been associated with different disorders and has changed over 
time. In DSM-II it was associated with suicide; in DSM-III it was first listed in 
association with BPD, Childhood Onset Development Disorder and Unspecified Mental 
Retardation; in DSM-5, self-mutilation underwent a name change (NSSI), which was also 
a shift from solely being associated with BPD; and most recently, a proposal is in place to 
have self-mutilation be a separate disorder from BPD in future editions of the DSM-5. 
Here we can see how self-mutilation appeared as a symptom of a disorder and essentially 
has transformed into a (proposed) new, separate disorder over time.  
It is worth examining this shift in detail, particularly the APA’s rationale for 
divorcing self-mutilation from BPD in order to have self-mutilation gain independent and 
separate status as NSSI disorder. From DSM-III (where both self-mutilation and BPD 
were first seen) to DSM-5, self-mutilation was listed either as a central, specific 
diagnostic feature (i.e., as part of the diagnostic criteria) or peripherally as an associated 
feature or complication (its inclusion in the category of “associated features” highlights 
the fact the self-mutilation was being seen in other clinical presentations). Below is a 
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table outlining where self-mutilation was listed as a defining feature of a disorder as part 
of the explicit diagnostic criteria. 
Table 4.3 Self-mutilation listed as explicit diagnostic criteria 
DSM-I (1952) None 
DSM-II (1968) None 
DSM-III (1980) 299.9x- Childhood Onset Developmental Disorder 
319.0x- Unspecified Mental Retardation 
301.83- Borderline Personality Disorder 
DSM-III-R 
(1987) 
301.83- Borderline Personality Disorder 
DSM-IV (1994) 301.83- Borderline Personality Disorder 
DSM-IV-TR 
(2000) 
301.83- Borderline Personality Disorder 
DSM-5 
(2013) 
301.83 –Borderline Personality Disorder 
  
What might be the implicit rationale for divorcing self-mutilation from BPD in 
order to have self-mutilation gain independent and separate status as NSSI disorder? For 
example, what happened in DSM-III-R (1987) to the references to self-mutilation in the 
other two diagnostic categories? This is important in terms of understanding how BPD 
has become so stigmatized. What does that transformation in terminology say about self-
mutilation and its association with BPD? Is the proposed divorce from BPD in part an 
attempt to have NSSI taken seriously without the negative associations of being 
“difficult” to treat? 
Smith (1990) argues, in relation to the production of knowledge through 
sociological research, that researchers often come up with new concepts removed from 
the actualities of people’s lives; that is, that data are merely formulated to fit or elaborate 
on already existing concepts and forms of knowledge, in ways that do not access lived 
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experience and that therefore obscure complicated relations of people’s day-to-day lives. 
Smith enables us to extend this critique to other practices and disciplines that produce 
objectified knowledge(s). Objectified forms of knowledge get written into DSM in subtle 
ways and get taken up in practice, and this is where understanding the DSM as a 
document that is an active social agent becomes useful. The process of becoming 
mentally ill (or rather being diagnosed as such) is a process in which psychiatric agencies 
participate (Smith, 1990). An individual is recognized as not fitting appropriate social 
norms and thus is seen to exhibit “symptoms”; this individual is then diagnosed by a 
professional relying upon “objective” diagnostic criteria and is then subsequently counted 
in mental health statistics. However, “objective” criteria, apart from symptoms that are 
absolutely physically observable, are difficult to find. Seeing what people do as 
symptoms of mental illness comes about in a process of social interaction (without 
interaction, symptoms are not observable by others). The process of diagnosis is done 
through interaction. Even if the position of the professional (e.g., psychiatrist, 
psychologist) is one of detachment, or the diagnostic tool is a document (DSM), this still 
constitutes as interaction. The DSM, then, is not simply a passive document but acts as an 
active agent in an interactive network.  
Once a diagnosis makes its way into the DSM, the text then becomes a cue to the 
practitioner to know what to look for, thus creating more examples of what they were 
looking for in the first place; a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is part of the process of the 
production and evolution of a disorder. Smith calls this the objectification of knowledge 
and argues this is not a true reflection of reality but how texts produce reality and 
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knowledge about it. Smith’s work is particularly fitting when asking how knowledge is 
produced. A longitudinal analysis of the DSM has highlighted the textually mediated 
objectification of self-mutilation knowledge.  
4.8 Discussion  
Psychiatry as a discipline holds incredible power to be able to make diagnostic 
and treatment decisions about people’s lives. The main diagnostic tool that provides the 
language to define disorder holds part of this power.  The influence of the DSM is far 
reaching. Beyond its obvious labeling power, the terminology in the DSM is taken up by 
practitioners to be able to characterize someone as disordered but also is taken up by the 
general public and used to surveil both others and themselves.  
Power can be exercised in many ways. Discipline is a mechanism of power that 
regulates the behavior of individuals in the social body. This is done by regulating the 
organization of space, of time and people's activity and behavior— which is enforced 
through complex systems of surveillance (e.g., psychiatry, diagnostic criteria). Foucault 
emphasizes that power is not discipline; rather discipline is simply one way in which 
power can be exercised, through the disciplining of knowledge but also of attitudes and 
gestures as well. Foucault also understood the shift from disciplinary power to modern 
forms of power in terms of relations of power that were constantly being produced and 
reproduced (Foucault, 1994). This power is exercised through the management of life via 
biopower and various technologies of power. The DSM is a technology of power. The 
DSM acts to normalize disorder by pathologizing the normal. Understanding how the 
DSM constructs disorder helps to understand the connection between how such 
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discourses are taken up and reproduced. Consider the discursive link between BPD and 
self-mutilation: this is a clear example of how psychiatrists link behavior with discursive 
references from the DSM and corresponding disorders. 
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Chapter 5 – Psychiatrists’ Understandings of Self-mutilation 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will “introduce” the psychiatrists I interviewed11, and then 
proceed to the first major theme: how do psychiatrists talk about self-mutilation.  In the 
next chapter I will discuss the other two themes: how psychiatrists deal with self-
mutilation in practice and whether or not they reproduce the language of the DSM. 
5.2 The Participants 
5.2.1 Dr. G  
Dr. G is a female psychiatrist specializing in child and adolescent psychiatry. She 
chose to go into child and adolescent psychiatry because she was interested in both 
pediatrics and psychiatry. Unlike general adult psychiatry, child and adolescent 
psychiatry has the added layer of having to include parents in the treatment process in 
order to understand the whole picture (which she argued was a challenge and a benefit). 
Dr. G could not recall learning much about self-mutilation in her training but what she did 
learn was the differentiation between self-mutilation and suicidal behavior. She also noted 
that since her training, knowledge around self-mutilation has changed. She maintains that 
each person’s cutting was about something different (e.g., acceptance as part of an in-
group in a school, trying to feel pain when they felt numb, trying to feel when numb when 
                                                
11 Pseudonyms were randomly assigned to each psychiatrist.  
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overwhelmed). People often cut because of a history of trauma or emotional neglect and it 
functioned as a coping mechanism to deal with the pain. She believes that genetics played 
an important role in temperament and subsequently how people deal with life stressors, 
and that environment and experiences compound the mix. Dr. G treats more girls than 
boys. She believes that self-mutilation is less visible in men. She believes that self-
mutilation behavior can be a trait of BPD but is not necessarily a defining trait of the 
disorder. She maintains that self-mutilation has both increased and is also more 
acceptable because it is less hidden. She was the only psychiatrist I interviewed to 
mention sensory profiles (e.g., high registry, low sensory or low registry, high sensory), 
arguing that people who self-mutilate have high sensory function and thus need strong 
sensations to deal effectively with overwhelming registries; these difficulties could be the 
result of trauma which has significantly impacted particular pathways in the brain and 
responses to external stimuli and internal anguish.  
5.2.2 Dr. H 
Dr. H is a child and adolescent psychiatrist. He explained that his interest in both 
pediatrics and psychiatry is what had steered him into practicing child and adolescent 
psychiatry. He did not think self-mutilation is a major concern in psychiatry today but is 
nonetheless of importance because it is an “epidemic among teenage girls”. While he 
does treat boys who self-mutilate, he emphasized that girls self-mutilate far more. Dr. H 
could not recall learning much, if any, about self-mutilation in his training. He defines 
self-mutilation as burning and cutting, but not hitting oneself. He is adamant about not 
paying too much attention when his patients tell him about their practice of self-
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mutilation or show him their scars; he believes paying attention to the behavior might 
reinforce it and lead them to increase their activity. He was careful to distinguish self-
mutilation from suicidal threats/ thoughts, noting the two are not the same.  
Dr. H believes many patients (almost always girls) self-mutilate to make a 
statement, to ease tension at home or to relieve tension after a relationship has ended. 
Other patients hurt themselves because they are frustrated and angry; the endorphin 
release has a positive, reinforcing effect. He strongly cautioned against equating self-
mutilation with depression because he has seen several patients who self-mutilate and are 
not depressed. Often times, those who self-mutilate have the diagnosis of BPD but this is 
not exclusive. Other patients include adolescents who see self-mutilation as a viable 
option for coping with stress. Dr. H believes that teaching alternative ways to experience 
pain without damage to the body (e.g., pinching the Achilles tendon or holding ice cubes) 
is key to treatment. He cautions his patients about how scars may affect how people are 
treated in the future. He did not think self-mutilation is more acceptable socially, but has 
seen an increase over the past number of years.  
5.2.3 Dr. F 
Dr. F specializes in child and adolescent psychiatry. She remembered learning 
about self-mutilation in residency and that self-mutilation was associated with people 
with personality disorders (mostly BPD) and had nothing to do with wanting to commit 
suicide but rather is a way to regulate emotions. She also noted that self-mutilation is 
looked at negatively in the mental health community. In her practice, she has seen a lot of 
adolescents who self-mutilate and argues that in this population in particular, self-
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mutilation goes through phases and periods of trendiness. She also observes self-
mutilation behaviors in patients with personality disorders (mostly BPD) and argues that 
people have very little tolerance for people with BPD because of patients’ difficulties 
with abandonment.  
Dr. F thought there was no typical patient, she sees more girls who self-mutilate 
more than boys, although she noted that boys do engage in the behavior (albeit in 
different ways) and that boys who are troubled are more likely to fall towards the 
correctional system than the mental health system. The goal for her in practice is to figure 
out what distress precedes the action. In her opinion self-mutilation is not “treatable” per 
se, but understanding the context of the situation is important.  
She also mentioned not paying too much attention to patients showing their scars, 
because doing so might reinforce the behavior. She cited self-mutilation as a major 
concern in psychiatry because of its prevalence. She has seen an increase, but suggested 
that this is not necessarily because the behavior has increased, but that people perhaps 
talk about it more openly. She thought the openness in celebrity culture/ reality television 
could be a possible contributing factor to people engaging in self-mutilation or at least 
talking about it more freely, because it has become more acceptable or even ‘cool’. Dr. F 
thought one of the long-term consequences of having self-mutilation scars was that it 
served as a constant reminder to the patient.  
5.2.4 Dr. E 
Dr. E specializes in child and adolescent psychiatry and enjoys the thinking aspect 
of psychiatry and highlights self-mutilation as one of her areas of interest.  She was also 
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drawn into psychiatry because of her cross-interest in pediatrics and psychiatry. She did 
not remember learning about self-mutilation until her residency training, where she 
learned that self-mutilation was: (1) often a coping skill that helped regulate emotions or 
(2) about turning anger inwards. She also learned that it was part of the diagnosis of 
personality disorders (mostly BPD), which she cautioned, is not the same as having BPD 
but tends to be more common in those with BPD. She also sees it in the absence of a BPD 
diagnosis and in connection with other diagnosis. The typical or stereotypical patient who 
presents with self-mutilation tendencies is the adolescent female who has difficulty with 
mood regulation. She understands self-mutilation as an attempt to self-soothe and manage 
moods. She believes Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT)12 is an effective treatment in 
addition to other types of therapy and supportive relationships. She maintains that self-
mutilation is a major concern in psychiatry because of the underlying distress. She 
contends that celebrity culture is influential and a place where teenagers learn about 
practices such as self-mutilation. Dr. E believes that scars serve as an outward expression 
in the short- term but long-term as a reminder of the painful past.  
5.3.5 Dr. D 
Dr. D specializes in adult emergency psychiatry. She remembers learning about 
self-mutilation in her residency training and that it was largely a coping strategy 
employed for those with affective dysregulation. That is when people feel very distressed 
and have no other method to soothe their moods/ emotions; self-inflicted pain is effective 
                                                
12 Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) is a form of psychotherapy developed by Marsha Linehan, and is 
often used to treat people with BPD and/or those who are chronically suicidal. The approach combines 
mindfulness and cognitive behavioral approaches focusing largely on distress tolerance and acceptance.  
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and helps ease the emotional distress. Further, self-mutilation is most often associated 
with BPD. 
Dr. D most often has seen people in crisis and then for short-term follow-up.  In 
her clinical evaluation of self-mutilation in the emergency department, she feels it is 
important to judge whether or not the behavior is a chronic problem or short-term 
problem because it means different interventions are necessary (i.e., inpatient or 
outpatient treatment). In terms of who presents more, she cited the stereotypical younger 
woman and noted that, often times, people hear about self-harm practices from others. 
She maintains that patients do not always have to fit the criteria for BPD but do often 
have very dysregulated emotions, and that strong sensations seem to help them manage 
emotions effectively.   
In her experience as an emergency psychiatrist, she has seen an increase in 
transient self-mutilation (i.e., people trying it) but she does not see self-mutilation as a 
major concern in psychiatry. She cited suicide attempts and aggression toward others as a 
more pressing concern. She regards scarring as physically stigmatizing because people 
often judge what they do not understand and, for the patient, knowing this may physically 
inhibit what they do in the future.  
5.2.6 Dr. A 
Dr. A specializes in child and adolescent psychiatry. He recalls learning very little 
about self-mutilation in medical school. In residency, some of his training in treating self-
mutilation was academic and some of which was through clinical exposure. He always 
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thought of self-mutilation as a symptom, much like a cough or a headache. He learned of 
it in the context of depression, personality disorders and unhealthy coping skills.  
He referred to self-mutilation as being on a continuum spanning from a social 
phenomenon to an indication of severe mental illness. He noted that the emergency staff 
threshold for self-mutilation has increased and he thought this maybe was due to it being 
more common, making staff less uncomfortable with it. He contended that it was not 
necessarily that self-mutilation was more “acceptable” but, like anything in society, was 
gradually introduced and therefore drastic changes were less noticeable.  
He also acknowledged that seeing “cutting” behaviors in adolescents was often 
different than seeing it present in adults. In terms of who presents more, he most often has 
seen women but cautions that this may not reflect reality outside of practice. Cutting and 
self-mutilation is often seen in Cluster B disorders-Personality Disorders (BPD most 
often). He cited BPD as one of the best examples of nature plus nurture, because these 
patients are more vulnerable to doing poorly in the face of trauma and often are the ones 
who have experienced trauma. He noted self-mutilation occurs with other diagnoses as 
well, but as a consequence of being ill rather than a feature of an illness. He did regard 
self-mutilation as a major concern of psychiatry today because it is (1) a common 
symptom of a time consuming and resource intensive disorder (BPD) and (2) a symptom 
of another mental health concern.  
5.2.7 Dr. I 
Dr. I specializes in child and adolescent psychiatry and spent most of his career 
working as an inpatient psychiatrist. He did not remember specifically learning about 
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self-mutilation in his training, but argued that medical learning and training is always 
ongoing and is largely clinically driven. In his experience, he has mostly seen adolescents 
who had self-mutilated, most often in the form of cutting extremities, although sometimes 
burning and head banging. While females presented more, he thought boys were likely 
engaging in self-mutilation but in less visible ways. He thought that the commonality in 
those who self-mutilated was some sort of suffering connected to some kind of trauma 
more often than not, was severe trauma or emotional neglect. The experience of trauma 
shakes the foundation of their worlds and severely affects their sense of security, 
confidence and stability. This manifests in trust difficulties, how they relate to others in 
the world and their ability to form connections and attachments, which when healthy and 
intact, serve to significantly help people get through life with ease. Ultimately, trauma 
changes how individuals relate to themselves, and Dr. I understands self-mutilation to be 
some form of body message -- a communication and expression to both the self and the 
world. He also pointed out that it does not have to always be trauma based, it could also 
be associated with anxiety. Even if people are engaging in it as part of an in-group school 
trend, it still speaks to a pain and is worth inquiring about. Dr. I thought validation was a 
crucial part of treatment for those who have self-mutilated and have experienced trauma.  
5.2.8 Dr. C 
Dr. C specializes in adult psychiatry. He remembers learning about self-mutilation 
in his training mostly referring to the adolescent population, and to individuals with 
particular personality qualities. He also remembers learning that self-mutilation was not 
necessarily related to wanting to commit suicide. He differentiated between self-
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destructive and self-mutilating behaviors, noting that behaviors involving drugs and sex 
can be self-destructive, but self-mutilation usually caused physical harm damaging the 
integrity of the body structure. Dr. C cited the most common self-mutilation patient as the 
stereotypic female between the ages of 15 and 40, who usually possessed BPD traits and 
had difficulties in tolerating distress where self-mutilation acts as a temporary relief. He 
notes having seen self-mutilating behaviors in men in the same age range (citing men can 
also suffer from BPD), but believes that in men it is more about expression and less about 
self-soothing. Most self-mutilation he has seen is in the form of cutting the extremities 
but noted that it can include other methods and locations of mutilation.  
Dr. C does not think self-mutilation is a major concern in psychiatry because he 
does not consider it an epidemic and is not sure that there has been an increase; rather, he 
suggests that people are possibly more open and forward about it, which means 
psychiatrists have less difficulty obtaining that information from patients.  
5.2.9 Dr. B 
Dr. B is a general adult psychiatrist who became interested in psychiatry during 
one of his medical school rotations. One of the biggest changes in his time practicing 
psychiatry has been the changes in medications as well as changes in the DSM. He 
remembers learning about self-mutilation in his training but only in connection with BPD.  
Yet, over time he has learned that people do it for different reasons, mostly to relieve 
some sort of tension.  
He noted that self-mutilation in adolescence is not uncommon in his experience, 
but the ones who persist into adult life tend to have personality disorders (most often 
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BPD). In his experience, “Borderlines” are most often women and are the ones who have 
most often experience sexual or physical abuse. BPD can also exist in men, but he admits 
that this disorder is poorly understood. He considered self-mutilation to be aggression 
turned inward and thought of it as a dysfunctional, immature response to anger of 
frustration. Dr. B has not seen an increase in self-mutilative behaviors but does think that 
self-mutilation is a major concern insofar as it usually means “Borderline” patients which, 
he argues, do worse in hospital, do not respond medications and are often difficult to 
treat.  
5.2.10 Dr. J 
Dr. J is a general adult psychiatrist. He remembers in his training learning that 
those who self-mutilate have disturbed psychodynamics that can lead to a number of 
illnesses, most often BPD.  He also noted that mentally handicapped people employed 
self-mutilation as an expression tool because they have great difficulty expressing their 
emotions. He admits that when he sees patients who self-mutilate, he is often suspicious 
of an Axis 2 diagnosis (i.e., personality disorder). Dr. J understood self-mutilation as 
aggression directed inward toward the self, and an expression of disapproval or anger.  He 
has seen this most often in patients with BPD, Histrionic Personality Disorder and the 
mentally handicapped. He mentioned psychotherapy as most appropriate modality to deal 
with past issues or the distress underlying self-mutilation. He believes self-mutilation has 
increased in the past few years because of the increased awareness and recognition of the 
issue.  
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5.3 Findings  
The goal of this chapter is to highlight how self-mutilation knowledge is 
understood and constructed by psychiatrists. The next chapter tackles if and how 
psychiatrists reproduce self-mutilation knowledge found in the DSM. Conducting 
interviews with psychiatrists resulted in rich, vast data. The data speaks to the complexity 
of how self-mutilation is described and understood by psychiatrists. There were some 
commonalities among psychiatrists in their perspectives on self-mutilation, but there were 
also differences and contradictions. Three main overarching themes came out of the 
interviews: how psychiatrists talk about self-mutilation, how they deal with it in practice 
and whether or not they reproduce the language of the DSM. Some themes or quotes 
contain multiple cross themes. For example, the section on “the skin” contains ideas 
about appropriate bodies and scarring, the social consequences of scarring, gender and 
risky behaviors. The section on “self-mutilation as language” contains other themes 
pertaining to gender, the skin, and bodies.  
5.3.1 How do Psychiatrists Talk about Self-mutilation? 
Psychiatrists talked about self-mutilation in a number of different ways: self-
mutilation as an expressive body language, self-mutilation as a trend, self-mutilation as a 
symptom of a disorder, self-mutilation as not connected to a disorder at all, and at times 
all of the above. Most psychiatrists agreed that self-mutilation often has very little to do 
with wanting to commit suicide but rather is used as a coping mechanism to tolerate 
distressing emotions (that is, a way to create physical pain to distract from or bring one 
back from intense emotions or thoughts they were experiencing as overwhelming).  
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Almost all psychiatrists equated self-mutilation with cutting or, at the very least, 
damage to the skin. Rarely were any other methods mentioned (e.g., burning, picking) 
and even when other methods were mentioned, it was usually only when I prompted them 
to define what they considered self-mutilation. When I asked Dr. H to define self-
mutilation, he immediately spoke of cutting. He also referred to other methods of self-
harm but still only those that involved damage to the skin.   
INT: How would you define self-mutilation? 
 
DR H: I guess anyone who mutilates themselves, anyone who [wrist/ arm slashing 
gesture and slightly twisted facial expression mimicking someone cutting their 
arms]. 
 
INT: What would you define as mutilation, cutting or hit themselves? 
 
DR H: Hitting themselves is not mutilation. Some kids actually burn themselves, 
some dig pins through their face, or wrist pins through their face. Some of them 
get something and keep burrowing into the skin until it hurts. And I have seen 
them use everything, glass, razor blades, coke cans. 
 
Dr. I also referenced cutting as the most frequent method of self-mutilation, and 
extremities as the most frequent location he has encountered in his experience.  
DR I: Cutting, mostly arms. Or you know, most extremities. Mostly arms. 
Sometimes legs. Sometimes abdomen. Sometimes burning oneself with cigarettes. 
Sometimes banging their head against whatever. Much less commonly but still 
sometimes, various insertions or injections of things in bodies.   
5.3.1.1 Self-mutilation as Language  
Self- inflicted injury as a form of expression or language was one of the more 
common themes described by psychiatrists. Psychiatrists understood self-mutilation as an 
expression of pain, a literal body language intended to make clear the internal suffering. 
Either self-mutilation was as a form of communication or expression to the outside world, 
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or a physical sign of internal anguish or anger directed toward the self. There were, 
however, differing opinions about the reasons underlying the desire to hurt oneself and 
this is highlighted by the different ways psychiatrists read and understood the patient’s 
literal body language.  Some psychiatrists argued that every person’s reason for cutting 
may have been different but still had to do with the difficulty with regulating emotions 
and, as Dr. G maintained, difficulties communicating in relationships were part of this. 
Dr. G’s explanation also houses a common idea among psychiatrists that self-mutilation 
is an abnormal response because “most of us” communicate or deal with things 
differently.  
DR G: So one of the things we always do when we see a patient is we try to 
formulate them into that whole bio-psycho-social understanding.  Everybody’s is 
different and your understanding of the act is also different depending on the 
person so for many it is because they don’t have the emotional regulation but I 
think it is for many as well the difficulties they have relationship wise, it doesn’t 
allow them to use verbal kinds of interactions. Which is what most of us do. We 
talk it out, write it down, and go for a run. 
 
Dr. I believed self-mutilation was often a message to others. He told the story of a 
young patient trying to use the skin as a canvas on which he was conveying a message to 
his mother.  
DR I: Totally, I’d say it does. I think that with each body, um, action there’s as 
part of that a communication, there is a message there that if you can understand 
it as a friend or family member or a treating clinician, you have gone a long way 
towards getting aligned with the point of view of the person you are caring for. 
Um, and so that message can be anything. I am thinking of um, a young teenage 
boy I saw whose mother was a dermatologist [laughter] who you know was going 
after his skin in you know really visible ways while his mother was making her 
career [in dermatology] so that’s again a sort of simple but um, that there is some 
message there. In that case it was telling the mother you know [hesitant]. 
 
INT: Pay attention? 
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DR I: F*** off. 
 
Dr. F similarly felt the self-mutilation was an outward expression of what was 
going on inside of the person and noted that long-term self-mutilators often times change 
their method of pain infliction by shifting to tattoos or piercings. Despite the shift, she 
still sees the underlying motivation for controlled pain as the same-—a desire to have an 
outward representation of internal feelings.  
DR F:  The scarring, um in, the short term, I find people like it {the scar], its sort 
of um a badge of honor or its an outward expression that they have been suffering, 
it’s a way to tell the world there is something going on here with me. I think in the 
short term, people like their scars. I have had patients who have stopped cutting 
and once their scars faded they had to do it again, they had to have some mark 
there as an outward representation of what they have been through. It’s probably 
on a continuum with things like tattoos and piercings and those sorts of things. 
Um and a lot of people who self-mutilate long term will have a lot of tattoos and 
piercings and will try to shift it to that. But they need some outward marker of 
what’s going in with them on the inside.  
 
Self-mutilation was also seen as manipulative or used for attention seeking. Dr. H 
explained that self-mutilation was often employed by young teenage women in an effort 
to diffuse tense situations in their homes, most notably those with their parents. He also 
cautions against equating self-mutilation with depression.  
DR H: A lot of them do it to make a statement and say if you a daughter who was 
a teenager and the mother sees that she has cut her wrist or arm or body some 
place, the red flags go up and so it sometimes brings a whole lot of attention and 
eases the situation at home. There is a reward for some of these kids so if you just 
skipped off school and your mother is rip roaring mad or you are doing drugs and 
your mother is absolutely mad at you and then you go cut your wrists that diffuse 
the whole situation and eases the chaos in the house and all of sudden instead of 
being mad at you, mom is totally concerned about you so I would think a lot of 
cases are like that. They’re mad at some family situation or some personal stress 
that they have in their lives. They are failing or are on drugs or their boyfriend 
has left them and they are getting depressed, but don’t equate self-mutilation with 
depression because I would think most of the kids I see who self-mutilate are 
definitely not depressed.  
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Similarly, Dr. F felt that self-mutilation was also sometimes used as a 
manipulation tactic to ease tension at home, knowing that their parents would fear that 
self-mutilation was a precursor to suicide. The response had come from a discussion 
between us centering on parents’ (mis)understanding and fear of self-mutilation.  
DR F: The main thing initially is are they suicidal and the next thing is how 
stressed are they to be chopping their bodies up and sometimes they’re doing it to 
manipulate: if you don’t give me this or let me do that I’m going to cut and it’s 
your fault. There is a lot of blame and, you know, it can’t be a tool for 
manipulation because it increases the risk for further behavior so it becomes 
reinforcing. It worked for me now so it will work for me the next time and a lot of 
parents are put off by it and they are just like why can’t you come talk to me, it is 
hard to understand.  
 
Self-mutilation as an expression of anger was another theme that came up. 
Interestingly, some psychiatrists also noted both the act as well as the placement of scars 
as a particular expression of anger, either toward oneself or directed to the external world.  
DR E: Our understanding of it would sort of be as a form of mood regulation or 
affective regulation whereas some people project their anger outwards, might sort 
of punch walls or fight with other people but some people project their anger 
inward and that can be through cutting or self-mutilating. The wrists or outside 
we think of as more anger to the outside and inner on your body sort of maybe 
your breasts or abdomen or thighs is anger toward the self. Um, it’s sort of a 
coping skill in a way as some people might use drugs or drink alcohol when they 
feel overwhelmed, um young people sometimes self-mutilate, more so girls but 
sometimes boys as well. So that was my understanding of it or what I learned 
about it.  
 
Furthermore, Dr. E thought expressions of anger were also gendered and that girls 
were often socialized to internalize intense emotions.  
DR E:  Personally, I think girls are socialized to turn their anger inward so they 
are more likely to cut, that’s more acceptable coping. It’s less likely that a girl 
would go punch another girl, although it does happen. The boys will be more 
socialized to turn their anger outward so they might sort of, they might hit 
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somebody, they might start a fire, they might steal something, throw rocks at cop 
cars. They have other things to do to express their anger, that’s my opinion why 
it’s a little bit different but you can see either activity in boys and girls, its not, ah, 
a perfect correlation. 
 
Dr. E’s observations of anger as a gendered expression were in line with Young’s 
(2005) thoughts on gendered bodily comportment. Young contends that women in society 
typically comport themselves differently than men do. For example, she argues that the 
different ways in which men and women are socialized to express anger are connected to 
particular bodily comportment styles that are either internalized or externalized where 
women take up passivity and men take up activity. Because men and women are 
socialized to take up space differently, they act accordingly to the space they feel they 
have available to them.  
Self-mutilation as language was one of the many ways psychiatrists described 
self-mutilation. Although, their experiences may have differed, most agreed self-
mutilation was a message or cry for help indicating something was going on internally 
that needed attending to. The message was clear, how the message was read and dealt 
with was complicated.  
5.3.1.2 Self-mutilation as Dysfunctional Response 
Self-mutilation was also described as a dysfunctional or immature response to 
negative emotions or thoughts. Most psychiatrists talked about self-mutilation as a 
dysfunctional response to emotional distress, yet some also argued that while it is an 
unhealthy, dysfunctional response, it serves a function for those who engage in it:  mood 
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regulation, tension relief, creating a numbing effect, attempting to feel strong sensations 
when numb (i.e., grounding), or dealing with feelings of guilt and shame.  
Some psychiatrists argued that self-mutilation serves a function at the basic 
physiological level due to the endorphin release that follows the pain. Many psychiatrists 
talk about self-mutilation as mood management and an attempt to self-soothe. Dr. F notes 
the difference between self-mutilation and suicide and highlights the function of self-
mutilation for people experiencing too many emotions. 
Dr. F: Um, its more often than not, not to do with wanting to be dead, more to do 
with emotional regulation either because you have no feelings or because you 
have too many feelings and you can’t get rid of them.  
 
Self-mutilation was also described as a poor coping mechanism. One psychiatrist 
thought self-mutilation was a result of what she termed “shitty life syndrome”, a 
combination of social, environmental, and psychological factors. In addition to these 
factors, she thought there were just some people who had poor coping mechanisms and 
found that self-mutilation was useful.   
DR G: I think, um, income, poverty, relative neglect, and emotional, physical 
neglect.  I think for some, there’s the group that—the sexually abused group and 
the severely traumatized and one could argue that it’s partly social and partly 
psychological, and then there are those who have, I think, just innately poor 
coping mechanisms who discover that this works for them. So I think that there’s 
multiple groups, but I have a number of people who have really horrible life 
stories and losing parents, being put in foster care, parents that are incarcerated, 
parents who are substance abusers and maybe never quite meeting the level where 
child youth and family services would remove them.  I really truly believe there is 
an endorphin release piece and it becomes almost addictive for some kids so I 
think that for some kids, in and of itself, for some reason they do something that 
they realize gives them that release, that sense but the vast majority of kids that we 
see that cut or self-mutilate, sorry, more chronically have significant mental 
health issues.  They have significant social problems.  I call it SLS, shitty life 
syndrome.   
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The underlying emotional distress causing people to self-harm was regarded with 
concern, but the expression of distress via self-mutilation was sometimes viewed as 
immature or inappropriate. Dr. B read self-mutilation as an expression of outward 
frustration, but also noted it as a dysfunctional response.  
DR B: Yeah I think it’s, a lot of it, it is, we will talk about distress, aggression 
turned inward, response to frustration, and it’s a learned response. It’s a 
dysfunctional response. It is an immature response. 
 
In conversations about self-mutilation, BPD came up frequently. Psychiatrists 
cited this disorder for numerous reasons: first, where self-mutilating behavior is seen as a 
criterion of BPD and second, because several patients that they had seen in adult 
psychiatry had the diagnosis of BPD and often had great difficulty in regulating intense 
emotions. Dr. A argued that for people with BPD self-mutilation often functions as a 
useful grounding technique.13 
INT: So that’s the Borderlines, and you see them self-mutilate more often because 
of the chronic difficulties? 
 
DR A: Um, yeah, well but also because of the dissociation. Hurting yourself is a 
powerful grounding technique. So, like I say, why do they self-mutilate? Because 
it works, the basic reason is why does it work? It works for all kinds of reasons. It 
works because it might be the most healthy coping mechanism they have, as sad 
as that is, because it might stop the voices in their head, so you know on and on it 
goes.  
 
Furthermore, Dr. D agreed that self-mutilation was most often employed by BPD 
in an effort to soothe emotion. She highlights here, the connection between self-
mutilation and BPD.  
                                                
13 I will return to a more detailed discussion of BPD later in this chapter. 
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DR D:  Ah, I learned that it was, a, um, largely a coping strategy they would 
employ, you know, for what we call affective dysregulation, so when they felt very 
distressed and they had no other way of dampening down their emotions, this was 
something they could do to ease that. And it was associated with, you know, in 
terms of our diagnostic system; it was mostly often associated with borderline 
personality traits or disorder.  
5.3.1.3 Self-mutilation as Trend 
Self-mutilation was also described as a trend, almost exclusively among child and 
adolescent psychiatrists who have seen self-mutilation in their practices. It was thought 
that while some people engaged in it because of significant underlying mental health 
stressors, others tried it either because it was a fad or part of accepted junior high or high 
school culture. Dr. E wondered whether or not the influence of celebrity culture had an 
effect on the increase in self-mutilation behaviors. Another psychiatrist, Dr. H, thought 
self-mutilation was seen as an available option to youth now to deal with their pain.  
When I asked Dr. G if she thought self-mutilation had increased in the past 10-20 
years, she noted an increase but thought there were important factors involved: that it 
seems to have increased, but it might seem that way because people are more open to 
talking about it and it is less hidden. In addition, she noted it does seem to be a more 
mainstream practice and therefore more acceptable and more common, particularly as 
part of school risk-taking in-group dynamics. Psychiatrists also thought that there are 
those who are engaging in what they termed “transient self-mutilation” where they try it 
once.  
DR G: There’s actually schools where the whole culture is unless you can show 
that you have self-mutilated, you can’t be a part of a certain social group, high 
schools. I think it’s really prevalent and I think there is a group that goes on to 
continue to use it as a form of coping or whatever else they are using it for. I 
would say that, teachers would tell you that 10 to 20 percent of the kids are self-
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mutilating in high school or doing self-mutilative kind of gestures in high school 
and a lot of them just try it once. 
 
Dr. F also noted this kind of behavior in high schools, the trend of self-mutilation 
and the influence of celebrity culture.  
DR F: I see a lot of the because of the group I see. It can be trendy. We have gone 
through periods where it is very trendy to now, where it is not very trendy, it 
seems to have settled down a bit. Um, like so it’s a teenage thing I guess, where 
one is doing it so all of their friends are doing it so it becomes legitimate because 
everyone is at it. There was a period two or three years ago where they are having 
wussy tests, what they used to call it in school, where they would burn or cut, 
that’s sort of gone now. Everything comes and goes in phases. The people we see 
now are more likely the people with the personality disorders or are heading that 
way as opposed to a couple of years ago when it was a popular thing, just like 
dressing in black went through a period right?  
 
Dr. F also noted the paradoxical effect celebrity culture had on engaging in and 
understanding behaviors like self-mutilation. While it was a place where young people 
could see and reproduce these behaviors, it also meant that those who engaged in self-
harm could have their feelings validated. 
DR F: I think that it has become more acceptable to talk about and to seek help 
about it and there has been a bunch of movies and it was trendy, I don’t know if 
you saw the movie 13? If you didn’t I recommend you watch it.  It was written, ah 
the person who plays the bully was actually a victim in real life. It is a really 
interesting movie about a 13-year-old girl who moved and didn’t fit in and fell in 
with the wrong people; it’s all about self-abuse. They all get together and beat 
each other up and slap each other for fun. It’s really and you know that for a 
while was the movie that everybody, it wasn’t have you seen 13? It was when did 
you see 13, you know? 
 
INT: You saw an increase in it because of the movie? 
 
DR F: Plus, yeah, and then you have the Hollywood stars come out, like Megan 
Fox has come out and acknowledged that she used to cut, and Demi Lovato, she 
was in some fancy rehab, there’s others that admit that they used to do it so that 
becomes sort of role modeling in a negative way for some people, so they will pick 
it up but it also legitimizes it for people already at it so you’re more likely to go 
get help, right? 
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Dr. E cites similar experiences and adds that there are youth out there who have 
traumatic backgrounds and that self-mutilation appeals to them for many reasons.  
DR E:  I don’t know. I don’t know if it’s always been there and we are seeing it 
more or if its become more acceptable or more talked about and I do think that 
with the rise of social media and the internet, if someone is doing something it is 
easier to convey that to a wider audience, so people are more aware of some of 
these things. Some of this is a positive in that people can get help with coping or 
that they are not alone but it can be a negative because if people are not doing 
well and they read someone else’s blog about cutting and how it makes them feel, 
I think they might be more likely to try it. There are a lot of youth who are 
disenfranchised who don’t belong anywhere and if they can find a place where 
they belong, especially the invalidated youths with traumatic backgrounds, I think 
that’s really appealing. So I think this whole subculture, it’s appealing to them on 
a whole bunch of levels. 
 
Dr. I contended that whether or not some self-mutilation behaviors are part of a 
trend or not, it is still a concern that is in need of inquiry. This was in response to our 
discussion of self-mutilation as a trend or being influenced by pathological celebrity 
culture.  
DR I: I would be weary of that as an explanation to dismiss a large amount of 
behavior as something not rooted in the person themselves or in the space 
between the person and others in their world so, yeah maybe it would allow 
something to be more visible, but I would be surprised if it would be like some 
other culturally driven behavior. I would say there is something going on at least 
worth inquiring about. 
5.3.1.4 Adolescent Versus Adult Self-mutilation 
Following the discussion of self-mutilation as a trendy behavior, it is noteworthy 
to focus some attention on how psychiatrists understand the difference between 
adolescent and adult self-harm. Self-mutilation in adolescent populations is read as a 
phase or something that will mellow out, and likely stop completely, as the individual 
matures. It is interesting to note that the adult population is understood and labeled 
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differently; for adults, self-mutilation tends to be understood in the context of personality 
disorders. Dr. B held the idea that self-mutilation is often the result of common adolescent 
turmoil, but those who continue to self-mutilate into adulthood frequently have 
personality disorders.  
DR B: Well, I think with adolescence you start off as a child, and you wind up as 
an adult and there is a whole bunch of turmoil in between where all of your values 
are turned upside down and challenged so there is a great deal of distress in the 
best of us, so a lot of things happen in adolescence that we grow up from, recover 
from and settle down, so its certainly very common in adolescence. Most 
adolescents are of course—most of that falls into child and adolescent psychiatry, 
but the ones who persist into adults tend to be people with personality disorders.  
 
Given that self-mutilation is a criterion associated with BPD, which is a diagnosis 
given to those usually over the age of 18 due to the fact that many of the symptoms could 
be misread as normal adolescent reactions, child and adolescent psychiatrists are hesitant 
to give the BPD diagnosis to adolescents, although they do note whether or not the 
individual display BPD traits. Similarly, DR. F argues that these sorts of behaviors can be 
restricted to the particular life phase.  
INT: I know you have mentioned it before that there is no typical self-mutilation 
patient, but you mentioned it was often associated with BPD, so—most often? 
 
DR F: It’s hard for me to say in my population, 9 times out of 10, because I would 
say in the adult population 9 times out of 10, but in the adolescent population they 
sometimes go through difficulties that are kind of restricted to that phase of life. 
 
An extension of the argument surrounding adolescent versus adult self-mutilation 
was the consideration of where self-injury is located along a continuum (social 
phenomenon to pathological). Some psychiatrists thought that regardless of where self-
mutilation was on the continuum it was a concern because of the underlying distress or 
reason that preceded the act. Others were not sure what they would deem pathological 
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versus normal life phase expressions or a cultural phenomenon. Dr. A spoke about how 
complex he thought this continuum was. 
DR A: Very complex, and I always think about stuff in continuums. So you know, 
define the two ends and everything else is in the middle. On the one end, self-
mutilation is not at all related to mental illness. It is some form of coping or a 
social phenomenon. There’s many possible explanations. Taking mental illness as 
an axis upon which to measure it. Um, you know. No mental illness on one end 
and severe mental illness on the other end and, big continuum in the middle.  
 
Dr. E also discusses self-mutilation on a continuum (but refers instead to an 
expression continuum), arguing that some people shift from certain expressive skin 
markers to others.  
DR E: I find people like [the scar], it’s sort of um a badge of honor or it’s an 
outward expression that they have been suffering, it’s a way to tell the world there 
is something going on here with me. I think in the short term, people like their 
scars. I have had patients who have stopped cutting and once their scars faded 
they had to do it again, they had to have some mark there as an outward 
representation of what they have been through. It’s probably on a continuum with 
things like tattoos and piercings and those sorts of things. Um and a lot of people 
who self-mutilate long term will have a lot of tattoos and piercings and will try to 
shift it to that. But they need some outward marker of what’s going in with them 
on the inside.  
5.3.1.5 The “Typical” Patient 
Some psychiatrists would agree that there was a “typical” self-mutilation patient 
or a stereotypical patient and others would say there was not a typical self-mutilation 
patient. Yet, others would not explicitly describe a typical patient, but would cite common 
characteristics that seemed to be congruent with the ways in which other psychiatrists 
described self-mutilation patients.  
Common themes that came up in discussions of the typical patient were trauma, 
gender and BPD. Most of the references to the typical patient were references to women. 
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In the interviews, I heard numerous times that women cut more and women are more 
often BPD patients. The DSM, in fact, stated that 75% of those with BPD are women 
(DSM-5, 2013). The typical patient section describes what psychiatrists either explicitly 
discussed as the typical self-mutilation patient or implicitly referred to by talking most 
often about a certain type of person or a common experience.  
Dr. H thought self-mutilation was “an epidemic among young teenage girls” and 
that this is not surprising because women genetically are more predisposed to affective 
(mood) disorders. Dr. G thought the typical patients were those who had significant social 
problems. In her experience, Dr. D felt women presented more often with cutting 
behaviors and this was because women chose cutting as an option more often.  
DR D:  Ah, well in my experience, it would be the classic sort of younger women. 
um. [Pensive look]. Why do I think that is? [laughter] um, [pause]. I think, ah, 
that women with affective dysregulation in my experience seem to gravitate 
towards, for example, cutting self-harm whereas men with affective dysregulation 
might gravitate towards more anger outbursts, drug use, that sort of thing. That’s 
gross generalizations, but in terms of emergency presentations, that would 
probably be more of my experience. I think there is a certain amount, what I 
always ask people when they come in, if they have been cutting is, in what way did 
they start because there is a certain amount of, um, you know ah, mirroring or 
people hear about it from friends or you know there seems to be in a younger 
cohorts a little bit more discussion of cutting. It is bit more an acceptable 
behavior right. So it’s not uncommon, you know, for me to see a 19 year old who 
says oh yes, my friend did it. I am not sure men have the same dialogue around 
cutting.  
 
Discussion of the “typical patient”, particularly with psychiatrists specializing in 
adult care, usually meant a discussion of the typical BPD patient, which were most often 
women. Dr. C also noted that men can also have BPD although men with BPD tended to 
have effeminate qualities and/ or be homosexual.  
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DR C: Yeah. Of course that applies to women as well, but generally it’s almost as 
a self-soothing strategy. And again if you look at statistics, if you’re talking about 
borderline patients, I mean the majority are female, um, and it’s not just a bias, a 
sex bias, or gender bias, I think it actually it is a difference maybe, with part of a 
neurobiology, and all that kind of stuff and the child/mom relationship which is 
different obviously in women than to a man. But in the men that you see with 
similar traits, we’ll say borderline, they usually are more effeminate. We do know 
that. Usually are more homosexual in orientation. Again, um, just seems to be 
things, seem to always kind of be there, you know, always comes out.  
 
Conversely, Dr. G was the only psychiatrist who understood typical self-
mutilation patients as having particular sensory profiles.  
DR G: Our OT would tell you that there are people who have low sensory 
profiles; she is very interested how sensory profiles fit with different behaviors.  
 
INT:  What do you mean by sensory profile? 
 
DR G: So, she’ll look at whether a person has kind of normal responses to 
sensations so like you’re sitting there, a fire alarm goes, and it may be a nuisance 
whereas another child may go ballistic so they may be high registry, low tolerance 
whereas people with high registry or low tolerance: people with high registry or 
low tolerance logically to me would be the people more likely to self-mutilate. 
Because they have low registry or low sensory things.  Perhaps because they 
haven’t learned touch or other things so that pain is what actually gives them the 
fulfillment that they need.  So I would suspect that it is that group, we have talked 
about it before, that it would make sense. 
 
Dr. I was not convinced that there was a typical patient per se but rather believes 
there is a commonality in experience of suffering or trauma among those who self-
mutilated.  
DR I:I think what’s in common is some kind of suffering, some kind of pain of 
some sort, um that often times, and I think that this would go to typical. Um, is 
rooted in and you know it could be way deeper, there is not necessarily a direct 
connection here but rooted in or connected to some kind of trauma and I say that 
in terms of typical, just with the sense of most commonly occur. That’s what I 
mean by typical. I don’t think that is the case with everyone that is doing self-
destructive behavior or self-mutilation. Ah, but I think that more often than not. 
 
 132 
 
Dr. C describes the typical adult self-mutilator that he sees in his practice, both 
female and borderline, with difficulty tolerating distress. He is aware, though, that this is 
the stereotype.  
Dr. C: I know it’s gonna sound like a stereo…well, I guess some stereotypes are 
true so it’s not a stereotype, but it would be female, between the ages of [little 
pause] fifteen to about [little pause] early forties usually. Usually possesses what 
we would term as borderline personality traits, or borderline personality disorder, 
you’ve probably already heard all of this before. Um…Tends to coincide with 
someone who has difficulty with distress tolerance and coping, usually there is a 
lot of crises on the go. The crises might not necessarily be apparent to the 
individual, so it’s almost like a situational anesthesia, that they can’t really see 
the chronic issues, or chronic to acute to chronic issues that are exacerbating the 
distress. However, they are quite well adept at telling you that they’ll engage in 
certain behaviors, at least temporary relief with long-term consequences and one 
of the things is self-mutilation. That would be the kind of classic, but that being 
said, you know… 
 
Dr. B, in speaking about the typical self-mutilation patient, referred to what he 
thought the typical BPD patient was. His response contained ideas about gender, 
heterosexuality and normal, stable behaviors.  
DR B: Well they tend, BPD for some reason tend to be more often female, males 
tend to be anti-socials. They tend to have very high rates of childhood physical 
and sexual abuse. Uh, they tend to have instability all over place, so intense 
unstable personal relationships, they get [umpteen? unclear] usually boyfriends 
[laughter] or other relationships which are very intense, and then of course crash 
and yeah. So what you are looking at most commonly in adult psychiatry would be 
your BPD. 
5.3.1.6 Self-mutilation as Symptom 
Self-mutilation was also understood as a symptom, an indication that something 
else was going on. In addition to it being an indicator of distress, it also served as a 
reminder to screen for BPD. Dr. D understands it as an index of symptoms that helps 
direct the treatment required.  
 133 
 
DR D:  Well, I think you see it as, I look at it is as an index of symptoms and an 
index of a person’s emotional state and dysregulation and then you try and get a 
sense of how chronic it is versus acute, um, because it does sometimes point to 
different interventions. 
 
Dr. A regarded self-mutilation as a symptom much like a headache, where it could 
indicate something minor or something major. He did however see self-mutilation as a 
major concern in psychiatry because it is a sign of something “not right” and because it's 
a sign of BPD which is a very time consuming and resource intensive disorder.  
DR A: Um, I guess because coming at this from two sides. One because it is a 
common symptom of a common condition that occupies a lot of resources and 
time, i.e., BPD and on the other side it is s sign or symptom, like a canary in the 
mine shaft, that it is, um, it is highly suggestive that there is something not right 
here and can point to mental illness and it is certainly indicative of some sort of 
mental health concern. Differentiating that from mental illness. It is certainly 
cause for concern and question.  
 
Dr. B viewed self-mutilation as important clinical information and also as an 
indication of a BPD patient, which to him meant another “difficult” patient.  
DR B: I have long since gotten to the point where it is just more clinical 
information. Well you look at it and you tend to think well uh-oh [laughter] 
INT: why do you think uh-oh, another borderline? 
 
DR B: Yup. You certainly suspect a borderline in adults. I mean there are times 
you can be mistaken. Well, your borderline patient, your personality disorder 
patient by definition, are more difficult patients. Your straightforward psychotic 
patient, your straightforward clinical depression, or mild anxiety…well they are 
people [laughter] you know people like you and I. Well, so are people with BPD 
they tend to be a lot more unreasonable. 
 
5.3.1.7 Borderline Personality Disorder 
BPD, a disorder characterized by emotional instability, warrants significant 
attention here because it was the most mentioned disorder in interviews with 
psychiatrists, it has a negative connotation in the psychiatric community and is said to 
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affect women more than men. The link between self-mutilation and BPD was highlighted 
in previous sections; discussions of the typical self-mutilation patient often led 
psychiatrists to speak about the typical BPD patient. Speaking with psychiatrists about 
BPD elicited mixed reactions: some were weary of the diagnosis altogether, some were 
compassionate and, for others, the very mention of it was frustrating. The interviews often 
led to the question of why people with BPD engaged in self-mutilation, what led to the 
development of the diagnosis and what did the diagnosis mean over the life course. The 
following section highlights the “why” of BPD and provides some insight into the 
relationship between trauma, invalidation and purposefully hurting oneself.  
Dr. F spoke of BPD in terms of emotional dysregulation and impulsivity and the 
inability to tolerate emotions.  
DR F: They have trouble regulating their emotions. They love you, they hate you. 
It could all be five minutes apart. They are super happy or super angry or super 
fed up. A lot of trouble with stuff like that, idealize, devalue. So on any given day 
they are running into all kinds of trouble because of their dysregulation. They are 
very impulsive, so often times they will do something in the heat of the moment 
because they don’t take the time to think. They are almost sometimes pseudo-
psychotic in the way they believe things and experience things. The identity 
disturbances are the ones who have no feeling and they don’t feel anything, they 
often cut because they are numb. Most of them, it’s because of the fact they are 
unable to tolerate the feelings/ emotions they have.  
 
Dr. G mentioned sensory profiles in the previous section on the typical patient but 
she elaborated on why she thought patients with BPD self-mutilated, arguing that often 
times due to their particular sensory profile, they needed stronger physical sensations, 
particularly if they had a background of trauma where over time they have learned how to 
tune sensations out. 
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Dr. G: For some of these kids, it’s because over time they have learned to tune out 
their registry. If you are repeatedly smacked, hit you may start to tune out that 
physical sensation to a certain extent so you need a much stronger physical 
sensation in order to elicit a response.  
 
Dr. A claimed that people with BPD are often very vulnerable and are also likely 
to do poorly in the face of trauma but that self-mutilation is a useful way for BPD patients 
to self soothe their emotions. 
DR A: Ultimately these people are more vulnerable to more poorly in the face of 
life’s traumas. Truly terrible things happen um, there is hypersensitivity where 
they are more likely to perceive life’s difficulties as being traumatic. Um, but in 
addition to that there is also something specific to these people that put these 
people in harm’s way more often. Whether that’s, there’s all kinds of reasons for 
that. Their history of relationships, they are more likely to be in these impetus 
impulsive relationships so you think of the people that they are with, they tend to 
have their own sets of problems, personality disorders. Um, so to be in abusive, 
unhealthy relationships or just to be in dangerous situations if they are attracted 
to, if there is thrill seeking, attracted to dangerous situations, they will be in 
dangerous situations. So there is that and there’s um, I often think of the, have you 
ever seen the wildlife show and you’d see the lion stalking the wildebeest. You’ll 
often hear the narrator say, the lion knows which wildebeest to get; they stick out 
somehow. Borderlines are like the wildebeest. Yes, so as a diagnosis, they are 
highly likely to do bad.  
 
When I asked psychiatrists what caused BPD, the responses ranged from genetics, 
to environment, to trauma, to invalidation. Many noted that the old literature pointed to a 
strong link between sexual abuse or childhood trauma and BPD but recent research 
speaks about the link between an invalidating environment and BPD. While sexual, 
physical and emotional abuse are all forms of extreme invalidation, psychiatrists 
maintained that sometimes invalidation could take the shape of a bad parental fit between 
the emotional needs of the child and parent even if the parent was well meaning.  
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Dr. C understood BPD as a combination of distinct temperamental qualities and 
experience with invalidation. He believed BPD people were more sensitive and outlined 
some of the ways that type of sensitivity could play out.  
DR. C: Someone who [pause] has distinct temperamental qualities and possibly a 
level of invalidation um, um, throughout their life experiences… It’s a horrible 
way to live… I’ve never met a patient with borderline personality that wasn’t 
sensitive. They can cover it up by being external or very tough and assertive, but 
deep down they are very sensitive and they invalidate their own sensitivity by, you 
know, ridiculing it or discounting it. Right? Some people are born with thick skin; 
they can take a lot of crap, they can dish out a lot of crap, and if they are in an 
environment that’s invalidating, so the worse form of invalidation, let’s say for 
example sexual abuse or some kind of horrific event, they might be able to handle 
it and move on and adapt and grow. While someone who is very sensitive, they 
could be paralyzed by that, right? And they develop their own ability to invalidate 
their own experiences, they are not important enough to themselves to, they don’t 
love themselves enough to genuinely appreciate anything with themselves. So they 
invalidate themselves as being crazy or unstable or abnormal and they’re trying 
the best they can and they can’t regulate, they can’t sooth themselves, it takes 
longer, [unclear] mentally, it takes longer for distress to reach baseline or 
stabilization. So as a child, the child may cry for a longer period of time than 
another child who is much more able to settle down. For example, support fit 
between a parent and a child, I’m not saying a bad parent. A good parent who’s 
really, really attentive to the needs of the child, but still doesn’t understand why 
the child can’t sooth themselves. They say, “everything’s ok, nothing’s going on, 
nothing’s wrong, nothing’s wrong”, and the child’s like “what the hell? I’m 
feeling like crazy, I’m exploding out of my mind here and you’re telling me 
everything is fine. What the hell”, you know. And you don’t know what it is right? 
Because you just can’t get it as a parent. You can be the best parent in the world 
you know, God’s gift to parenting, just not a good fit because…our classical 
invalidating parent would be a parent like “Look what you’re doing to me. Look 
at you crying there, making a fool of yourself in front of…look what people are 
thinking of me”. That’s invalidation right there. You know, the ultimate form of 
invalidation is when someone takes your body and does what they want with it and 
doesn’t respect your thoughts about it or your personal space or whatever, you 
know. Or your emotions. Or your experiences. And their priorities come…anyone 
with sexual abuse, I mean, their priorities need to be met before that other person. 
So that’s the ultimate form of invalidation. Invalidation can happen in many ways, 
shapes and forms. 
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Dr. D also thought BPD was a result of temperament and environment and 
sometimes a poor fit between parent and child. She thought this was a useful way to 
explain it to patients.  
Dr. D:  The core, the core of the theory behind BPD is that there is a, people have 
a temperament, temperament is very sort of biological explanation. People will 
talk about temperament a lot in pediatrics, babies that are easy to sooth etc. so 
um, you know in about 10 percent of the population, there seems to be sort of an 
intense temperament where you are more predisposed to affective dysregulation 
but only about 1-2 percent of the population meets criteria for BPD so then they 
sort of think there’s something about an environment as you grow up where a 
person either learn strategies or not around recognizing and dealing with their 
emotions right so that’s sort of how I talk about it to patients…Invalidating 
environment is the term used. So certainly, you know the most invalidating 
environment you are ever going to find is emotional neglect, sexual abuse, these 
sorts of things but it doesn’t always have to be that and sometimes parents can be 
very well meaning you know but is just they have got this child who is really 
intense and they are trying to help he or she deal with it but they just you know, 
it’s hard right.  I find that sometimes helpful when I am talking to patients so that 
they don’t feel like its necessarily pointing fingers right?  
 
In addition to an invalidating environment, Dr. E thought people with BPD who 
self-mutilated and had difficulty regulating their emotions likely struggle because of early 
life experiences where parental comfort and attachment was absent.  
Dr. E: I think more likely they have had some sort of trauma. More likely they 
haven’t learned to manage their emotions, um I personally think that some of that 
comes from very, very early life and um you know I am a big advocate of sort of 
Bruce Perry’s work and your brain developing within the first couple of years And 
he wrote the boy who was raised as a dog and other um, I forget the rest of the 
title but he writes a lot about children needing to be picked up, held, comforted, 
learning to manage their emotions in the first couple of years and if that’s not 
done then you don’t learn to control your emotions and if your emotions are 
overwhelming you are more likely to present as being Borderline. Um, people 
with family histories of a lot of mood disorders or trouble regulating their moods 
are more likely to have it. It’s more typically girls than boys although can be 
either or and we also talk a fair bit about families who are invalidating. So where 
the person’s feelings are not respected so they have to really act up or act out in 
order to get their needs met or to get attention so if they are sitting quietly not 
bothering anybody and they just say I need whatever, they don’t necessarily get it 
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but if they kick and scream and yell then they do so that sort of parenting probably 
encourages it. 
 
Many psychiatrists expressed frustration with people with BPD because of their 
self-sabotaging behaviors. Dr. F explains her mixed experience of frustration and 
compassion.  
DR F: Because they are always are self-injuring, they don’t listen to what you 
want them to do, they sabotage themselves, you know they don’t, they are 
perceived sabotaged by someone else, it goes back to abandonment. If you are 
getting close and things are working, they will reject you so you don’t have a 
chance to reject them. If they are in a relationship that they are enjoying, they will 
think it is not going to last so they will do something that will precipitate the break 
up subconsciously. Not even consciously, they are always their own worst enemy.  
I always say be grateful you are not in their skin. When people get frustrated with 
them. It’s a lot easier to be on the other side of the table trying to help them than 
to be in their skin. Their skin is a horrible place to be. 
 
Because of therapy interfering behaviors, such as self-sabotaging as described in 
the previous quote, in addition to BPD patients being considered difficult or high risk, 
patients with BPD are often regarded pejoratively. Dr. I, however, expressed that because 
of this there is often hopelessness associated with these patients and finds other ways to 
make sense of the pain to ensure they get the care they require.  
DR I: Right again, most people to my thinking, most people who have what others 
would call BPD, have likely some either disclosed or undisclosed, aware of or not 
aware of um, trauma that is driving most of the signs and symptoms and 
unfortunately, there is a kind of hopelessness that gets generated as soon as 
someone is identified as havening BPD that my concern is leads to that person not 
getting the kind of care that would be beneficial…I can’t think of the last time I 
have described borderline as having borderline personality disorder. I will always 
find a different way to make sense of it that speaks to some more of the nuance of 
what’s going on with the hope of having anybody else involved in their care, 
family members or friends or some of the staff or the group home worker or the 
child protection service social worker have a more nurturing sympathetic 
approach to the kid instead of, “it’s just a borderline” which basically means the 
she or he pisses someone off and the way to approach them is with a kind of more 
harsh and distancing.  
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5.3.1.8 The Skin 
“The skin is an outer covering of the body that both protects us from others and 
exposes us to them.” (Cataldi, 1993, P. 145).  
 
The skin becomes meaningful through how it is read, and it can be read in 
multiple ways. As Ahmed and Stacey (2001) have noted, if skin is read differently, then 
consider the ways in which various techniques for reading produce skins in specific ways. 
They argue that this is especially true with reading the feminine skin, because it is read in 
terms of anti-aging techniques, being smooth, soft and shaven, covering any trace of 
surgery or illness.  
“Indeed surfaces of the skin will always fail to be smooth, whether that failure is 
upon the deliberate markings of the skin or upon the unwanted traces of bodily 
changes or medical interventions, or upon the impossible desires produced by 
consumer culture.” (p. 2).  
 
The marking of the skin is also temporal and spatial, temporal in that it is affected 
by the passage of time (wrinkles, signs of time, or records of biographies on the skin) and 
spatial in the sense that it expands and contracts. The skin is a canvas and cuts turn into 
lasting scars that serve as an outward reminder to both the world and the person who put 
them there. Self-mutilation was most often understood in terms of cutting oneself, or 
purposefully damaging the skin in some way. Ideas about the skin also reflected dominant 
ideas about beauty and gender.  
Discourses of risk were evident with the words of the psychiatrists I interviewed 
in that damaging one’s body, one’s skin on purpose was seen as risky because of its 
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consequences (e.g., infection, scarring). Dr. D thought cutting was damaging to the 
integrity of the body.  
DR D:  I think we just have this feeling that, society, that we are supposed to 
maintain the integrity of our skin unless it’s in a planned purposeful way and even 
so, people have problems with that. But you know. It just, I guess people have this 
inherent feeling that it is disrespectful you know. I don’t know.  
 
Dr. D went on to say that because society is often offended when people engage in 
risky behaviors that reflect lack of appropriate self-control (e.g., weight, exercise, alcohol 
use); there is often a judgment when people do things to themselves. Because of this 
assumption, scars are often physically stigmatizing to those who have engaged in self-
mutilation.  
DR D:  I think people judge people who do things to themselves or perceive that 
they do it to themselves. I think people— that with eating disorders, self-
mutilation, I think people experience it with drugs and alcohol. Anything where 
it’s a behavior that the person is technically doing, I think it is very hard for 
people to understand and have the same empathy for that.  
Gender was extremely significant when it came to discussion of the skin and 
scarring. Almost all references to the consequences of scarring were female references. 
This was likely because psychiatrists stated that women cut more and therefore all of their 
references to women were reflective of what they saw in their practices. However, in 
talking about the consequences of visible physical damage to the skin, psychiatrists may 
have been invoking taken for granted discourses of culturally acceptable beauty and 
femininity.  
Not only were the references to scarring gendered but they also reflected ideas 
that were heteronormative. For example, Dr. F refers to life events such as graduation and 
motherhood.  
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DR F: Scarring is a problem and sometimes I will say you’re gonna have to stop 
that one of these day, you’re gonna want to put on a pretty grad dress and people 
are gonna be saying what’s that all about, or you’re gonna have a kid who says 
but mommy you cut. But I don’t say that unless it’s early in and I think they can 
stop without too much effort and because otherwise you are just giving them 
something else to feel bad about themselves. You have to be very, very careful 
with that.  
 
Dr. G Similarly refers to wearing a wedding dress and motherhood.   
DR G:I think the big ones are the ones I always say to people, how are you going 
to explain that to your 14-year-old daughter when she sees your arms or do you 
want to walk down the aisle, are you going to wear long gloves when you go to 
your wedding? Um… 
5.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I offered a summary of each of the psychiatrist’s backgrounds and 
perspectives, to help provide a contextual picture of each psychiatrist apart from only 
knowing them by their quotes. In the next chapter, I will explore two themes: how 
psychiatrists deal with self-mutilation in their practices and how self-mutilation is 
connected with the DSM. Emphasis will be placed on linking what the psychiatrists said 
to my analysis of the DSM.  
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Chapter 6  – Psychiatric Practice, Self-mutilation and the DSM  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on how psychiatrists experience and treat self-mutilation in 
their practices and what influence the DSM has on psychiatric practice. First, I will 
describe how psychiatrists deal with self-mutilation when it presents to them and what 
sort of treatment or advice they offer. I will then move to the ways in which the DSM 
influences practice, in terms of how psychiatrists take up and resist DSM knowledge.  
6.2 How Psychiatrists Deal with Self-mutilation in their Practices 
Previously in Chapter 5, I discussed how psychiatrists described self-mutilation, 
how they understood the behavior and the reasons behind it, and what type of patient they 
believe is likely to engage in such acts. In this section, I am outlining what psychiatrists 
say they do about self-mutilation.  
Psychiatrists most often cite their major concern with self-mutilation to be the 
underlying distress of the patient. While there is no necessary treatment for self-
mutilation, the implicit goal is for the behavior to stop. When I asked Dr. G about how 
those who self-mutilate are treated by mental health professionals, she provided some 
important insight into understanding doctors’ frustration. She thought that self-mutilation 
is both puzzling and frustrating because it is not necessarily “fixable”. 
INT: Mm hmm, and would you see a severe reaction or a reaction in general in 
psychiatry amongst your colleagues, when someone presents to emergency and 
they are covered in scars, are they treated differently.  You have a little smile 
there. What’s the smile about? 
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DR G: [knowing smile] I would like to say no, but I think that …long pause…even 
as a resident I remember people that were coming in with repeated episodes and 
you are thinking “do they really want to kill themselves?” Again that was 26 
years ago and I have a very different understanding now its sometimes it’s just, 
it’s just maybe its frustration on our part because we can’t fix it because we are 
doctors and that’s what doctors do, they fix things. You go through helplessness 
and are frustrated by not being able to fix it. 
 
Dr. F, in response to a discussion about what she has learned about self-mutilation 
in her training, speaks in part to the negative connotation surrounding self-mutilation.   
DR F: About self-mutilation? Um, it’s mostly associated with people with 
personality disorders, borderline personality disorder. Um, its more often than 
not, not to do with wanting to be dead, more to do with emotional regulation 
either because you have no feelings or because you have too many feelings and 
you can’t get rid of them and its looked on very pejoratively by many people in the 
community and in health care matter of fact. 
 
Dr. F believes self-mutilation is maladaptive coping and that the best course of 
action is to understand the context and help them to stop. According to her, sometimes 
understanding the underlying reason is futile because not much can be done about 
underlying stressors.  
DR F: Yes because it is maladaptive coping and that’s how to talk to them about 
it. The feelings you have are real and genuine. Sometimes there is nothing you can 
do about the underlying reason so the best thing is to focus on understanding the 
illness and the circumstances in which they do it and how we can help them stop 
doing it. Because it sounds more like aggression but you need to ask the questions. 
Why did you do it? Were you mad? Were you really frustrated or wanting to feel 
hurt because lots of times they will say they had to feel something. Yeah, so yeah it 
needs to be clarified. Context is the big word in psychiatry. Get context instead of 
just ticking off sheets.  
 
Dr. G thought getting at the underlying reason was an important start to sorting 
out where to go from there.  
DR G: Well, I think it’s relatively common, one of the things we do is try to sort 
out is this a kid who tried it for a reason, sometimes it’s a social reason, 
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sometimes it’s an accepted reason, sometimes they just heard that it works to 
relieve pain. 
 
Dr. I did not feel stopping the behavior was necessary but thought self-mutilation 
presentations were a type of communication and that his goal was to help make meaning 
of them. He spoke about the common goal to stop the behavior but cautioned that for a 
group that is likely already feeling misunderstood, this may set up struggle.  
DR I: yeah, right and I think it always is you know it’s like some kind of 
communication and um, some kind of expression. Maybe expression is better. Um 
you know so I think that um, if you, like, notice what it is the person is doing and 
aim to make some meaning of it, ideally in concert with them, then um, you can 
learn a lot. They can potentially learn something and that potentially offers that 
shared understanding, that shared meaning making, um, offers a potential 
approach to shifting something so that they are not doing it anymore if that is 
what people decide. I think it depends on the person, the context, you know. I 
there are a lot of clinicians who would say you know, “this is bad, it must be 
extinguished at any cost with any sort of degree of intervention”, and often times 
that sort of approach sets up more struggle unfortunately which leaves someone 
experiencing again usually that people aren’t with them. People don’t get them.  
I will touch a patient and touch that scar or that wound as a way of making 
contact and also as a way of diffusing some, some of the what most of time I 
experience as shame, or being frightened by it or disgusted by it. It’s like kind of, 
this is your body, I can deal with it, I can deal with it this way you know.  
 
Similarly, Dr. C sees the presentation of self-mutilation in his practice as an 
opportunity to explore the patient’s pain.  
DR C: Well, concern, but I wouldn’t be like, oh my God, we gotta do something 
about it. I would actually say, because it is a choice, right? And therefore a choice 
to validate someone you have to validate that they chose to do this and a bigger 
validation is to let them to express it and to not see it as a horrible thing or ‘look 
what you did’, you know, ‘oh my God, now we got to go clean this up’. I would 
use it as an opportunity to explore. Because clearly it’s a choice, it’s not like 
automatically you start doing this, right?  
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Self-mutilation often serves as a cue to look for BPD. It is hard not to make that 
connection when in DSM versions 3, 4 and 5 it was the only disorder that explicitly and 
continuously listed self-mutilation as a diagnostic criteria. 
Dr. B sees the presentation of self-mutilation in his practices as clinical 
information pointing to BPD, although he acknowledges this is not always the case. He 
sees self-mutilation as a symptom of a major concern. 
DR B: I have long since gotten to the point where it is just more clinical 
information. Well you look at it and you tend to think well uh-oh [laughter]... You 
certainly suspect a borderline in adults. I mean there are times you can be 
mistaken. Well it’s a symptom of a major concern. It’s a symptom [of BPD].  
 
Dr. A similarly sees self-mutilation as a symptom of a major concern (one of 
which is a BPD diagnosis).  
DR A: um, I guess because coming at this from two sides. One because it is a 
common symptom of a common condition that occupies a lot of resources and 
time i.e., BPD and on the other side it is s sign or symptom, like a canary in the 
mine shaft, that it is um it is highly suggestive that there is something not right 
here and can point to mental illness and it is certainly indicative of some sort of 
mental health concern. Differentiating that from mental illness. It is certainly 
cause for concern and question.  
6.2.1 Alternative Options for Pain 
While there is no necessary treatment for self-mutilation, the implicit goal is for 
the behavior to stop. This is done either by addressing the underlying distress, by 
substituting something else in place of permanent body damaging practices, or by a 
combination of these. The intervention is closely tied to ideas surrounding the skin and 
the integrity of the body because the alternatives still cause pain enough to distract from 
uncomfortable emotions without lasting damage or scarring to the skin. Implicitly, 
psychiatrists are not saying purposeful pain is wrong; rather they are concerned about 
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infection and aware of the stigma surrounding self-injury scars. Often their goals were to 
provide alternative strong sensations.  Dr. H’s approach involves teaching other ways of 
dealing with distress. 
DR H: I might add that some kids come in here and say they’d rather feel the 
physical pain over the psychological pain. That line has been presented to me 
many times. Must be extraordinary. Some of the stresses that these kids have are 
extreme, anything they could do to distract themselves could be positive. We teach 
them other options, press on their Achilles tendon or hold an ice cube. That 
doesn’t leave scars or do much damage. Run for 10 minutes as fast as you can.  
 
Dr. F’s goal is to help stop self-mutilation through various methods by providing 
alternatives that do not damage the skin permanently in the form of scars.  
DR F: we usually come up with some things they can do, it’s better if they come 
up with it. When you read all of the things like snap a rubber band, they find that 
trite and insulting. I usually pass out things that other patients told me will be 
helpful.one of my patients that was really bad used to have to feel something so 
she would hold ice cubes and they would burn but don’t leave marks but is just as 
discomforting when you are doing it she felt more so than cutting. Still have pain. 
 
Dr. D suggests painful sensation alternatives as well that that are part of 
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT).   
DR D: I think there’s something about just the extreme um intensity of what they 
are experiencing that this seems to or on the other hand, emptiness is the other 
feeling that people feel and say they cut in response to. But whatever it is, it is so 
profound that I think that they, this is some sort of tangible way or it’s for some 
reason helps. But sensory, sensation seems to help with dysregulation. So for 
example, I don’t mean to keep harping on this but with DBT they try to give other 
things that people can do. So they will suggest ice packs, people will even do 
really extraordinary things like stick their heads in water, like cold water as an 
alternative to cutting. Because it’s a big physical sensation that at least is not 
destroying the skin right? So there seems to be something that having an intense 
physical sensation helps but I don’t pretend to understand it because I don’t have 
that experience.  
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Dr. H sometimes uses the fear tactic of talking about scar infection as way to get a 
patient to stop the behavior.  
DR H: I have seen some girls rip their faces, their chest their arms, their legs, and 
what I tell them all now is I try I say to them go ahead if you want to do that, 
sometimes they take out something right in front of me and will start cutting. And I 
will say go right ahead if you want to do that. But I give them two medical facts. 
Number one, of you cut yourself like that it will leave scars and one of these days 
you will be in a sleeveless dress at graduation and as you walk down the stage 
people are gonna see those scars and say, what’s wrong with her. That’s one. 
Secondly, I tell them look the skin is like a coat of armor and if you break it, germs 
and bacteria can get in there and if it gets in too far, and antibiotics are of no use 
and if its starts to travel way in there then the only treatment is amputation and 
their eyes open, usually open like that. And then I tell them true story about who 
that happened to. 
 
A second psychiatrist also mentioned using a fear tactic such as telling patients 
that cuts can lead to possible infection. Both psychiatrists admitted they have not seen any 
cases of infection resulting from self-mutilation in their practices.  
Beyond providing advice around alternative options, psychiatrists thought therapy 
and teaching problem solving skills were also useful. Dr. B spoke to the importance of 
preventing recurring crisis and teaching patients skills that can lead to independence.  
DR B: I think we need to try to avoid drugs unless there is a very specific reason 
there and we are really looking at psychotherapy/ counseling and I think really 
the emphasis is in the here and now in terms of recurrent crisis intervention, a 
little bit of encouraging them to stand on their own two feet and assistance in 
problem solving, it is very important not to take over.  
 
Dr. C talked about the importance of therapy for people with BPD more 
specifically but also the establishment of clinical therapeutic relationships.   
DR C:  We don’t have a full good repertoire, but dialectical behavioral therapy, if 
you’re talking about borderline personality disorder specific, it’s one of the 
psychotherapies, there’s also schema-based psychotherapy, mentalization-based 
psychotherapy. Always sounds really good on paper, but in terms of practical, or 
in terms of availability, not always the best. Especially in our province. But it’s 
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changing I understand. We’re supposed to be getting a DBT group coming in, or 
be trained. I was part of the initial, kind of, one day workshop. But there is a 
training of sorts happening, some staff… to do that. So those would be the 
prominent ways, evidence, I mean there is some equivocal evidence about the long 
term effectives and all that, but one would say that, and there’s also arguments 
saying even the standard clinical follow-up where you see somebody and create a 
therapeutic relationship is sufficient to keep someone stable. I find that is relevant, 
but certainly it doesn’t make anyone grow. Right? It just keeps things the way it is 
right? Um, but it works better than nothing. Um, medications are sometimes used 
for some properties like impulse control and for mood regulation where some 
people don’t have a big emotional fluctuation in check, but it’s not fool proof of 
course.   
 
Dr. G also talks about the importance of a therapeutic relationship and the values 
of consistency.  
DR G: I have a group of kids, a number of young women who have shitty life 
syndrome who at various times would have met criteria for depression, borderline 
personality disorder who at times would have had medication. Some of them I 
have seen every two weeks for years and years and years and sometimes we would 
just sit here and all we do, I would say “it really sucks that your dad is in jail 
again”. Sometimes I am the most consistent person in their life for a period of 
four to five years.   
 
6.3 DSM Knowledge and Psychiatric Practice  
As I have outlined in Chapter 4, the DSM strongly aligns self-mutilation with 
BPD. While self-mutilation is seen as a characteristic of other disorders, it has been 
explicitly listed as a diagnostic criterion of BPD since the DSM-III-R (1987). Most 
psychiatrists made self-mutilation synonymous with cutting, referred almost exclusively 
to women when speaking of cutters, and often made the connection between self-
mutilation and BPD. This highlights part of the construction of knowledge of self- 
mutilation. Of course knowledge production is complicated and is influenced by many 
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factors. I am concerned with the relationship between the knowledge production in the 
DSM and psychiatrists’ experience in practice.  
Psychiatrists drew on different forms and sources of knowledge in their practices. 
Occasionally they referred to other texts or sources of information, seen in the ICD or 
academic literature pertaining to self-mutilation, DBT or BPD, and specific texts such as 
Kaplan and Sadock’s (2007) Synopsis of Psychiatry.  
6.3.1 Uptake of the DSM  
The DSM is the language of psychiatric communication and, taking that into 
consideration, it would be nearly impossible not to expect that DSM terminology or 
references would not come up during interviews. This section highlights the particulars of 
my participants’ use of DSM language in reference to self-mutilation or BPD. Their 
words illustrate that the DSM shapes psychiatric practice and that psychiatrists both 
reproduce and resist the language of the DSM.  
Dr. E spoke of the DSM as a tool of communication with other mental health 
professionals, a way to have a common language to report what they were seeing so 
everyone in the treatment team could be on the same page.  
DR E:  Okay, so the texts that I use… my DSM. I mostly use that because it’s a 
tool of communicating so when I say somebody has something, if another 
psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker sees that patient, in my diagnosis 
accurately portrays the problem, then we are all speaking the same language. A 
tool for communicating. Um that’s the primary thing. 
 
Dr. H draws on DSM categorization by differentiating certain mental disorders. In 
the following example, Dr. H is noting the difference between Bipolar Disorder and BPD, 
referring to the DSM categorizations of what constitutes a “true” mental illness. He refers 
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to what is in the DSM as a form of diagnostic truth. He adds that he understands BPD as a 
“defect” in personality.  
DR H: Bipolar is a totally different diagnosis. A totally different illness. 
Everything gets in high gear their affect, mood, speech and it doesn’t just shut off 
just like that. Borderline personality disorder one second can be in the depths of 
depression and two seconds later bang they are high as a kite, so, they do 
everything. Making people worry. Repeatedly cutting up or overdosing [screwing 
up face when speaking] or just causing a big bunch of chaos. 
 
INT: And why do you think it is that they are doing those things? Like repeatedly 
overdosing? 
 
DR H: We don’t know the answers to that. We don’t know, they don’t handle 
stress well and we talked about the emotional lability they have already, 
emotional dysregulation, they react to the extreme, no middle ground, 
unfortunately not. We try to teach them a middle ground I suppose. 
 
INT: And that’s not, so you said bipolar was an “illness” and that’s not the case 
with borderline? 
 
DR H: It’s in the DSM so it’s not up to me to call it an illness or not. It’s a defect 
in personality and if you want to include that as an illness go right ahead. 
 
Distinctions between “real” or “true” mental illness or disorders affect patients not 
only in terms of what seems to be a less empathic response for those with personality 
disorders, as I have shown in the previous quote, but also in terms of treatment coverage, 
particularly in the United States. Dr. F puts into perspective the power that diagnostic 
labels have for some. While she has never practiced in the United States, she talks about 
some of her colleagues’ experiences with Health Maintenance Organization, HMO, and 
coverage. In an effort to obtain treatment for the patient and to get paid for practice, some 
psychiatrists will classify those with BPD as Bipolar Disorder because they can loosely fit 
the criteria for emotional liability and risky behaviors.  We can see how the distinction 
between certain DSM diagnosis is understood and used by insurance companies to accept 
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or deny treatment coverage and may also be bent by psychiatrists to obtain payment. It is 
also interesting to note how BPD patients are set up as risky, time-consuming patients in 
the mental health community.  
DR F: I enjoy the teenagers generally, right? But a lot of people won’t take them 
for different reasons, they are risky patients, which will put anybody off, but they 
are also very time consuming. So if you are out in the community, you can only 
bill so much time. In fact, in the United States, there used to be a lot, of literature 
on borderline but there isn’t anymore because the HMO’s won’t pay for many 
sessions with patients with personality disorders, so everybody now is classified 
as bipolar because if you look at the criteria, loosely they can fit because of the 
emotional lability and the dysregulation and some of the risky behaviors. 
 
INT: So they pay for bipolar because—? 
 
DR F: It’s chronic true mental illness and they don’t look at personality disorders 
as so, and it’s for psychotherapy and so a lot of the research is kinda flipped 
around. Just like there are a lot of children with bipolar disorder which is all 
nonsense really because it’s just a bunch of kids with temper problems, but you 
cant get paid for temper problems? Plus you add the drug companies on top of it 
who are trying to get their mood stabilizers and anti-psychotics to market and this 
is a lovely market because they are always on pills. Both of that pushing in that 
direction so the literature has shifted. I don’t know how to look it up but there is a 
way to look how many sessions you can have for personality disorder treatment as 
a psychiatrist in the States and how many sessions you can have for bipolar 
disorder and you will see why there’s a switch. 
 
INT: It is funny how labels have power.  
 
DR F: Yeah but at the end of the day, we all like to get paid. So if you are in the 
community and they are very labor intensive and on any given day, they are very 
unstable and you are trying to plan a clinic and ah, a lot of people will not be 
particularly interested in having this population, just like if you are a family 
doctor you wouldn’t want to take a person with chronic diabetes, a 50 year old 
diabetic with cardiovascular, renal and respiratory problems. They are just one of 
our more complex problems but we take people here off a list and they come off a 
list. So we don’t pick and choose and if we see them in the emergency department, 
they are ours. So again, we don’t pick and choose who we see. 
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6.3.2 Ambivalence or Resistance Toward the DSM 
Psychiatrists did not always take everything in the DSM at face value. Dr. E 
remembers learning about self-mutilation as part of personality disorders (that is, as 
related to BPD), but in her experience it is not always linked to BPD.  
DR E:  We also learned about it I guess as part of personality disorders, 
specifically borderline personality disorder because it tends to go with that.  
 
INT: I’ll get back to that because it keeps coming up, its something now that I 
have to consider, it comes up so much. 
 
DR E:  Because it is part of the diagnostic criteria. My experience is that it isn’t 
sort of one and the same as borderline personality disorder especially now you 
see it much more. It is much more common than just in BPD.  But in thinking of 
what I was taught, that would have been what I was taught, that it goes with BPD. 
My experience is that it’s more than that.  
 
However, she does note that self-mutilation serves as a reminder to screen for 
BPD. 
DR E:  My experience is that anybody who had distress can have self-mutilation; 
anybody who had identity issues can have self-mutilation. It’s really multifaceted 
as you said before and can occur in almost any diagnosis or without a diagnosis, 
it isn’t exclusive to BPD. When I see it, it reminds me to screen for BPD to see if 
people have the other symptoms or not but not necessarily.  
 
Dr. A was not critical of the DSM per se but was critical of its potential for 
misuse. First, he thought that DSM criteria could be followed too blindly, thus ignoring 
important clinical observations. Second, problems could also arise if psychiatrists only 
relied on clinical observations without taking into consideration the DSM criteria. He 
cites Bipolar Disorder as an excellent example of ignoring criteria and creating new 
diagnoses that do not yet exist in the DSM.  
DR A: Because um, not just the fourth edition but just as a thing. It’s like being 
mad at guns you know, because it’s the people using it. It is a tool that has the 
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potential to be misused. Any tool can be misused, I have no illusions about that 
but um, as someone who has spent a considerable amount of his life learning how 
to use it properly, um, it is a certainly a source of frustration to see it misused or 
mishandled either, the two broad ways we see this done is um, the extremes. 
Whether just blindly following the criteria without any regard for the reality in 
front of you or the other side of blindly applying diagnoses from the hip just 
entirely instinctual perspective without any regard for the criteria. [laughter] 
probably some, we have to keep both things in mind at the same time. Bipolar 
serves an excellent example of the erosion of the criteria and how people sort of 
constructed new diagnoses from the, you know. Ah, you must have, in fact this 
relates to BPD. Because you’ll have people say you must have ultra-rapid cycling 
Bipolar disorder. Look it up in the DSM, it’s not there! What’s this ultra-rapid 
cycling? Oh they have mood swings. How long do they last, oh a few minutes to a 
few hours. Well that is really rapid cycling! It is both a scientific document in the 
sense that it is supposed to be based on epidemiological data but it’s also a 
political document. 
 
He is also referring to the bending of criteria to loosely fit another disorder. Dr. F 
mentioned this previously in her discussion of diagnosing people with Bipolar Disorder 
when they have BPD. In fact the description of ultra-rapid cycling Bipolar Disorder 
sounds like the criteria pertaining to the emotional instability outlined in BPD criteria.  
When I informed Dr. C that NSSI was proposed to be included as a new disorder 
in the DSM-5, he voiced his concerns about the DSM being pharmaceutically driven and 
cited concerns about the inclusion of new disorders.  
DR C: Ahh…I think they are using it for a political tool. It’s mainly, it’s taken 
advantage of by researchers. It gives them a research direction to use, which is 
fine, but, you know, sometimes I find that you can’t create a clinical syndrome to 
do research on, that’s an issue. And I also think there’s a lot of them that are 
pharmaceutically driven. Again, case in point, anxiety disorders, all of them are 
supposed to have a sub-component, or a subtype called delusional, delusional 
level of poor insight which might trigger anybody to use anti-psychotics in that 
population, which is big money for drug companies. So, that’s an example, that’s 
my opinion again. Certainly, it’s up for debate. It’s a controversy but I’ve talked 
about this with my colleagues. This is just an example. I don’t put a lot of stock 
into new syndromes. Stuff like Olfactory Reference Syndrome becoming a stand-
alone condition. You know and as an anxiety disorder. Certainly there are 
syndromes in psychiatry or psychological experiences that people do, that have a 
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lot of symptoms black and white but there’s a meaning behind it. You know, self-
mutilation stand-alone to be honest with you I never knew it was gonna be there. 
You informed me of that. 
 
Dr. B cites the criterion system to be useful but cautions against the over-reliance 
on diagnostic checklists. I thought it was particularly interesting that he also spoke about 
how the DSM was taken up by the public.  
DR B: [pause, thinking]. I think changes are coming fairly slow; there have been 
huge changes in medications. Unfortunately the changes in medications have been 
more driven by drug companies than by reality. So that there is a [unclear] the 
Prozac’s were much, much better than the tricyclic’s, the new anti-psychotics 
were much, much better than the old ones. It’s all smoke and mirrors, its 
nonsense. Unfortunately, the Americans have done 3 or 4 DSMs—well we have 
DSM 3, which was clearly a major advance because it took us to a criterion-based 
system which I think was helpful. So that’s the advantages and disadvantages of 
that but it was overall helpful. They also introduced multiaxial diagnosis. Um, so 
not only in illness but also in personality. That came out in three, it went from 
three to three-revised to four. Um, [long pause] they have chopped things more 
and more and frankly they have, I think in fact things are in fact deteriorating 
from that point of view. I think there are some advantages but they are certainly 
making some retreats and I think one of, we are not, we are tending to look at 
checklists as opposed to taking and listening to patients and unfortunately the 
checklists become known to the public so if you wanted to walk in and tell me that 
you have Bipolar disorder, you know exactly what to say, [heavy laughter] and if 
I sit and look at a checklist I can be dumb enough to follow it.  
6.3.3 Self-mutilation, BPD and the DSM 
As I have outlined in Chapter 4, the relationship between self-mutilation, BPD and 
the DSM is very clear. BPD was a strong theme that ran through all ten interviews with 
psychiatrists. Dr. E noted that self-mutilation can be seen in the absence of a diagnosis, or 
seen with the diagnosis of BPD. However, she remembers learning about self-mutilation 
in connection with BPD, and the presentation of self-mutilation cues her to screen for the 
disorder (recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures or threats or self-mutilating behavior is 
listed in criterion #5 for BPD in the DSM). This was not an uncommon response from 
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psychiatrists.  Adult psychiatrists almost always associated self-mutilation with BPD 
because they were less likely to view it as a trend or phase, as child and adolescent 
psychiatrists did. 
Discourses around gender and instability were also taken up in talk about self-
mutilation and BPD. Dr. B describes what he sees as a typical self-mutilation patient, and 
reproduces DSM language in terms of Cluster B disorders, sex, sexuality and instability.  
INT: Okay, so is there a typical self-mutilation patient within these people with 
personality disorders? 
 
DR B: Well, you’re gonna be more likely to see patients, well it’s one of the 
characteristics, one of the criteria of Borderline Personality Disorder which is 
actually the ICD-10 does a better term than the DSM, it uses emotionally unstable 
character disorder which is a much better term. You’ll see it to a lesser extent in 
the other cluster B personality disorders but the big one is Borderline. 
 
INT: Ok, and who is the typical BPD? 
 
DR B: Well they tend, BPD for some reason tend to be more often female, males 
tend to be anti-socials. They tend to have very high rates of childhood physical 
and sexual abuse. Uh, they tend to have instability all over place, so intense 
unstable personal relationships, they get usually boyfriends [laughter] or other 
relationships which are very, very intense, and then of course crash and yeah. So 
what you are looking at most commonly in adult psychiatry would be your BPD. 
 
Dr. A reproduces DSM language when referring to the ABC cluster of disorders 
(personality disorders), claiming cluster B disorders are often people in society who we 
would label as bad; BPD falls in this category.  
INT: So would say self-mutilation occurs along with a particular psychiatric 
diagnosis more often than not? 
 
Dr. A: We can look at this from two different sides, um, what illnesses, if you have 
a particular diagnosis will you commonly see cutting in that diagnosis, your 
cluster B personality disorders, is that something you have come across so far? 
They call those, the way we teach is that is ABC, which is mad, bad, sad. Cluster 
B is bad. Not judgment bad but those are the ones that society or people would 
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consider bad. They are your Borderlines, your histrionics, and your narcissists. 
Um, they tend to cut more than say your other personality disorders and 
specifically mostly we see the cluster B personalities, the BPD um and not 
necessarily that we see the full blown diagnosis at this stage but we see traits of 
BPD. Now we certainly see some patients who absolutely warrant the full 
diagnosis. Um, but we apply so much care because the personality is not finished 
forming. [Child and adolescent psychiatrist] 
 
Dr. J argued when someone with self-mutilation presents, he becomes suspicious 
of an AXIS II diagnosis (the axis where Personality disorders was located in editions 3 
and 4, but was changed in the recently published DSM-5) and although he notes the over-
reliance on BPD as a diagnosis, he associates self-mutilation with personality disorders.  
INT: Is there a typical self-mutilation patient? 
 
Dr. J: Those especially who are having personality disorder traits. For example, 
histrionic personality traits, borderline personality traits, and a combination of a 
number others like if the person is like a handicap who is intellectually 
challenged. [pause] or a personal abuse as a child. They would also express their 
disapproval or anger in the form of self-mutilation. Some of my colleagues are 
very much fond of BPD because whenever a person comes to the unit with suicidal 
ideation, they get an axis 2 diagnosis very easily because they feel that if a person 
is doing this, there is something other than normal depression. Normal depression 
means clinical depression they have some personality component and it most often 
fits into borderline because they get other characteristics. So sometime, it’s an 
overgeneralization. As a matter of fact, it is not only BPD. It is other traits as 
well.  
 
Although, the presence of self-mutilation does not necessarily mean a BPD 
diagnosis will be made, Dr. E said self-mutilation reminds her to screen for BPD to look 
for other symptoms. This highlights how self-mutilation cues the practitioner to look for a 
collection of other symptoms linking the presentation of self-mutilation with BPD.  
Dr. E:  My experience is that anybody who had distress can have self-mutilation; 
anybody who had identity issues can have self-mutilation. It’s really multifaceted 
as you said before and can occur in almost any diagnosis or without a diagnosis, 
it isn’t exclusive to BPD. When I see it, it reminds me to screen for BPD to see if 
people have the other symptoms or not but not necessarily.  
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6.3.4 Bodily Damage and control  
Interviews really brought out normative ideas about damage to bodies, the skin 
and the lasting effects of scarring. Given that the alternatives psychiatrists provided still 
somewhat satisfied the patient’s desire for temporary bodily pain, it is important to ask 
why it is that opening the skin and scarring is seen as something that is offensive and 
needs to be stopped. Psychiatrists, while they may not condone it, clearly acknowledge 
purposely inflicted pain is a useful tactic for some people who have great difficulty 
dealing with intense emotions. In my discussion around the skin in Chapter 5, it was 
obvious that scarring was regarded both as a reminder to the self-mutilator of their past 
pain and as a sign of instability to the outside world. These were seen as adequate 
motivations to avoid damaging the skin. Psychiatrists discussed the long-term impact of 
scarring and proposed alternative ways to regulate emotions, such as holding ice cubes 
tightly in the palm of the hand, pinching the Achilles tendon or placing one’s hand in ice-
cold water. They provided alternatives because they saw self-mutilation as damaging to 
the integrity of the skin and body. What does skin, and the opening of skin, signify then?  
As I outlined in the literature review chapter, the opening of one’s body/ skin not 
only threatens normative ideas about beauty and the body but also blurs the boundary 
between what is considered public and private. The skin is seen as the boundary between 
the blood and organs and the outside world. When what is considered to be private enters 
the public realm it often seen to as “inappropriate” and/or “risky”. This sort of separation 
between public and private is kept in place by normative ideas and risk discourses that 
regulate what is socially acceptable and unacceptable. Anthropologist Mary Douglas 
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(1969) has argued that bodily control is an extension and expression of social control. The 
body and its openings are symbolic of boundaries around stability and order and are 
constructed by ideas of “inside” and “outside”, “dirty” and “clean,” policed by the 
processes of marginalizing those who engage in what is considered taboo. Purposeful 
injury is bewildering on a number of levels. Self-mutilation threatens not only social 
order but also normative ideas about bodies and gender (scars and ideas about smooth 
feminine skin), pain and pleasure, the ability to appropriately regulate emotions, the 
symbolic boundary of the skin (keeping the inside and outside separate), and ideas about 
mental stability 
6.3.5 Bodily Expression and Gender  
While there are mixed reactions to BPD patients and to what BPD even is, when I 
asked psychiatrists if they see self-mutilation occur frequently with a particular diagnosis, 
they routinely mentioned BPD; further, they emphasized women as the majority of both 
BPD patients and self-mutilation patients. The descriptions around the expression of 
anger were also interesting to note. Some psychiatrists either explicitly or implicitly 
thought girls who show anger tend to cut whereas boys who show anger tend to express it 
outwardly through aggression. For instance, Dr. E’s observations underlined how the 
gendering of anger steered more girls toward psychiatry and boys towards correctional 
systems. Gender and anger are both inscribed on bodies and perceived differently. I think 
part of understanding the relationship between self-mutilation and gender is 
understanding how we think of female and male bodies and what we think appropriate 
gendered reactions are supposed to look like.  
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6.4 Summary 
The data presented in this chapter highlighted how the DSM influences and is 
taken up or resisted in practice. While the DSM is the main communication tool among 
psychiatrists and does influence diagnosis and decisions making, psychiatrists seemed to 
make up their own mind about the role of the DSM in their practice and often relied upon 
their clinical experiences and other literature bases. The DSM is taken up as a tool of 
communication, a diagnostic guide to look for certain things, a language to describe and 
explain what is observed, a document to use with patients and a political document that is 
sometimes misused.   
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Chapter 7  – Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has outlined the intersections between gender, power, and psychiatric 
knowledge. My goal was to examine the relationship between textual medical knowledge 
of self-mutilation and psychiatrists’ understandings of self-mutilation based on their 
professional experience. To my knowledge, there has been nothing written to date on how 
self-mutilation knowledge is constructed in the DSM and understood by psychiatrists. 
Taking that into consideration, this project is an original contribution to the literature on 
self-mutilation. The impetus for this research came from a desire to explore and examine 
psychiatric understandings of self-mutilation. This, of course, was only one window of 
insight into the DSM and psychiatric descriptions of self-mutilation and the interaction 
between the two. I do, however, think it provided important insights into how self-
mutilation knowledge is constructed and taken up. What this project can speak to is the 
common descriptions and discourses among psychiatrists and the DSM and how these 
discourses reflect dominant ideas about gender, risk taking and bodies. Deconstructing 
the ideas embedded within self-mutilation knowledge opens up the possibility of 
understanding its nuances and complications and subsequently understanding self-
mutilation differently. If the language provided by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
limits psychiatrists’ perceptions of particular behaviors, it is possible that self-mutilation 
will continue to be mainly influenced by the DSM and dominant discourses. This is not to 
say that psychiatrists are not attentive to the difficulties and complexities in people’s lives 
and cannot have their own nuanced ideas about why someone does something, but rather 
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if their knowledge base comes largely from a place that obscures complexities and is 
inherently invalidating, maybe we need to consider alternative ways of understanding the 
phenomenon. 
The objectives of my research were: 1) To examine the construction of expert 
medical knowledge through an examination of self-mutilation references in the DSM 
(editions 1 through 5), as well as how psychiatrists describe and understand self-
mutilation; and 2) To better understand how knowledge(s) of gender, the body and risk 
shape how self-mutilation is understood and whether or not these dominant knowledge(s) 
re-produce inequalities. 
7.2 Self-mutilation Knowledge Production  
Self-mutilation was described in many different ways but the common thread that 
ran though most descriptions by psychiatrists was discourses surrounding unstable, 
dysregulated, minds and bodies. Embedded within those discourses as well were ideas 
about gender and risk, but also conceptions of what is disordered. These are the areas I 
would like to focus on most in the following discussion, as they are foundational pieces to 
self-mutilation knowledge construction.  
Larger, dominant ideas about bodies, gender, and risk are reflected in the 
interviews regarding psychiatric practice as well as implicitly embedded in the statistics 
and descriptions in the DSM. The DSM is not an ahistorical, apolitical document; it is a 
reflection of the cultural, social and political context in which it is written and influenced 
by the individual and collective politics represented by the working groups. Given all of 
this, it is reasonable to suggest that the DSM also reinforces dominant ideas about 
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normative minds and bodies, which are of course gendered, raced and classed. The DSM 
has become the universal language of psychiatry and is a very influential document that 
has very real effects for the people who are labeled with the diagnoses it contains. Being 
considered a “301.83 BPD” (DSM-5, 2013), which may look like a harmless combination 
of letters and numbers, often has very harmful effects if it is understood as a pejorative 
label. Many mental illnesses have a stigma attached to them, some more than others. 
“BPD”, for psychiatrists, often connotes a difficult, unstable, impulsive, time intensive 
patient. If self-mutilation is tied up with BPD, it could be argued that self-mutilation, too, 
comes with a set of ideas and explanations that reflect some of what is embedded in the 
negative discourses surrounding BPD.  
The discursive link between self-mutilation and BPD is evident in the DSM and is 
also reflected in interviews with all of the psychiatrists. The association of BPD patients 
with being difficult and time-consuming patients was most often reflected in interviews 
with psychiatrists who practice adult psychiatry. Furthermore, part of the impetus to re-
name some self-mutilating behaviors NSSI is a push to divorce it from the negativity 
associated with BPD. This has both problematic and positive effects. It is problematic 
insofar as the proposal to create a separate NSSI disorder legitimizes self-mutilation in a 
way that is not the case for those who self-mutilate and are diagnosed with BPD. 
Conversely, this type of recognition can have positive effects for individuals who do not 
have BPD, find it distressing and would like to seek help.  
Self-mutilation can also be understood in terms of risk in a number of ways. First, 
the opening up or damaging of one’s skin can be understood as physically risky due to the 
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chance of infection and, albeit rare, is a risk that still exists. Second, cutting or damaging 
one’s skin purposefully can be understood as “ social” risk-taking because the behavior 
falls outside of social norms and is often associated with impulsivity and instability; scars 
and cuts serve as external markers of internal chaos. Self-mutilation and scarring are risky 
insofar as they incur the risk of stigma, especially for women where expectations of 
beauty are, in part, tied to ideals of flawless, smooth skin. Third, because BPD is often 
connected with impulsivity and is understood as a “risky” disorder, self-mutilation 
(because of its strong link with BPD) is, by association, also understood as “risky”.  Self-
mutilating means you are “at risk” of having BPD. There is a difference between 
individual intention and public perception of self-mutilation. The function of self-
mutilation for the individual who engages in it is often for the purpose of sensory 
intensity, I see this as separate from how self-mutilation is understood and argue that self-
mutilation is still viewed as a risk-taking behavior by society in general.   
Foucault’s work was useful insofar as his notion of the clinical gaze of disease 
demonstrates how changing ideologies can be seen as a product of different perceptions 
of the body. The concepts of biopower and technologies of power were also useful in 
understanding the role of the DSM, the construction of psychiatric truths, and the 
discipline of psychiatry in general. The DSM can be understood in Foucault’s concept of 
a technology of power as it determines the conduct of individuals by submitting them to 
certain ends through the objectivizing of the subject. Through discourse of the body and 
mind, choices are made when defining what constitutes unstable or disordered, 
inappropriate or dysregulated. Knowledge, power and practice are intimately connected. 
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The DSM acts to normalize disorder and understanding how the DSM constructs disorder 
helps to understand how such discourses are taken up and reproduced and influence 
practice. 
Smith’s work is also useful in understanding knowledge production and the 
production of mental health statistics.  She provides insight into the ways that objectified 
forms of knowledge are produced, are a result of ruling relations and obscure the 
complexities of people’s everyday lives; but also how texts are mediated-- all of which 
apply to the consideration of the DSM as a social agent.   
7.2.1 Discourse and Interaction  
Language is powerful and discourses reflect and reinforce power relations. How 
people talk about others’ bodies reflects ideas around morality and risk and often 
reinforces inequality. Popular mental illness discourse often leads to stigma. Mental 
illness discourse is part of larger normative discourses surrounding stability so that when 
individuals deviate from normative behaviors, they are marginalized and often viewed as 
ill, dangerous and unpredictable. In society, unpredictability and uncertainty are regulated 
by risk discourses and are kept in place by surveillance and regulation. Furthermore, the 
structuring of knowledge around gender, the body and risk contribute to the discourses 
about self-mutilation.  
The language used to reflect and reinforce ideas about bodies in turn reflects 
inequality.  The production of diagnosis leads to the production of certain kinds of bodies, 
healthy or ill, stable or unstable. Everyday discourses reflect ideas about bodies and 
health, equating the healthy body with the stable and regulated mind/body. Emily 
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Martin’s book The Woman in the Body examines how scientific/medical discourses shape 
how women view and experience their bodies but also how such discourses are embedded 
within ideas about women’s bodies and lives. I agree with Martin that such language and 
metaphors will inevitably result in affecting how women are viewed in general but also 
how women view themselves. Historically and socially, negative ideas are embedded 
within the discourses surrounding women’s lives in general from menstruation to mental 
“illness” to mothering to sexuality. Such ideas are created and re-created by reducing 
people’s lives and experiences to medical/scientific/ biological explanations and then 
using biology to promote inequality. She argues that these metaphors are reflective of 
particular ideologies and also affect the ways in which women conceptualize 
themselves—including how women internalize discourse. 
Medicalization shapes women’s lives, and the field of psychiatry is no exception. 
Psychiatric admission and use of psychotropic drug rates are higher among women than 
men even when both women and men present the same symptoms (Woodlock, 2005). 
According to Stoppard (in Woodlock, 2005), women make up 70 percent of the recipients 
of psychiatric drugs. A crucial question here is: Why do women receive psychiatric 
diagnoses and prescriptions more often? The answer, of course, is not a simple one 
because many factors need to be taken in account. Blum and Stracuzzi (2004) found that 
most psychiatric illnesses are implicitly gendered; they are constructed and understood in 
terms that convey femininity and/or masculinity. For example, they argue, addictive 
disorders and violent behaviors can be considered masculine while depression can be 
viewed as passive and feminine. Blum and Stracuzzi completed a study on Prozac, 
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focusing on its usage and influence in the popular media. They found that discussions 
surrounding Prozac were filled with covert messages about body disciplining for women, 
stating that the drug induces a masculine type of detachment. Women using the drug 
described themselves with vocabulary such as: “efficient”, “hard,” and “muscular”. 
Cooperstock and Lennard (1987), in Clarke (2004), described women’s usage of 
tranquillizers in terms of aids to help them cope with their socially assigned roles in the 
context of family and childrearing responsibilities. 
Women labeled mentally ill or prescribed psychotropic drugs may experience 
negative reactions from other people. Goffman (1963) uses the term “stigma” to describe 
the negative associations given to a particular group or individual status. Goffman stated 
“Stigmatized attributes are those which are deeply discrediting in particular contexts, 
which tend to become the dominant identities by which the person is perceived” (1963: 
3). He stressed that because of its devaluing, discriminative nature, stigma should be 
understood in the context of relationships. The majority of stigmatized views that 
surround mental illness are disseminated and maintained through the mass media where 
people are portrayed as violent and less competent. Low self-esteem is assumed to arise 
as a result of these processes because people apply these harsh beliefs to their own 
identities. People who self-mutilate are often portrayed as extremely unstable, 
unpredictable people and because of this may be treated with hesitation and harsh 
attitudes (Liebling et al, 1997). 
A study by Camp et al. (2002) concluded that women with chronic mental health 
problems made negative comments about themselves and avoided disclosure of their 
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diagnosis out of fear of others’ reactions (i.e., rejection). Although stigma can affect one’s 
self esteem, other factors have to be considered. The loss of valued roles in the family or 
community and/or loss of relationships can also lead to a lowered self-esteem. It is also 
possible that people who expect to be rejected may isolate themselves out of fear of 
further rejection. Isolation is both a so-called symptom of being “mentally ill” and a result 
of being labeled “mentally ill”. This is often where the boundary between what is or is not 
an illness begins to blur (Camp et al., 2002). Symptoms of mental illness are also the 
same sort of problems that arise when a person has been isolated and stigmatized; it is 
difficult to tell which came first. In relation to self-mutilation, the body is marked both 
overtly (scars) and subtly (norms, values) and voluntarily marking a permanent message 
on the skin offends Euro-American sensibility. Stigma associated with self-mutilation 
related scarring could lead to further isolation; negative reactions from others might also 
shape how those with scars view themselves.  
7.2.2 Knowledge and the DSM 
Knowledge affects people’s lives and the DSM is a diagnostic tool that is a way of 
ordering knowledge (Malhi, 2013). The DSM and its constantly changing criteria and 
definitions provide a great example of how knowledge affects practice and is translated 
into reality. Changes to text affect people’s day-to-day realities (Martin, 2009). In fact, 
the recent overhaul of the DSM is leading to considerable adjustments by both mental 
health professionals and some patients.  
The DSM is an impressive and influential document in that updates and changes 
in wording and classification translate into real life effects for millions of people. These 
 168 
 
changes can be positive or negative. The Axis II diagnosis in previous editions of the 
DSM (prior to the DSM-5) meant that some people with personality disorders did not 
receive coverage for treatment because Axis II disorders were not covered. The recent 
DSM, the fifth edition, no longer has the multi- axial system, and personality disorders 
have been moved from Axis II to the main disorders section. This may have positive 
effects for those who previously may not have been covered for expenses. Sometimes, 
psychiatrists question the DSM based on their what they see in practice. In my interview 
with Dr. G, she reported that she was seeing things in her practice that did not coincide 
with diagnoses in the DSM and became aware that most of those she had seen who self-
mutilated did not have clinical depression and did not respond to medications. This meant 
that they did not fit any pathology in the DSM which maybe, she thought, may have led 
to the creation of the new proposed NSSI diagnosis or pointed to something larger going 
on (for example, self- mutilation acts as part of a social phenomenon). Perhaps this is why 
there is a proposal to include NSSI as a disorder in DSM-5 and why an alternate model of 
personality disorders is also being considered. Psychiatrists are seeing things in their 
practices that the DSM does not explain. Knowledge production is a two way street; 
knowledge is produced in the DSM but is also produced from clinical experience.  
The proposal to include NSSI as a diagnosis, and the alternative models for 
personality disorders in the next DSM-5 revisions, at the very least expresses a more 
complicated and nuanced way of looking at these behaviors and characteristics; it also 
illustrates the effect psychiatric practice has on the development of and revisions to the 
DSM.  
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Knowledge is created and re-created and re-created by the many actors involved. 
The DSM is a critically influential actor that seems to take on a life of its own; it evolves 
and plays a huge role in psychiatric diagnostics and practice. It also finds its way into 
popular culture. Pop phrases and mainstream discourses use DSM terminology to 
describe everyday things: the weather is described as “bipolar” and conscientious people 
are described as “OCD”, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Martin, 2009).  
It is not hard to see the ways the DSM influences psychiatric practice, first, by 
legitimizing certain disorders which have effects on people’s treatment and ultimately 
their quality of life and second, by medicalizing normal reactions to life experiences. The 
DSM of course plays a role within a system, and psychiatrists also have their own 
backgrounds and experiences in practice. My research suggests that psychiatrists use and 
resist 14 (are critical of) the DSM simultaneously. They are aware of the ways in which it 
is misused and the problems that occur because of its misuse.  For example, Dr. A was 
aware of the ways in which the DSM could be misused and mishandled by those either 
blindly following criteria without looking and listening to the patient in front of them, or 
diagnosing someone based on DSM discourse without actually following the criteria. Dr. 
B agreed that a problem with the DSM was that it often meant psychiatrists followed 
checklists as opposed to talking and listening to patients. He also added that because the 
DSM was available to the public, patients often knew which criteria to verbalize in order 
to obtain a diagnosis. 
                                                
14 That is, psychiatrists are often skeptical of the DSM. For example, they may see it as a political tool, 
pharmaceutically driven, or overly pathologizing, and yet still use it. 
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Classification systems in modern society and modern medicine play a crucial rule 
in data collection and analysis. Classification gives voice to some perspectives while 
silencing others. Once classification is established, it reproduces itself in an instinctive 
way that silences debate (Jutel, 2011).  Nosologies psychiatric or otherwise are rarely 
permanent and grow out of specific historical contexts (Grob, 1991). Davis (2006) argues 
that criteria have been included in the DSM are often based on clinical judgment rather 
than empirical research, a process of course that is more political then scientific. Over 
time, DSM construction in part is based on various political factors and is influenced by 
the historical time in which it is produced. Taking this into consideration, criteria then are 
not and cannot ever be objective as they are embedded in socio-cultural-political contexts 
in which they are produced and will inevitably change. This has been the case with 
references to self-mutilation over the past 60 years.  
7.3 Reflections 
When I started this research, I wasn’t sure I knew what to expect, particularly 
when talking to psychiatrists. In retrospect, this research was both challenging and 
surprising. Psychiatrists provided invaluable insight into psychiatric thinking and 
practice. I appreciated their time and their honesty as they reflected on their training and 
experiences in practice. The interviews provided rich data that were useful and 
particularly so when complimented by an analysis of the DSM.  The psychiatrists I 
interviewed are well intentioned and very much want to help reduce suffering for their 
patients. This sometimes means that they provide consistent appointments, or take on a 
psychotherapist role, or discuss alternative ways to deal with the overwhelming emotional 
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pain. Usually by the time a patient presents to the psychiatrist, it has gotten to a point 
where the person or, in some cases, the parent of a child, is seeking help because the 
behavior is distressing or impacting daily life. Psychiatrists have the knowledge that they 
received in their training, and iteratively they continue to build their knowledge via texts 
and through experiences in practice.  
The DSM is particularly important in that it contains the procedures and language 
that is needed to communicate between mental health professionals, and is the main texts 
psychiatrists use to diagnose disorders. Adult psychiatrists often viewed self-mutilation as 
an indication of BPD and although they noted exceptions, the DSM still prompted 
psychiatrists to look for BPD. Other psychiatrists, particularly those specializing in child 
and adolescent psychiatry, saw variations of self-mutilation that fell outside of BPD and 
were not listed in the DSM. They did admit that they did not like to diagnose those under 
18 with BPD. They understood the behaviors as a trend or a phase that would extinguish 
over time.  Others acknowledged that both BPD and self-injury were still poorly 
understood, but they did their best to help with what they had. Psychiatrists, like 
everyone, are shaped by various knowledge bases, their personal histories, their training 
and the political dynamics within they work.  
It was interesting to see and note the similarities and differences in approaches -- 
similarities in gendered, heterosexual approaches and differences in thinking about BPD. 
Some of the similarities may have been due to shared educational background and 
training, as most of the psychiatrists had completed undergraduate degrees in the same 
disciplines or had attended medical school at the same university. Differences in 
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perspectives could be the result of a combination of many factors such as: educational 
training, training post medical school or psychiatric residency, sub-specialization, 
psychiatrists’ own subjective life experiences and personalities, type of practice, practice 
population, exposure and experience with practice, length of time practicing, age, sex, 
and the sources of textual knowledge they draw on in their day to day practices and in 
their own time.  
Opinions about the function of self-mutilation were relatively consistent among all 
ten psychiatrists. They thought it was a coping mechanism, a way to manage intense 
emotions when patients felt numb and needed to feel, or when patients felt too much and 
needed to numb. However, perspectives on the reasons that lead to intense emotions 
varied. Some psychiatrists saw the underlying stressors as the result of trauma (physical, 
sexual, or emotional) or BPD; others had a multifaceted, complex understanding of 
reasons for self-mutilation. These tended to be the psychiatrists whose knowledge not 
only came from an intellectual and experiential place but also from a patient centered 
understanding of self-mutilation. They also were more likely to refer to patient’s 
narratives of self-mutilation and numerous sources of literature on self-mutilation, and 
tended to refer to the DSM less. For example, Dr. G had a perspective on self-mutilation 
that was a complex interplay between different factors such as genetics, temperament, 
neurology (pathways being interrupted by trauma), environment, socio-economic status, 
and sensory profiles.  
Dr. H on the other hand had a very linear perspective on self-mutilation and 
focused less on the various nuances that may lead someone to self-mutilate. He felt 
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strongly that genetics played a central role in determining those who have personality 
disorders. He felt that self-mutilation was an epidemic among teenage girls, was most 
often because of BPD, and was often used as a method of manipulation or to experience 
an endorphin release. Drs. A, E, and F, all whom have expressed a special interest in self-
mutilation and BPD, told me they have done a lot of reading on the topic and actively 
continue to do so. They revealed a deeper understanding of those with BPD and those 
who self-mutilate and appeared to be highly compassionate to patients’ pain and struggles 
with living in their own skin. All three had done extensive reading on the locations of cuts 
and what the location might have symbolically meant for patients. They had learned to 
look past the physical markings and try to understand the deeper meanings; they read 
scars differently (for example, cuts on the wrists were considered an outward expression 
of anger and cuts on thighs were considered self-hatred directed inwards—which they 
regarded as important clinical information).  
Even though their backgrounds were different, for example, Dr. A practiced adult 
psychiatry and Dr. E practiced child and adolescent psychiatry, it was clear that they had 
some similar understandings and/ or they were influenced by similar schools of thought. 
For example, all used “self-soothing” (a much less judgmental or harsh term) to refer to 
the use and function of self-mutilation; they were the only psychiatrists to reference that 
term in the interviews. 
There were differences between child and adolescent psychiatrists and adult 
psychiatrists in terms of how they understood self-mutilation and how they spoke in the 
interviews.  Child and adolescent psychiatrists often spoke collectively, speaking in the 
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“we,” referring to the other child and adolescent psychiatrists they worked with. Adult 
psychiatrists almost always spoke exclusively of themselves and their own thoughts and 
experiences. I believe I obtained a somewhat more consistent perspective of self-
mutilation from child and adolescent psychiatrists. It seemed that they worked as a team, 
or had similar training backgrounds. Their gentle, team-oriented approach may have also 
been reflective of the population they worked with: parents are often involved in the 
picture and children are often seen as vulnerable and still developing, thus perhaps 
eliciting more sympathy or patience from psychiatrists; they are still viewed as immature 
and their immature behaviors are understood and tolerated differently. Psychiatrists who 
see adults as patients seem to have less tolerance for what they viewed as immature 
behaviors (such as cutting or other impulsive acts).  
Psychiatrists also seemed to read self-mutilation differently in different 
populations. In the adolescent population, self-mutilation was often seen as a phase, 
something transient that would pass. It was either understood as a part of a social 
phenomenon in schools or as a result of turbulence associated with the adolescent life 
phase. In contrast, self-mutilation in adulthood was often seen as pathological because it 
was thought that the personality was developed and fixed, therefore ruling out the 
possibility of a phase.  Although this explanation subscribes to the view that the 
personality stops developing at some point, it must be noted that this is contradicted by 
other psychiatrists (and sometimes the same psychiatrist) who hold the view that the brain 
is malleable (the concept of neuroplasticity) and is changeable through therapy or 
medications.  Self-mutilation in adulthood is almost always associated with BPD by 
 175 
 
psychiatrists who practiced Adult psychiatry. Child and Adolescent psychiatrists, while 
they may have seen patients who they viewed as having traits of BPD, were hesitant to 
give a diagnosis of BPD because they also felt it was difficult to tease out BPD behaviors 
from “normal” adolescent behaviors (such as unstable sense of self, impulsivity and risk-
taking).  
Younger15 psychiatrists seemed to have a more nuanced and empathetic approach 
to self-mutilation and to BPD. They tended to talk about BPD in terms of invalidation, 
referred to the complexities surrounding self-mutilating behaviors and were fully aware 
of the negative connotation of BPD and what that meant for people who were diagnosed 
with the disorder. This did not mean, however, that they did not cite BPD patients as 
difficult or time intensive; some of them did. Older psychiatrists were also aware of the 
negative association attached to BPD diagnosis but spoke less about the nuances 
surrounding some of the behaviors; they spoke about both self-mutilation and BPD in 
rigid and very definite ways, leaving little room for alternative understandings or 
interpretations. These differences may have been reflective of different knowledge bases 
(i.e., curriculum they learned in their training) or length of time in practice. 
 In terms of sex differences, I cannot say that men or women seemed drastically 
different; some psychiatrists were gentler than others but this was purely based on 
individual personalities, although women tended to be more inquisitive and make more 
                                                
15 This was a subjective judgment. I determined psychiatrists to be younger or older by either our informal 
conversations about the number of years they have been practicing (not everyone divulged that information 
to me) or based on their physical appearance (skin, posture, hair color). I determined older to mean over 
what I thought was 50 years of age and younger, less than 50 years of age. 
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eye contact. All of the psychiatrists were very cooperative and helpful. It was a pleasure 
interviewing them.  
All references to long-term consequences of scarring were gendered, referring to 
women, and reflected heteronormative ideals such as marriage and family. 
When asked if there was an increase in self-mutilation, most psychiatrists felt that 
there had been an increase in self-mutilation in the past 10-15 years, however some 
suggested that this may be because it had become more talked about and therefore more 
visible.  
7.4 Implications for those who Self-mutilate 
My research findings illuminate how psychiatrists need to re-understand and re-
read the complexities of people’s lives, in particular those who experience severe trauma. 
If part of the difficulty lies with how self-mutilation is read, then a new reading of the 
skin, trauma and pain is crucial. First, how distress and trauma manifest in the physical 
body and are mediated by gendered experience needs to be examined in more depth. 
Second, while some psychiatrists have very nuanced and critical understandings of self-
mutilation, others do not and hold rigidly to a particular perspective, reading the DSM 
rather than reading the skin; the implications of this for patient care requires further 
research. Medical/ mental health professionals who are ultimately concerned with helping 
patients who self-harm need to have well rounded understanding(s) of what self-harm 
means for people’s lives. This is less about a medical model of treatment but more about 
a human validation of one’s pain and an acknowledgement of one’s voice. Understanding 
the behaviors outside of diagnostic criteria may help to have different, alternative 
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readings of self-mutilation, moving the diagnosis from being considered a pathological 
behavior instead to being a sign of strength or self-preservation. Labeling distress as an 
“illness”, even with the best of intentions and as something in need of treatment, can be 
problematic.  
7.5 Limitations 
As with any research project, there are things I would have done differently if I 
were to do it again. While transcribing the interviews, I noticed that I could have asked 
some different questions or probed others a little more. While I did re-arrange and change 
a few questions after my first few interviews, it was not until I was transcribing and 
deeply involved in my data that it was clear that, while my findings were rich and very 
detailed, I would have liked to have a clearer picture of how psychiatrists defined self-
mutilation and probed their ideas on normal, gendered bodies a little more.   
If time had permitted, I would have liked to include the voices of lived experience, 
as I think that would have accessed incredibly important information that would help to 
provide a fuller picture of how self-mutilation knowledge is constructed by both experts 
and lay people (although one could argue that those who have lived experience are the 
experts). If nothing else, this research provided important information about how 
psychiatrists understand and deal with self-mutilation in their practices. Of course, 
without the point of view from a lived experience perspective, which is an important 
piece of the puzzle, I cannot speak to the ways in which patients feel they have been 
treated by psychiatrists when it came to sharing information about purposefully hurting 
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themselves. This perspective is critical. These considerations were realized through 
reflection once the data had been collected and analyzed. 
7.6 Implications for Practice 
The aim of my research was not to provide generalizable findings but to provide 
rich, detailed data. My research will be useful as a reflective account for psychiatrists to 
see how they themselves describe self-mutilation. It provides a solid starting point for 
future research on how self-mutilation is understood. In particular, it provides a snapshot 
of how self-mutilation is described by psychiatrists in the context of Newfoundland. 
Finally, highlighting the relationship between the DSM and self-mutilation reveals how 
expert knowledge is constructed, reproduced, adapted, and resisted by psychiatrists. I 
have illustrated how the DSM is gendered when it comes to the diagnosis of BPD and its 
relation to self-mutilation with the hope that health care professionals might exercise 
caution when interpreting behaviors and applying diagnoses.  
7.7 Future Directions for Research 
Future research might examine the lived experience of those who self-mutilate or 
have a diagnosis of BPD or have been hospitalized for either of these, to explore their 
experiences of staff attitudes, treatment by psychiatrists, other patients, and being an 
inpatient. Such a perspective would be extremely helpful in uncovering unhelpful 
interventions, gaps and inconsistencies in treatment. It would also be worthwhile to 
further examine ideas and discourses contained within self-mutilation knowledge or BPD. 
It would also be worthwhile to interview psychiatrists about the adjustment and changes 
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to the DSM-5 and whether or not the new text has changed how psychiatrists understand 
self-mutilation and in what ways this has changed how they practice.  
Beyond psycho-medical approaches, it would be useful to have a multifaceted 
understanding of the commonalities in the subtle nuances in self-mutilation: for those 
with trauma, those who are trying it transiently and those who continue to do it and find it 
an effective coping skill over the course of many years.  In addition, for those who try it 
transiently, we also need to understand the effect of celebrity culture and other cultural 
factors that influence behaviors that are considered pathological. A phenomenological 
approach would likely be most useful for these types of questions.  
An important note that can be taken away from this research and interviews with 
psychiatrists is the need for validation when it comes to seeking help for self-mutilation 
or medical professionals’ reactions to scars. Beyond the main concerns of infection rate 
(which remains low) and scarring which does have long term stigmatizing effects, one of 
the main reasons people chose to engage in self-harm behaviors is due to distressing 
feelings that come from some sort of invalidation. Invalidating environment is the new 
catchword in BPD literature. Older BPD literature suggested that sexual abuse was 
present in most patients with BPD and was thought to be a major contributing factor to 
the development of BPD. Recent studies suggest, however, that invalidation in some form 
or another is common in most people with BPD. Invalidation can take on a number of 
forms: toxic familial environments, verbal abuse, the child’s emotional needs not being 
met by caregivers, or some would argue the ultimate kind of invalidation, physical or 
sexual abuse. People who self-mutilate do not need to be further invalidated by negative 
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reactions, misunderstanding or being told to stop the behavior. This is perhaps why 
doctors cite hospitalization for BPD patients as being unhelpful and making patients 
worse. While some psychiatrists see self-mutilating behaviors in hospital as a fight for 
control, they continue to help their patients as best they can with the resources available.  
7.8 Final Thoughts  
This thesis has outlined the intersections between gender, power, and psychiatric 
knowledge. The connection between and mutual transformation of these three was 
evident in the ways that psychiatrists talk about gender power, the skin and the typical 
patient. This thesis has demonstrated the discursive link between self-mutilation and BPD 
that reinforces particular gendered ideas about both BPD and self-mutilation. This is 
evident in the ways that psychiatrists talk about gender, the skin and the typical patient in 
the interviews. In addition there were also discourses of risk and healthy bodies, both of 
which are also gendered.  
I outlined the shifts in DSM in terms of how self-mutilation and its association 
with BPD have shifted over time. I also provided insight into psychiatrists’ perspectives 
on self-mutilation, the various discourses they used to describe their experiences and the 
ways in which they resist and reproduce DSM language. BPD and self-mutilation are 
discursively linked in both the DSM and in psychiatric practice, although this may be less 
so now over the past few years with the rise of alternative ways of reading self-mutilation 
and consideration that self-mutilation that falls outside of BPD criteria may speak to 
something more pervasive and perhaps, cultural shifts. My research was an original 
contribution to the literature on self-mutilation and its knowledge production. It is my 
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hope that in the future self-mutilation and scarred skin are both read in more nuanced and 
complex ways that fall outside of the dominant psycho-medical perspectives.
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Appendix B – Recruitment e-mail to the head of psychiatry 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Medicine 
Division of Community Health and Humanities 
The Health Sciences Centre 
St. John’s, NL, Canada A1B 3V6 
Tel:  709-777-6213/6652   Fax: 709-777-7382 
www.med.mun.ca 
 
 
Dear Dr. X, 
 
My name is Ashley Patten, I am a master’s student in the division of Community 
Health and Humanities at MUN working with Drs. Natalie Beausoleil, Olga Heath and 
Fern Brunger.  My research interest is in the area of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), often 
referred to as self-mutilation or self-harm. As part of my thesis research, I am interested 
in interviewing psychiatrists about their views on self-injury.  
 
Research on the incidence and prevalence of purposeful self-injury in 
Newfoundland and Labrador is very limited. However, one recent quantitative study 
conducted at Memorial University examining the overlap between NSSI (non-suicidal 
self injury) and disordered eating behaviors suggests that NSSI is indeed a serious 
concern in this province and one warranting further investigation. The study surveyed 
1639 undergraduate students (response rate 80%) and found that 6. 52% of participants 
engaged in NSSI at least once in their lifetime and both females (6.5 %) and males (6.5%) 
engaged in self-mutilation as a coping mechanism (Duggan, Button, Heath and Heath, 
2010). Furthermore, these numbers reflect higher prevalence rates than many other 
mental health issues including eating disorders (1.7%, Statistics Canada, 2002), 
schizophrenia (0.5-1.5%, DSM IV-TR, 2000) and bipolar I (0.4-1.6%; DSM-IV-TR, 
2000) which have been the subject of closer examination.  
 
My research examines how self-mutilation is described and understood in the 
DSM, by psychiatrists and from the perspective of lived experience. Thus, I am 
examining the construction of expert and lay knowledge. I believe a better understanding 
of how self-mutilation is described and understood sheds light on the complex 
phenomenon of purposeful self-injury and has implications for psychiatric practice.  
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I am wondering if I could set up a meeting with you to discuss how I might best 
recruit psychiatrists for these important interviews? 
 
I would also be happy to meet with the Division of Psychiatry to present to 
discuss my findings.  
 
If you would like any more information, I would be happy to answer any 
questions or concerns. You can contact me by email at apatten@mun.ca or by phone at 
709-763-2445. 
 
Thank you for your time. I look forward to hearing from you.  
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Ashley Patten 
 
B.A., Master's Student (MSc. Med) 
Community Health and Humanities 
Faculty of Medicine 
Memorial University 
apatten@mun.ca  
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Appendix C – Follow-up e-mail to psychiatrists interested in 
participating 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Medicine  
Division of Community Health and Humanities 
The Health Sciences Centre 
St. John’s, NL, Canada A1B 3V6 
Tel:  709-777-6213/6652   Fax: 709-777-7382 
www.med.mun.ca 
 
 
Dear Dr. X, 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in my research. Your name and e-mail 
address has been forwarded to me by Dr. XX, the head of psychiatry. 
 
I will be conducting interviews over the next month. Please let me know a date and time 
that is most convenient for you during this period. Each interview will last approximately 
one hour.  
 
If you require any additional information regarding my research, please let me know; I 
would be pleased to send additional information along.  
 
You can contact me at 709-763-2445 or apatten@mun.ca. I look forward to hearing from 
you.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ashley L. Patten 
 
 
_____________________________ 
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B.A., Master's Student (MSc. Med) 
Community Health and Humanities 
Faculty of Medicine 
Memorial University 
apatten@mun.ca 
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Appendix D – Information sheet 
 
 
 
Faculty of Medicine 
Division of Community Health and Humanities 
The Health Sciences Centre 
St. John’s, NL, Canada A1B 3V6 
Tel:  709-777-6213/6652   Fax: 709-777-7382 
www.med.mun.ca 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
My name is Ashley Patten, I am a master’s student in the division of Community Health 
and Humanities at MUN working with Drs. Natalie Beausoleil, Olga Heath and Fern 
Brunger.  My research interest is in the area of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), often 
referred to as self-mutilation or self-harm. As part of my thesis research, I am interested 
in interviewing psychiatrists about their views on self-injury. At this point, you have most 
likely received an e-mail from Dr. Callanan explaining my study and notice that I would 
be contacting you about possible participation. 
 
Research on the incidence and prevalence of purposeful self-injury in Newfoundland and 
Labrador is very limited. However, one recent quantitative study conducted at Memorial 
University examining the overlap between NSSI (non-suicidal self injury) and disordered 
eating behaviors suggests that NSSI is indeed a serious concern in this province and one 
warranting further investigation. The study surveyed 1639 undergraduate students 
(response rate 80%) and found that 6. 52% of participants engaged in NSSI at least once 
in their lifetime and both females (6.5 %) and males (6.5%) engaged in self-mutilation as 
a coping mechanism (Duggan, Button, Heath and Heath, 2010). Furthermore, these 
numbers reflect higher prevalence rates than many other mental health issues including 
eating disorders (1.7%, Statistics Canada, 2002), schizophrenia (0.5-1.5%, DSM IV-TR, 
2000) and bipolar I (0.4-1.6%; DSM-IV-TR, 2000) which have been the subject of closer 
examination.  
 
My research examines how self-mutilation is described and understood in the DSM, by 
psychiatrists and from the perspective of lived experience. Thus, I am examining the 
construction of expert and lay knowledge. I believe a better understanding of how self-
mutilation is described and understood sheds light on the complex phenomenon of 
purposeful self-injury and has implications for psychiatric practice.  
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Each face-to-face interview will take approximately one hour or less and will involve a 
few guiding questions to get conversation started. Accessing psychiatrist’s perspectives is 
important not only for my research project but also in better understanding the 
complexities of self-mutilation.  
 
Over the period of January to April, would you be able to participate in a face-to-face 
interview? 
 
If you would like any more information, I would be happy to answer any questions or 
concerns. If you would like to participate in this research project, please contact me either 
by e-mail or phone.  
 
You can contact me by email at apatten@mun.ca or by phone at 709-763-2445. 
 
Thank you for your time. I look forward to hearing from you.  
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
_____________________________ 
Ashley Patten 
 
B.A., Master's Student (MSc. Med) 
Community Health and Humanities 
Faculty of Medicine 
Memorial University 
apatten@mun.ca 
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Appendix E – Consent form 
 
 
 
Faculty of Medicine 
Division of Community Health and Humanities 
The Health Sciences Centre 
St. John’s, NL, Canada A1B 3V6 
Tel:  709-777-6213/6652   Fax: 709-777-7382 
www.med.mun.ca 
 
Consent to Take Part in Research 
  
TITLE: How is Self-mutilation Constructed? An Examination of Knowledge Production 
Surrounding the Body, Gender, and Risk.   
 
INVESTIGATOR: Ashley L. Patten, Community Health and Humanities Master’s 
Student  
 
You have been invited to take part in a research study.  Taking part in this study is 
voluntary.  It is up to you to decide whether to be in the study or not.  You can decide not 
to take part in the study.  If you decide to take part, you are free to leave at any time.  
Before you decide, you need to understand what the study is for, what risks you might 
take and what benefits you might receive.  This consent form explains the study.   
 
Please read this carefully. Take as much time as you like. If you like, take it home to 
think about for a while. Mark anything you do not understand, or want explained better. 
After you have read it, please ask questions about anything that is not clear. 
 
The researchers will: 
 
• discuss the study with you 
• answer your questions 
• keep confidential any information which could identify you personally 
• be available during the study to deal with problems and answer questions 
 
 
1.    Introduction/Background: 
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Self-mutilation is often misunderstood and gaining a better understanding from multiple 
perspectives is important. As mental health professionals, psychiatrists’ experience in 
dealing with patients who self-mutilate provide important perspectives.  
 
 
2.    Purpose of study: 
 
The purpose of this study is to gain insight into how self-mutilation is described and 
understood. I am examining both expert and lay knowledge production by examining 
psychiatric texts, interviewing psychiatrists and by examining blogs where people talk 
about/ write about their own experiences with self-mutilation.  
 
 
3.    Description of the study procedures: 
 
Each participant will take part in a digitally recorded, face-to-face interview. Each 
participant will be asked a few demographic questions as well as open-ended questions 
including: age, sex, educational background, experiences in dealing with patients who 
have self-mutilated, and what they think self-mutilation is about. The purpose of open-
ended questions is to encourage a less structured, conversational style of interviewing.  
 
 
4.    Length of time: 
 
This interview will last approximately 1-2 hours. 
 
 
5.    Possible risks and discomforts: 
 
Potential risks and discomforts of participating in this study are minimal. 
 
 
6.    Benefits: 
 
It is not known whether this study will benefit you.  
 
 
7.    Liability statement: 
 
Signing this form gives us your consent to be in this study.  It tells us that you understand 
the information about the research study.  When you sign this form, you do not give up 
your legal rights.  Researchers or agencies involved in this research study still have their 
legal and professional responsibilities. 
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8.    What about my privacy and confidentiality?  
 
Protecting your privacy is an important part of this study. Every effort to protect your 
privacy will be made. However it cannot be guaranteed. For example we may be required 
by law to allow access to research records. 
 
 
 When you sign this consent form you give us permission to  
• Collect information from you 
• Share information with the people conducting the study 
• Share information with the people responsible for protecting your 
safety        
 
 
Access to records 
 
The members of the research team will see study records that identify you by name. 
Other people may need to look at the study records that identify you by name. This might 
include the research ethics board. You may ask to see the list of these people. They can 
look at your records only when supervised by a member of the research team.  
 
 
Use of your study information 
 
The research team will collect and use only the information they need for this research 
study.        
 
This information will include your:  
 
• Sex  
• Age 
• Educational Background 
• Information from study interviews and questionnaires 
 
 
Your name and contact information will be kept secure by the research team in 
Newfoundland and Labrador.  It will not be shared with others without your permission. 
Your name will not appear in any report or article published as a result of this study. 
 
Information collected for this study will be kept for five years. 
 
If you decide to withdraw from the study, the information collected up to that time will be 
destroyed. This information will only be used for the purposes of this study.  
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Information collected and used by the research team will be stored in the Division of 
Community Health and Humanities, faculty of medicine, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland. Both my supervisor, Dr. Natalie Beausoleil and I, Ashley Patten, as 
principle investigator, are responsible for keeping the collected data secure. 
 
Your access to records 
 
You may ask the researcher to see the information that has been collected about you.   
 
 
9.    Questions or problems: 
 
If you have any questions about taking part in this study, you can meet with the 
investigator who is in charge of the study at this institution.   
 
Principal Investigator- Ashley Patten - 709-763-2445 / apatten@mun.ca 
 
Or you can talk to someone who is not involved with the study at all, but can advise you 
on your rights as a participant in a research study.  This person can be reached through: 
 
Ethics Office 
Health Research Ethics Authority 
709-777-6974 or by email at info@hrea.ca 
 
 
After signing this consent form you will be given a copy. 
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Signature Page 
 
Study title:  
 
How is Self-mutilation Constructed? An Examination of Knowledge Production 
Surrounding the Body, Gender, and Risk. 
                                                                                                                                    
Name of principal investigator: Ashley L. Patten 
 
To be filled out and signed by the participant: 
 
Please check as appropriate: 
 
I have read the consent form.                        
Yes { }     No { } 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions/to discuss this study.             
Yes { }     No { } 
I have received satisfactory answers to all of my questions.          
Yes { }     No { } 
I have received enough information about the study.           
Yes { }     No { } 
I have spoken to the principal investigator and she has answered my questions       
Yes { }     No { } 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study 
Yes { }     No { } 
• at any time 
• without having to give a reason 
I understand that it is my choice to be in the study and that I may not benefit.   
Yes { }     No { } 
I understand how my privacy is protected and my records kept confidential.   
Yes { }     No { } 
I agree to be digitally recorded.                     
Yes { }     No { } 
 
I agree to take part in this study.           
Yes { }     No { } 
                                                    
__________________________ _____________________   _________ 
Signature of participant   Name printed     Year Month Day 
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To be signed by the investigator or person obtaining consent 
 
I have explained this study to the best of my ability. I invited questions and gave answers. 
I believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any 
potential risks of the study and that he or she has freely chosen to be in the study. 
 
                         
Signature of investigator  
 
Name printed   
 
Year Month Day 
 
Telephone number:    _________________________ 
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Appendix F – Interview script (Original) 
Interview Script 
 
 
1. Tell me about your educational background? What made you choose psychiatry? 
 
2. Tell me about your experience as a psychiatrist in dealing with patients who self-
mutilate? 
 
3. How does it make you feel when your hear a patient describe the act of self-
mutilation or see their scars? 
 
4. In your training, do you remember learning about self-mutilation? 
  
5. Tell me how would you describe self-mutilation? 
 
6. Is there a typical self-mutilation patient? 
 
7. Tell me, in your experience as a psychiatrist, what you think self-mutilation is 
about? 
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Appendix G – Interview script (Revised) 
Interview Script 
 
Pseudonym: 
Sex: 
 
 
1. Tell me about your educational background? What made you choose psychiatry as 
a specialty? (are you an adult or child/ adolescent psychiatrist) 
 
 
2. In your training, do you remember learning about self-mutilation? 
 
3. Is there a foundational or specific text that you often refer to or would cite as a 
useful psychiatric text? 
 
4. Tell me about your experience as a psychiatrist in dealing with patients who self-
mutilate? 
 
 
5. Is there a typical self-mutilation patient? (who presents with self-mutilation 
behaviors more often?) 
 
6. Would you say that self-mutilation often occurs along with a particular psychiatric 
diagnosis  
 
 
7. Tell me, in your experience as a psychiatrist, what you think self-mutilation is 
about? 
 
 
8. How does it make you feel when your hear a patient describe self-mutilating or 
see their scars? 
 
 
9. In your practice, would you say self-mutilation a major concern in psychiatry 
today? 
 
10. Are you seeing an increase in self-mutilation behaviors in the past 10-15 years? If 
so, why do you think that is? 
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Appendix H – DSM data 
Given that there are multiple editions of the DSM, the search results concerning 
self-mutilation references were extensive. I organized the results in tables for each edition 
and outlined:  
• The DSM edition / year published 
• The search term used 
• The search term results 
• Page numbers 
• Headings 
• Associated diagnosis/ disorder 
 
The search terms included the term “self-mutilation” but also included any related 
synonyms to ensure I was obtaining all references to self-injury or self-harm. I must also 
note that when search results were returned, sometimes terms were found on multiple 
pages but were associated with the same disorder. I began with a chart outlining the DSM 
editions spanning from 1952 to 2013. There were no references to self-mutilation or 
related terms in the DSM-I (1952) so I provided a breakdown of DSM editions II through 
IV in the tables. Brief observational notes are listed at the end of each table. 
 
The search results are as follows: 
Table H.1 DSM overview editions I through V 
DSM Edition Year Published Number of Pages Number of 
Disorders 
DSM-I 1952 132 pages 106 disorders 
DSM-II 1968 119 pages 182 disorders 
DSM-III 
DSM-III-R 
1980 
1987 
494 pages 
567 pages 
265 disorders 
292 disorders 
DSM-IV 
DSM-IV-TR 
1994 
2000 
886 pages 
943 pages 
297 disorders 
297 disorders 
DSM-5 2013 947 pages 297 disorders** 
** Complaints about the ever-increasing number of disorders led the chair of the DSM-5 task to announce 
that the number of disorders in the DSM-5 will not increase. However, as Rosenberg (2013) has pointed out 
that given the major re-structuring of the DSM-5 means that the addition of disorders can be hidden 
underneath or swallowed up by other disorders.  
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Table H.2 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-II (1968) 
 
Search Terms 
Results 
Found 
on (# of 
pages) 
Page # Diagnostic category Associated disorders 
“Self-inflicted 
injur*” 
1 page p. 117 Section XVII 
(Accidents, 
poisonings and 
violence) 
Suicide and Self-Inflicted 
Injury (E950-959) 
* are included in search terms to obtain all possible variations of the word.  
Notes:  First reference to self-inflicted injury. 
 
 
Table H.3 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-III (1980) 
 
Search Terms 
Results 
Found 
on (# of 
pages) 
Page # Diagnostic category Associated disorders 
“Self-mutilati*” 4 pages p. 91 Disorders Usually 
First Evident in 
Infancy, Childhood 
and Adolescence 
 
299.9x Childhood Onset 
Pervasive Development 
Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic 
criteria) 
p. 273 Under Psychosexual 
Disorders 
302.83 Sexual 
Masochism 
(Listed under course) 
p. 41 Disorders Usually 
First Evident in 
Infancy, Childhood 
and Adolescence 
319.0(x) Unspecified 
Mental Retardation 
(Listed under diagnostic 
criteria) 
p. 323 Personality 
Disorders 
301.83 Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic 
criteria) 
“self-inflicted 
injur*” 
1 page p. 191 Schizophrenic 
Disorders 
295.2x Catatonic Type 
(Listed under 
description) 
* are included in search terms to obtain all possible variations of the word.  
Notes: Introduction of the classification-based system; First reference to self-mutilation. 
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Table H.4 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-III-R (1987) 
 
Search Terms 
Results 
Found on 
(# of 
pages) 
Page # Diagnostic category Associated disorders 
“Self-
mutilati*” 
5 pages 
(excluding 
2 pages 
where it 
was listed 
in the 
index) 
p. 80 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.23 Tourette’s 
Disorder 
(Listed under 
complications) 
p. 271 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.14 Multiple 
Personality Disorder 
(Listed under 
complications) 
p. 286 Sexual Disorders 302.83 Sexual 
Masochism 
(Listed under 
description) 
p. 
346/347 
Personality 
Disorders 
301.83 Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
(Listed under 
description and 
diagnostic criteria) 
“self-inflicted 
injur*” 
2 pages p. 94 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.30 Stereotypy/ 
Habit Disorder 
(Listed under 
complications) 
p. 196 Schizophrenia 295.2x Catatonic Type 
(Listed under 
description) 
“self-injur*” 4 pages 
(excluding 
1 
reference 
found in 
index) 
p. 94/95 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.30 Stereotypy/ 
Habit Disorder 
(Listed under 
prevalence) 
p. 29 Developmental 
Disorders (Axis II) 
Associated Features 
p. 35 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder 
(Listed under features) 
* are included in search terms to obtain all possible variations of the word.  
Notes: First reference to self-injury. 
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Table H.5 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-IV (1994) 
 
Search Terms 
Results 
Found on 
(# of 
pages) 
Page # Diagnostic category Associated disorders 
“Self-mutilati*” 7 pages p. 120 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under 
differential diagnosis) 
p. 478 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.12 Dissociative 
Amnesia 
(Listed under diagnostic 
features) 
p. 485 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.14 Dissociative 
Identity Disorder 
(formerly multiple 
personality disorder) 
 
Listed under Associated 
features 
p. 650/ 
651 
Personality 
Disorders 
301.83 Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
(Listed Under 
diagnostic features) 
p. 654 Personality 
Disorders 
301.83 Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
(Listed Under 
diagnostic criteria) 
p. 728 Criteria Sets and 
Axes Provided for 
Further Study 
Dissociative Trance 
Disorder 
(Listed under associated 
features) 
“ self-inflicted 
injur*” 
6 pages p. 
118/119 
Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic 
features) 
p. 121 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic 
criteria) 
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p. 382 Mood disorders Catatonic Features 
Specifier 
(Listed under 
description) 
p. 288 Schizophrenia and 
Other Psychotic 
Disorders 
295.20 Catatonic Type 
(Listed under 
description) 
p. 485 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.14 Dissociative 
Identity Disorder 
(Listed under 
Associated physical 
examination findings 
and general medical 
conditions) 
“self-injur*” 7 pages 
(excluding 
3 
references 
in the 
index) 
p. 119 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under diagnostic 
features) 
p. 120 Same as above Same as above 
(Listed under specific 
age and gender features) 
p. 121 Same as above Same as above 
(Listed under diagnostic 
criteria and prevalence) 
p. 523 Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders 
302.70 Sexual 
Dysfunction not 
Otherwise Specified 
(Listed under 
Paraphilias under 
diagnostic features) 
p. 42 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
319 Mental Retardation, 
Severity Unspecified 
(Listed under associated 
features and disorders) 
p. 67/ 68 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
299.00 Autistic 
Disorder 
(Listed under associated 
features and disorders) 
“self-harm” 2 pages p. 288 Schizophrenia and 
Other Psychotic 
Disorders 
295.20 Catatonic Type 
(Listed under 
description) 
p. 382 Mood Disorders Catatonic Features 
Specifier 
* are included in search terms to obtain all possible variations of the word.  
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Notes: First reference to self-harm. 
 
 
Table H.6 References to self-mutilation (and related terms) in DSM-IV-TR (2000) 
 
Search Terms 
Results 
Found 
on (# of 
pages) 
Page # Diagnostic category Associated disorders 
“Self-
mutilati*” 
9 pages p. 133 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under 
differential diagnosis) 
p. 520 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.12 Dissociative 
Amnesia 
(Listed under 
diagnostic features) 
p. 521 Same as above Same as above 
(Listed under 
associated features and 
disorders) 
p. 527 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.14 Dissociative 
Identity Disorder 
(Listed under 
associated features and 
disorders) 
p. 572 Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders 
302.83 Sexual 
Masochism 
(Listed under 
description) 
p.706/ 707 Personality 
Disorders 
301.83 Borderline 
Personality Disorder 
(Listed under 
diagnostic features) 
p. 710 Same as Above Same as above 
(Listed under 
diagnostic criteria) 
p. 784 Criteria Sets and 
Axes Provided for 
Further Study 
Dissociative Trance 
Disorder 
(Listed under 
associated features) 
“self-inflicted 
injur*” 
6 pages p. 131/132 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under 
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Adolescence diagnostic features) 
p. 134 Same as above Same as above 
(Listed under 
diagnostic criteria) 
p. 315 Schizophrenia and 
Other Psychotic 
Disorders 
295.20 Catatonic Type 
(Listed under 
description) 
p. 418 Mood Disorders Catatonic features 
Specifier 
p. 527 Dissociative 
Disorders 
300.14 Dissociative 
Identity Disorder 
(Listed under 
Associated physical 
examination findings 
and general medical 
conditions) 
“self-injur*” 7 pages p.44 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
319 Mental 
Retardation, severity 
unspecified 
(Listed under 
associated features and 
disorders) 
p. 72 Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
299.00 Autistic 
Disorder 
(Listed under 
associated features and 
disorders) 
p. 131/ 
132/133/134 
Disorders Usually 
Evident in Infancy, 
Childhood and 
Adolescence 
307.3 Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder 
(Listed under 
diagnostic features, 
specifiers, associated 
features and disorders, 
prevalence, and 
differential diagnosis, 
and diagnostic criteria) 
p. 466 Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders 
302.70 Sexual 
Dysfunction Disorder 
Not Otherwise 
Specified 
(Listed under 
Paraphilias, diagnostic 
features) 
“self-harm” 2 pages p. 315 Schizophrenia and 295.20 Catatonic Type 
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Other Psychotic 
Disorders 
(Listed under 
description) 
p. 418 Mood Disorders Catatonic Features 
Specifier 
* are included in search terms to obtain all possible variations of the word.  
 
 
 
 
